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Schumpeter's study on economic growth and technological progress in the capitalist system 
as a process of creative destruction has influenced many studies on industry dynamics. In 
addition to Schumpeterianism, evolutionary economics and organizational ecology also 
attempted to grasp the sources of industrial dynamics. Although each perspective is slightly 
different, they all perceived competition in the market as a major source of industrial 
dynamics. In particular, Schumpeterianism emphasized Schumpeterian competition that 
firms are competing their competitive advantage originated from innovation as a main 
source of industry dynamics. In this perspective, this study attempted to analyze the 
creative destruction mechanism of Korean industry. In particular, we tried to describe the 
selection criteria exists in the Korean industry through empirical analysis of exit firms.  
iv 
 
First, we reviewed theoretical background and the empirical analysis on the survival of 
firms and derived stylized facts on firm survival. The stylized facts were classified into 
individual level, firm level, industry level, and macroeconomic level. At the individual 
level, it was possible to derive a stylized fact that the higher the level of education and 
experience of the organization members, the better the survival of the firm. At the firm 
level, the firm size, age, R&D investment, and exporting and were identified as significant 
determinants on the firm survival. At the industrial level, it was reported that the firm entry 
rate, industrial growth rate, which determine the degree of competition of the industry, and 
technology intensity as determinants on the survival of the firm. At the macroeconomic 
level, we were able to derive a stylized fact that firms' survival rate is procyclic to upturns 
and downturns of the economy.  
Second, survival analysis was implemented to describe the selection criteria of Korean 
industry through firm level micro data. The results showed that the stylized facts on the 
survival such a as firm size, age, and R&D investment is also found in Korean industry. In 
addition, we found the changes in the firm selection criteria as a result of restructuring of 
the financial sector and the industry sector in the process of overcoming the Asian financial 
crisis. More specifically, it was found that there was a change in firm financial management 
behavior before and overall incentive in terms of firm survival for the firm's investment 
activity was reduced after the Asian financial crisis. 
Third, we focused on the cleansing effect hypothesis in economic recessions. This study 
investigated two recessions in Korea, the Asian financial crisis and the global financial 
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crisis. We measured total factor productivity using micro level manufacturing plant data 
from 1993 to 2013 and decomposed the source of the changes in total factor productivity 
to measure the cleansing effect in two large recessions. During the Asian financial crisis, 
there was no evidence to support a cleansing effect hypothesis. In contrast, during the 
global financial crisis, we found the evidence of a cleansing effect. Additionally, we found 
differences in market selection criteria in the two recessions; by the global financial crisis, 
the market selection criteria had changed to enable a more conducive environment for the 
creative destruction process.  
Fourth, the problem of zombie companies was investigated from a different perspective. 
Previous studies have recognized zombie companies as a factor that hinders the creative 
destruction process and recognized that they should be exited through restructuring. 
However, this study focuses on the fact that the problem of zombie firm may be different 
according to the financial system of the country. Specifically, we analyzed the 
characteristics of recovering firms and exiting firms in the credit based financial system 
such as Korea. Based on the firm level micro data, it was found that the firms with high 
amount of accumulated knowledge showed higher probability of recovering to the normal 
firms. Also, it is confirmed that the financial sector was not able to identify and support 
selectively firms between recovering firms and exiting firms.  
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The market constantly demands new products and ideas, which provides firms with a 
range of opportunities and a field of competition. As a result, firms with innovative 
products grow, while those that are edged out of the competition are scaled down and 
ultimately exit the market. It is very difficult for a firm to continue to win and survive in 
the competition of the market. Foster & Kaplan’s (2003) book Creative Destruction showed 
how difficult it is for a firm to prevail for long. Of the Forbes top 100 firms for 1917, 61 
had disappeared by 1987, and only 18 of the 39 surviving firms remained on the list of the 
top 100 firms. In addition, the average survival time of firms listed on the S&P 500 
decreased from 61 years in 1958 to 25 years in 1980 and to 18 years in 2010. McKinsey 
data confirm the same result. The proportion of long-lived survivors, which was above 60% 
in 1962, declined to 10% in 1998. Foster and Kaplan (2003) argued that while the shortened 
survival time for this phenomenon is noticeable, the speed of shortening is also accelerating; 
in other words, the process of creative destruction is accelerating. This tendency can be 
confirmed in Korea. According to figures released in 2014 by Statistics Korea, the national 
statistical office, the one year survival rate of firms was 62.4%, the 3-year survival rate was 
38.8%, and the 5-year survival rate was 27.3%. Looking at the 5-year survival rate of firms 
by year, it can be found that the survival rate decreased by 30.9% in 2007, 29.0% in 2008, 
and 27.3% in 2009. As of 2012, the number of firms surveyed in Korea that had been in 




(over 20 years). These figures show how difficult it is for a firm to survive in the long term. 
Geroski (1995) described the survival of an enterprise as follows: “Entry is easy, but 
survival is not. Entrants have been doomed to fail, and when firms that have survived 5 to 
10 years after entry are close enough to compete with incumbent ones, it prevents firms 
from generating revenue.” In this sense, strategic decision making of a firm can be 
interpreted as an effort to survive. Efforts to strengthen market dominance, to increase sales, 
and to invest in employee education are all efforts to avoid exit.  
Exit is the biggest tragedy for all firms. However, at the industry or national level, firms 
are required to be eliminated. Firms with weaker competitiveness, which do not exit and 
continue to occupy resources, degrade the efficiency of society as a whole and decrease 
productivity. The resources and the markets generated by the exit of incumbent firms serve 
as a platform for other firms to grow. In this perspective, Schumpeter (1942) sought the 
creative power of economic growth and technological improvement in capitalism. By 
competing in the market, efficient enterprises grow and inefficient firms decline. The 
selection function of this market is the outcome and result of the creative destruction 
process. 
If economic growth and technological improvement arise through the process of 
creative destruction that Schumpeter has described, we need to look at the functioning of 
market selection as a premise and consequence. This study analyzed the exit and survival 
of firms as a result of Korea’s creative destruction process. We obtained the selection 




economic fluctuations, such as the economic crisis, and the process of creative destruction. 
Especially in the capitalist system, finance plays the role of supplying resources to 
enterprises. In this process, finance evaluates firms and selects firms in which to invest 
resources, based on the evaluation results. Firms that acquire resources can grow, but firms 
that for a long period of business have difficulty in securing resources will exit. In other 
words, finance can be interpreted as playing a role in selecting firms. This paper examines 
the role of finance in supporting the creative destruction process. 
This study is structured as follows. In Chapter 1, we examine industrial dynamics, 
evolutionary economics, and organizational ecological perspectives as the theoretical 
background for the survival and exit of firms, and review stylized facts on firm survival 
through the empirical literature. In Chapter 2, we use data of Korean firms to identify the 
stylized facts related to the survival of firms in the manufacturing sector, and identify the 
changes of selection criteria in the market before and after the Asian financial crisis. In 
Chapter 3, we calculate the total factor productivity (TFP) of the Korean manufacturing 
sector and analyze its changes with a productivity decomposition using business-level 
micro data. In this chapter, we focus on two financial crises, the Asian financial crisis in 
the 1990s and the global financial crisis in 2000, to examine the effects of these events on 
the exit of firms. In Chapter 4, we approach “zombie firms” from a perspective that differs 
from the viewpoints of previous studies that have examined firms that are not profitable for 
a long time and should exit. We analyze those zombie firms, which are considered as 









Chapter 1. Research Background 
 
Entry, growth, and exit of firms are considered important areas of research in industrial 
dynamics. In particular, the entry of new firms and the exit of incumbent ones have great 
significance in terms of the metabolism of the industry. Entry rate and exit rate of firms are 
recognized as indicators of the degree of metabolism of industry and are used as a tool to 
examine the industry dynamics. In Section 1, we examine the theoretical background 
underlying this perception. Also, we examine empirical studies on the determinants of firm 
survival; we then classify the determinants of firm survival as individual, firm, industrial, 
and macroeconomic and derive stylized facts on firm survival.  
 
1.1 Theoretical background on firm survival 
Research on the entry, growth, and exit of firms is one of the core themes of classical 
economics, with companies as the analytical units. In particular, the analysis has focused 
on the dynamics of business in terms of industrial organization, a field of microeconomics. 
In the field of industrial organization, research on the entry and exit of firms has been 
carried out, in reconciling the number of firms, production volumes, and prices in the 
market with major variables and shifting the system to an equilibrium state. More recently, 
Ackerberg et al. (2005) made an attempt to form a dynamic econometric model, based on 
the theory of industrial organization, that also has static characteristics. However, in 




presupposes homogeneity of corporations or is biased toward static analysis. This section 
summarizes the theoretical background on the exit and survival of firms from the viewpoint 
of Schumpeter's creative destruction process, evolutionary economics, and organizational 
ecology, which perspectives are relatively free from microeconomic premises. 
 
1.1.1 Firm survival from the Schumpeterian perspective 
Schumpeter (1942) recognized the creative destruction process as the most fundamental 
force under which the capitalist economy operates, that is, new products, or new producers 
replacing existing products, or incumbent producers. In addition, he criticized the dynamic 
analysis of classical economics, based on premises such as profit maximization and 
perfectly competitive assumptions, arguing that these cannot account for the dynamics of 
capitalism in the real world. Rather, he tried to explain the dynamics of capitalism through 
risk-taking entrepreneurs and their innovations.  
Schumpeter emphasized entrepreneurship as an important factor for the creative 
destruction process. Entrepreneurship is a spirit that is willing to accept uncertainty or risk 
and to challenge through new innovations. As innovation by entrepreneurial actors leads to 
continuous creative destruction, the economy and capitalism develop. Schumpeter also 
found the motivation in entrepreneurs to take a risk on the monopoly profits that arise when 
introducing new innovations. However, since the monopoly profits from the introduction 
of new innovations are temporary, entrepreneurs continue to strive for innovation. The 




competition in the market. In other words, in order for the creative destruction process to 
continue, the entrepreneur's innovation efforts are important, but the competitive 
environment of the market is needed as well as the role of the entrepreneur. As the process 
of creative destruction is repeated through competition, the efficiency of society can be 
enhanced. The path through which a competitive market structure contributes to the 
efficiency and productivity of resource allocation can be summarized in three ways. First, 
competition improves the incentive structure of firms. Second, competition promotes 
innovation activities of companies. Third, competition plays an important role in the 
growth of efficient enterprises and the deselection of inefficient companies. In particular, 
the selection process through competition plays an important role in increasing the 
productivity of the entire market by moving the resources of the exiting firms to more 
productive firms. 
From the perspective of industrial dynamics, studies on the process of creative 
destruction have taken the economic dynamics and technological progress dynamics of 
firms as the analytical framework of their research, which is captured by the entry and exit 
of firms or businesses. Studies by Nelson (1981), Aghion and Howitt (1992), and Ahn 
(2001) have shown that the economy grows on the basis of firms’ entry and exit, and this 
process is recognized as the creative destruction process described by Schumpeter (1934). 
The process of entry and exit from a Schumpeterian perspective occurs as follows. New 
innovative firms enter the market with new technologies and compete with incumbent ones. 




and if new technologies fail, firms will not survive and will exit. From the viewpoint of 
industrial dynamics, entrepreneurial entry, growth, and exit process are the main 
components of the dynamic competition process of companies, and this dynamic 
competition is perceived as a creative destruction process. In other words, when the entry 
and exit of companies is active, the high rate of substitution is the creative destruction 
process, and if the entry and exit rates remain low, the dynamics of the market will be 
degraded (Lee, 2015). Through this dynamic competition, capital and labor are redirected 
from ineffective firms that decline and exit and are redistributed to efficient, fast-growing 
firms. In this context, examining the degree of entry and exit of firms is a tool to see how 
creative destruction is active in a society. Through competition in the market, capital and 
labor are reallocated from inefficient firms that decline and exit to new entrants and to fast-
growing, efficient firms. 
 
1.1.2 Firm survival from an evolutionary perspective 
Evolutionary economics attempts to explain the evolution of economic phenomena 
based on universal Darwinism. Universal Darwinism collectively refers to the attempt to 
apply Darwinian evolution to a variety of other fields of biology, positing that there is a 
common ontological basis for evolutionary processes in all systems, such as the natural 
world. The foundation of universal Darwinism can be explained through three processes: 
variation, selection, and replication (Hodgson, 2002; Aldrich et al., 2008). Attempts to 




into evolutionary economics. Evolutionary economics explanations of economic 
phenomena are often made at a figurative level. Attempts have been made to explain firm 
routines in terms of biological genes, or to compare the survival and growth of firms with 
evolutionary concepts such as survival of the fittest and natural selection.  
However, these attempts have been criticized for not being able to take into account the 
intentions of the actors. The point of such criticism is that economic evolution cannot be 
interpreted in the framework of universal Darwinism, in which economic agents’ intentions 
and economic behavior are irrelevant. Penrose (1952) argues that the subject’s behavior in 
economics is not unconnected to their intentions, and that the Darwinian concept of 
evolution does not take into account the intentions of the actor; so, it is not appropriate to 
interpret economic phenomena from an evolutionary point of view. In addition, Foster 
(1997) argues that it is impossible to explain evolutionary phenomena economically, 
because cooperative behaviors of economic entities that can occur in the economic realm 
have a great differentiation from the survival competition in the biological realm.  
Criticism of this disregard of intent of agent is caused by the narrow understanding of 
Darwinism as a natural biological theory, and making an intellectual distinction between 
the evolution of nature and the evolution of the economy. Hodgson (2004) argued that the 
core of universal Darwinism is causality, not intentionality; if economic phenomena can be 
explained causally because the intention of the economic subject is also the product of 
evolution, then the existence of intent is not a problem. The evolutionary theory of Nelson 




the concept of firm routine and its variation. In their theory, a firm is considered to be a 
satisfactory actor, and an enterprise tries to maintain existing routines or find new routines 
based on its aspiration level. The process of finding a new routine is an intentional search 
activity to satisfy the entrepreneurial aspiration level, and as a result it can be changed to a 
new routine. In other words, in the economic realm, the existence of intention is not 
necessarily a problem.  
In the evolutionary model of Nelson and Winter (1982), the selection process of routines 
proceeds through the following process. There are different routines within an industry, and 
each firm gets different profits according to their routines. In the current market conditions, 
if a firm is earning enough profits in terms of its aspirations, a firm that sticks to its existing 
routines, but does not get enough profits, will try to explore new routines or imitate routines 
from other firms. Firms that fail to obtain appropriate routines in the search for new routines 
are exited from the industry. The routines of surviving firms are selected and become the 
dominant routines of the industry. As a result, the market reaches equilibrium among the 
routines of the firms that have survived the competition. In fact, however, firms in a 
equilibrium state start exploring new routines once again, or the routines of new entrants 
are introduced to the market.  
 
1.1.3 Firm survival from an organizational ecology 
perspective 




of various types of organizations and their motivations (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Later, 
Campbell (1998) refined the concept of organizational change and focused on ecological 
processes such as the birth, growth, decline, and death of the organization over a long 
period of time. Organizational ecology recognizes the survival of the organization as a 
success of the organization. Also, organizational ecology recognizes organizational change 
as a three-stage process of variation, selection, and retention, based on modified Darwinism. 
In the course of the activities of each organization (firm), there are variations in the 
organization. Among the various types of organizations, the type of organization suited to 
the niche of the environment is discriminated by the environment. Choice implies the 
survival of specific clusters or specific organizations through interaction between 
environment and organization, and the environment defines the strategic decisions that an 
organization must follow to survive. The niche provides the resources that must be secured 
to survive. Finite resources limit the number of organizations that a niche can sustain, 
resulting in the death of some organizations and the survival of some organizations in the 
community. The variation by environment and niche is called the selection mechanism. 
Based on these theoretical frameworks, researchers in organizational ecology sought 
causality for the processes of birth, growth, decline, and death within organizational 
communities. First, from this perspective, attempts have been made to explain causality 
through competition and legitimation in organizational communities. Competition is 
closely related to securing resources for the survival of an organization. At an early stage, 




legitimacy to organizational types. However, if the organization density exceeds the 
carrying capacity of the community, the effect of the environmental justification of the 
organization type is reduced and the resource competition for organization survival 
becomes more intense. On the other hand, the death of the organization has a negative 
correlation with the entry of the organization. In other words, until the acceptable capacity 
is exceeded, the exit rate of organizations decreases, while the exit rate of organizations 
increases as their number starts to exceed the proper capacity. 
Second, researchers focused on organizational age as an important factor influencing 
the exit of the organization, and emphasized the existence of a “liability of newness” in that 
new organizations are more likely to exit than older ones. As a result of the burden of 
newness, the new organization generally recognizes its legitimacy issues and lack of 
coordination ability, when compared with incumbent organizations. Another factor creating 
liability of newness is that incumbent organizations have higher structural inertia. 
Structural inertia is perceived as a by-product of environmental choice, in that 
organizations chosen by the environment are able to acquire specific skills appropriate for 
the organization and that this is preserved as an inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). 
 
1.2  Empirical background on firm survival  
Firms face continuous competition from incumbent firms as well as from new entrants. 
The exit of firms that have lost their market position as a result of this competition is 




From the 1990s, attempts have been steadily conducted to analyze the determinants of 
corporate survival, and various factors, both internal and external, have been analyzed. This 
section reviewed empirical studies on firm survival determinants according to their 
analytical level, including individual, firm, industrial, and macroeconomic levels. Also, 
based on the review, some stylized facts on firm survival have been derived.  
 
1.2.1 Firm survival determinants: Individual level 
Individuals are the smallest units that make up a firm. It is possible to assess the 
competence of a firm by means of the competence level of the organization’s members, 
although there is a limit in recognizing the sum of the capacities of its individual members 
as the capacity of the organization. It is reasonable to assume that an organization with high 
levels of individual competence has a higher level of organizational competence than a 
non-competent organization. In this regard, Boden and Nucci (2000) emphasized the 
importance of intangible resources, such as human resources, for the survival of new firms. 
Existing analyses at the individual level have focused mainly on the degree of education 
and the level of prior experience of organization members. This is a resource-based 
perspective, since the degree of education and level of experience can be seen as intangible 
assets. Peña (2002) conducted a survey of Spanish companies and found that education 
levels and experience prior to startups contributed positively to firm survival and growth. 
Coleman et al. (2013) performed a survival analysis on 4,152 US companies and found that 




positively to corporate survival. The results of the pre-startup experience have a positive 
impact on the survival of the firm, as can be seen in van Praag’s (2003) study. In the case 
of young startups in the United States, this analysis found that experience in the same 
industry before startup had a positive impact on survival after startup. Brüderl et al. (1992) 
confirmed that past experience contributes positively to survival as a result of an empirical 
analysis of German businesses, and concluded that past experiences contributed to the 
productivity improvement of firms. In a recent study, Kato and Honjo (2015) analyzed 
Japanese firms and found that positive effects of entrepreneurial education level on firm 
survival were found in high-tech sectors. 
However, some empirical studies have reported that experience and knowledge 
embedded in entrepreneurs is not related to survival of firms after startup. Bates (1995) 
analyzed the educational attainment level into four categories: “under high school,” “high 
school graduation,” “university graduate,” “graduate school and above.” In other words, 
educational level does not necessarily contribute to survival as a linear form; rather, it 
contributes according to an inverted U-shape. Gimeno et al. (1997) reported that the 
experience of founders differed in their effect on firm survival. The managerial experience 
of an entrepreneur has no significant effect on the survival of a firm, whereas supervisory 
experience has a positive contribution to the survival of a firm. These authors argued that 
the growth and survival patterns of firms are different according to their business or 
environment. In other words, it is necessary to consider the determinants of survival at the 






1.2.2 Firm survival determinants: Firm level 
1.2.2.1 Firm size and age 
The size and age of a firm has been recognized as an important factor in the process of 
entry, growth, and exit of industrial dynamics (Dunne, 1994; Hopenhayn, 1992). In 
particular, the size of a firm is considered to be one of the major factors influencing its 
survival, and various studies have analyzed this relationship (Geroski, 1995; Agarwal & 
Audretsch, 2001). The research of Jovanovic (1982) can be considered as a theoretical 
foundation in considering that the size of a firm contributes positively to survival. 
Jovanovic argued that new entrants did not know their cost structure before entering, but 
learned about their cost structure while doing production after entry. After entry, firms 
decide whether to increase the size of their firm as they become aware of their cost structure. 
In other words, if a firm gets to know the cost structure after entry and the profit is bigger 
than expected before entry, the firm will increase its size. On the other hand, if the profit is 
smaller than expected, the firm will reduce production. In addition, exit of firms can be 
recognized as the extreme reduction of production near zero. Therefore, the size of the firm 
at the time of entry can act as a buffer in learning the cost structure after entry, so that larger 
firms can have a better chance of survival. This argue has been proven by a number of 
empirical studies. Mata and Portugal (1994) found that firms of larger size at entry time 




the higher the survival probability. Esteve-Pérez et al. (2004) analyzed Spanish firms and 
found that small firms are highly likely to exit. In addition, several studies have reported 
that the larger the firm size and the size of entry, the better the chances of survival (Tveterås 
& Eide, 2000; Esteve-Pérez et al., 2004). This phenomenon can be interpreted as the 
“liability of smallness,” which is addressed in organization ecology (Hannan, 2005). From 
the above discussion, we can derive a stylized fact about the relationship between firm size 
and survival. 
 
Stylized fact 1: Firm size positively contributes to firm survival (existence of liability 
of smallness).  
 
Similar to the “liability of smallness,” Freeman et al. (1983) argue for the existence of 
a “liability of newness.” “Liability of newness” implies that the shorter a firm’s age is, the 
more disadvantageous it is to survival or growth. This means that experienced firms are 
more likely to survive than less experienced ones. The rationale of “liability of newness” 
can be found in many studies, suggesting that organizational experience generates positive 
effects. The most typical example is the study of learning curves. The learning curve is a 
concept that Wright (1936) identified and introduced through the fact that the direct labor 
per capita was reduced by the cumulative production of airplanes in the American plane 
industry. It can be seen from Henderson (1984) that experiential knowledge acquired by 
production using a more refined learning curve contributes significantly to lowering costs. 




production costs. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argued that the learning process is 
cumulative within the organization. In the process of expanding existing knowledge, a firm 
with a large amount of accumulated knowledge in the organization is at an advantage to a 
small firm. Accumulated experience in the firm provides an advantage in the process of 
finding a more suitable routine for a firm (Richard & Sidney, 1982). Cressy (2006), 
investigating the existence of liability of newness, has shown through model studies that 
low performance in firms may be detrimental to survival. In addition, Thompson (2005) 
conducted a survival analysis of US shipbuilding companies and found that the longer the 
firm has been in business, the more profitable it needs to be to survive. Honjo (2000), 
Agarwal and Gort (2002), and Esteve-Pérez et al. (2004) also found startup companies 
disadvantaged in terms of survival. Some studies have reported that firm performance 
contributes to survival, presenting an inverted U-shape (Strotmann, 2007; Esteve-Pérez et 
al., 2008). Esteve-Pérez and Mañez-Castillejo (2008) reported that until the firm age 
reaches 20 years, the probability of exiting increases; it then decreases until 35 years, and 
increases again thereafter. Some studies have reported that the effect of firm age might be 
different depending on the industry and/or firm specific characteristics. Audretsch and 
Mahmood (1994) found that firms' size and survival are not related when the sample firms 
are new branches of existing firms. Based on UK firm level data, Disney et al. (2003) found 
that the positive contribution of firm age on firm survival only applies if the firm is a single 
plant firm. However, since the relationship between firm age and survival in the form of an 




relationship between business performance and survival from the above discussion. 
 
Stylized fact 2: Firm age positively contributes to firm survival (existence of liability 
of newness). 
 
1.2.2.2 R&D and innovation activity 
Schumpeter (1950) stressed the importance of innovation activities in the survival of 
firms. “Innovation does not contribute to the profit and production of the enterprise, but it 
affects the foundation and longevity of the enterprise.” The importance of innovation is 
also found in recent research. Baumol (2002) argued that “Innovation activities are 
mandatory in the capitalist system and are the factors that determine the life and death of 
companies.” Since the introduction of R&D activities as a major factor in the development 
of industry dynamics, many studies have analyzed the relationship between R&D 
investment, firm growth, and survival. In the resource-based view, it is perceived that the 
intangible resources obtained from R&D investment have a major influence on firm 
survival (Barney, 1991). From this perspective, it can be considered that more resources 
are accumulated in the enterprise due to R&D investment, and further, this process 
contributes positively to the survival of the enterprise. Kimura and Fujii (2003) analyzed 
the survival pattern of manufacturing and service industries in Japan and confirmed that 
firms that invest in R&D have a higher survival probability than those that do not. Esteve-
Pérez et al. (2004) also confirmed that R&D investment positively influences firm survival, 




121 companies in the LAN switch industry and found that R&D investment contributes 
positively to the survival of the firm. Also, he found that the closer the firm’s technology 
is to the technological frontier, the more likely it is to survive. On the other hand, there are 
also empirical results that the effect of R&D investment on survival varies. Esteve-Pérez 
and Mañez-Castillejo (2008) analyzed the relationship between R&D investment and firm 
survival in Spanish firms and found that the firms that bought R&D from out of the firm 
were disadvantaged to firms that conducted their own R&D to survive. Coleman et al. 
(2013) reported that R&D activities did not have a significant effect on firm survival.  
It is necessary to consider the characteristics of R&D investment of a firm to distinguish 
between R&D investment and innovation activity. In other words, even if the same R&D 
investment is made, it may have a different effect on the survival of a firm depending on 
whether it is invested in product innovation or process innovation. Abernathy and 
Utterback (1994) argued that after the advent of a dominant design, the number of new 
entry declines and that existing firms focus on process innovation to lower the cost of 
existing products rather than create new ones. According to the dominant design theory, 
firms are expected to see little new entry at the stage where they focus on process 
innovation, and competition among existing companies will become intense. Cefis and 
Marsili (2005) in their survival analysis of Dutch firms found that firms that innovate are 
more likely to survive, and that the innovation premium, which is more likely to survive 
than the product innovation, is more likely to survive. The study of Cefis & Marsili (2012) 




survival for the firm, and that it is advantageous to survive, especially by promoting product 
innovation and process innovation together. Børing (2015) also found that firms who invest 
on product innovation tend to acquired and merged by other firm rather than exit due to 
registration cancellation. There are also studies that distinguish innovation activities from 
firms with radical innovation and incremental innovation. Banbury & Mitchell (1995) 
argued that incumbent firms are likely to increase their market share when they continue to 
perform incremental product innovation activities, thereby contributing to a higher 
probability of survival. As a result of the analysis, radical innovation investment is 
financially valuable because it is an investment with high uncertainty, and as a result, it has 
a disadvantageous effect on survival. On the other hand, incremental innovation has been 
found to contribute positively to firm survival (see also Buddelmeyer et al. (2010)). In 
addition, Sinha and Noble (2008) analyzed UK firms and found that adoption of new 
manufacturing technologies increases the probability of survival of the firm and adoption 
when the newness of the technology is high. Helmers & Rogers (2010) analyzed the 
relationship between patent application, trademark registration, and firm survival as a 
means of protecting innovation. Both patent applications and trademark registrations have 
contributed to increasing the survival probability of companies. According to the literature 
reviewed, it is possible to derive the following stylized fact on the relationship between 
innovation and firm survival. 
 




(existence of innovation premium). 
 
1.2.2.3 Firm ownership and legal structure 
Firm ownership and legal structure have been recognized as major factors influencing 
firm survival in many empirical studies. The following is a summary of previous studies 
related to ownership structure and legal structure. First, there is a difference in the survival 
of de alio firms, which are seen as the expansion of existing businesses, and completely 
new de novo firms. De alio firms are less likely to have an initial risk of entry after entry, 
because they have the resources to mobilize compared with de novo firms, as they can 
utilize the resources of the parent firm (Levinthal, 1991). Also, business experience is 
different between de novo and de alio firms in that de alio firms are more likely to survive 
than de novo firms (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002). Audretsch and Mahmood (1995), Mata et 
al. (1995), and Portugal and Guimaraes (1995) have shown that de novo firms are less likely 
to survive than de alio firms in empirical analysis using firm level data in the United States 
and Portugal. Harhoff et al. (1998) for German firms and Kimura and Fujii (2003) for 
Japanese firms also found that de alio companies are more advantaged than de novo firms. 
However, there are also contradictory findings. Bates (1995) found that firms entering as a 
franchise are less likely to survive than independent firms. In addition, Tveterås and Eide 
(2000) reported no difference in survival rates between single-plant and multi-plant firms. 
However, it is hard to see franchises as de alio firm, since franchisee firms can get support 




plant firms with de alio and de novo firms, respectively, since the distinction between de 
alio and de novo firms is based on differences in resources and experience at the time of 
entry. From the above discussion, a stylized fact is obtained on the effect of de alio or de 
novo firms for firm survival. 
 
Stylized fact 4: De novo firms are disadvantaged in terms of survival compared with 
de alio firms.  
 
Second, the probability of firm survival depends on foreign equity participation. 
However, the effect of participation of foreign capital on firm survival is not established. 
The positive effect on the survival of a firm is attributed to the fact that it can be expected 
that the potential performance will be better than the immediate result of the firm (Esteve-
Pérez & Mañez-Castillejo, 2008). On the other hand, the argument that participation of 
foreign capital has a negative effect on firm survival is based on a study by Hymer (1976), 
that multinational firms may be less successful in terms of coordination. That is, due to the 
characteristics of the various capital players participating in the firm and the characteristics 
of the market, such as multinational factors, the adjustment cost may be high and the 
performance may be lower than that of the single national firm. The effect of foreign capital 
participation on the survival of firms shows different effects in empirical studies. For 
example, Mata and Portugal (2002) and Kimura and Fujii (2003) found that there was no 
difference between foreign or domestic capital investment on domestic companies’ survival 




Görg and Strobl (2003) found that multinational firms have a higher probability of survival 
in high-tech areas and a lower probability of survival in low-tech areas. The reason for the 
latter phenomenon is that this situation is more advantageous for domestic firms, because 
competition is made through price rather than technology capacity in low-tech areas. 
Bernard and Jensen (2007) found that multinational firms have a higher probability of 
survival than US firms in the United States. It is difficult to accept this as a stylized fact, 
since the effect of foreign investment on firm survival differs among previous studies. 
 
1.2.2.4 Financial status 
The deterioration of a firm’s financial status is perceived as a leading precursor before 
a default occurs. In this context, attempts have been made to analyze the relationship 
between the occurrence of default and various financial indicators such as leverage, debt 
cost, debt structure, etc. (Altman & Saunders, 1997; Crouhy et al., 2000). The “distance to 
default” approach is a well-known model of the relationship between financial indicators 
and defaults that suggests how important financial status is to the growth and survival of 
the firm (Merton, 1974). Also, Beck et al. (2005) argue that the financial status of a firm is 
an important factor in introducing new capital from outside the firm. In other words, a 
sound financial status is essential for the firm to grow, and a consistent interpretation is 
made that financially sound firms are favored for survival. Empirical studies also report 
that the firm’s financial health is directly linked to firm survival. Bottazzi et al. (2011) 




financial condition. Cooper et al. (1994) analyzed the impact of human resources and 
financial resources on firm survival in US entrarants. The result showed that firms with 
large capital at the time of entry are more likely to survive than small firms. This result is 
interpreted as favoring a large scale at the time of entry, because it facilitates the 
procurement of external resources after entry and is advantageous for firm operation. Bates 
(2005) investigated US SMEs and also found that firms with large capital at entry were 
more likely to survive (see also Liao et al. (2008) and Parker & Belghitar (2006)). Liu and 
Li (2015) found that firms under financial constraint are more likely to exit from an analysis 
of Chinese firm level data. In summary, the following stylized fact on firm’s financial status 
and firm survival can be derived. 
 
Stylized fact 5: A financially health firm is more likely to survive. 
 
1.2.2.5 Strategic decisions: Entry timing, Advertising, and Export activity  
Debates on the time of entry are discussed in terms of the first mover advantage and the 
late mover advantage. Firms that enter the industry early during the period when the 
industry is being formed have a disadvantage, because they have to operate under greater 
market uncertainty and technological uncertainty compared with the late entrants; however, 
there is also a monopolistic profit advantage. On the other hand, the perspective of the late 
mover advantage over the early entry firm—that it is advantageous to enter after resolving 
some degree of market and technical uncertainty—is also persuasive. However, empirical 




advantage exists in terms of firm survival. Robinson and Min (2002) compared the survival 
rates of 167 early-entry firms and 267 late-entry firms in the United States, confirming that 
the monopolistic profits after the early entry exceeded the burden as early entry firms. 
Agarwal and Bayus (2004) found that early-entry firms showed a higher survival rate than 
late entrants in an analysis of US firm level data. Their interpretation was that early entry 
firms have advantages in securing tangible and intangible assets that can act as an entry 
barrier to late entry firms, such as the establishment of industry standards and the 
development of distribution channels. 
Some studies found that investment in firm advertising also has a significant impact on 
firm survival. Segarra and Callejón (2002) conducted a survival analysis of Spanish firms 
from 1994 to 1998, and found that the firms that invest in advertising are more likely to 
survive than those that do not. Esteve-Pérez and Mañez-Castillejo (2008) looked at a firm’s 
advertising investment from a resource-based view. They argued that firm investment in 
advertising builds a firm specific asset and contributes to firm survival. 
There are also studies that have focused on the relationship between firm export activity 
and survival. Melitz (2003), Bernard et al. (2003), and Bernard and Jensen (2007) argued 
that it is theoretically advantageous for firms to export to survive. Firms that are limited to 
their domestic markets will suffer a slowdown in growth if the market becomes saturated. 
In addition, exporting firms can expect that the value of products and services in the global 
market can be interpreted as having a competitiveness in global market and that their 




Esteve-Pérez and Mañez-Castillejo (2008), Kimura et al. (2004), and Fujii (2003) found 
that firms that generate sales through exports have a higher survival rate than those that 
focus on domestic markets. In summing up the above discussion, we can synthesize the 
following stylized facts. 
 
Stylized fact 6: Early entrants are more advantaged than late entrants in terms of 
survival (existence of first mover advantage).  
Stylized fact 7: Firm advertising investment has a positive impact on firm survival. 
Stylized fact 8: Firms that export are more likely to survive than firms that focus on 
the domestic market. 
 
1.2.3 Firm survival determinants: Industry level 
Factors influencing firm survival at the industry level are industry characteristics, such 
as technological intensity, industrial cycle, and industrial entry rate. In this section, the 
factors influencing firm survival at the industry level are identified and classified as the 
static and dynamic characteristics of the industry. 
 
1.2.3.1 Static characteristics of industry 
Firm R&D investment and innovation activities have been treated as important 
variables in the analysis of survival factors at firm level. Similarly, there is an approach to 
find a difference in firm survival between industries where technology is intense and those 




technology-intensive characteristics and firm survival is a study by Audretsch (1995). 
Audretsch reported that there is a systematic difference between industries where 
technological intensity is low and where it is high; specifically, the survival rate of firms is 
low in more technology-intensive industries. Agarwal and Audretsch (2001) and Agarwal 
and Gort (2002) reported that the same result was observed in highly technology-intensive 
industries, because the technology capacity at the time of entry is exhausted faster than 
with less technology-intense industries. 
Second, the static nature of the industry derives from the view that there is a difference 
in the firm survival rate depending on the magnitude of the effect of economies of scale. 
Economies of scale is one of the basic concepts for analyzing industry in classical 
economics, and many studies have examined economies of scale through obtaining the size 
of the minimum efficient scale. The minimum efficiency scale is used as a measure to 
analyze the structure of the market in industrial organization theory. In an industry with a 
large minimum efficiency scale, the number of firms capable of producing a product 
exceeding the minimum efficiency scale is not large and natural monopoly is highly likely 
to result. On the other hand, in industries with a small minimum efficient scale, the effects 
of economies of scale are not so great and the probability of natural monopoly is low. In 
general, entrant firms present with a smaller size than the existing ones. In this case, in an 
industry with a small minimum efficient scale, entrants can easily reach a competitive level 
of production to challenge the incumbents. However, in an industry with a large minimum 




incumbent, because the size of the incumbent firm is dominated by the natural monopolistic 
production. Empirical analyses also support this tendency. Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) 
and Tveterås and Eide (2000) analyzed US firms and Strotmann (2007) analyzed German 
firms and found that firms have a higher survival rate in industries with small minimum 
efficient scale. However, some studies reported different results in that a small minimum 
efficient scale does not guarantee a high survival rate for firms. For example, Audretsch 
and Mahmood (1991) reported that the relationship between minimum efficient scale and 
firm survival is not significant for branch firms. Audretsch and Mahmood (1994) found 
that there is no significant relationship between these factors in high-tech industries. 
However, since these studies are based on the characteristics of the firm and the 
characteristics of the industry, respectively, they can be considered as an exception to the 
relationship between the size of the minimum efficient scale and firm survival. In this 
context, two stylized facts on firm survival about static characteristics of the industry can 
be derived.  
 
Stylized fact 9:  Firms in high-tech industry have a lower survival rate than firms in 
low-tech industry. 
Stylized fact 10: Firms survival rate is low in industries with large economies of scale.  
 
1.2.3.2 Dynamic characteristics of industry 
There are particular analytic frameworks related to industry and the business cycle in 




industry versus declining/mature industry, entrepreneurial regime versus routinized regime, 
and high entry industry versus low entry industry. Some studies show that the effects of 
industry dynamics on firm survival may vary. Entry rates vary greatly depending on the 
industrial cycle. In general, the entry rate is high in the period when the industry is emerging 
or growing, and low when the industry is declining. Abernathy and Utterback (1994) is a 
representative study of the change in entry rate according to these cycles. The study shows 
how the entry rate of the industry and the direction of innovation change with the 
emergence of dominant design products. In this sense, Geroski (1995) argued that higher 
entry rates in the industry will naturally affect the survival of the enterprise, because of 
higher competition in the market; higher industrial entry rates will lead to turbulence in the 
market. Mata and Portugal (2002) also found that a high entry rate in an industry has the 
effect of lowering the survival rate of firms. A high entry rate means that the entry barrier 
is low. Headd (2003) implemented an empirical analysis by classifying firms in the US into 
manufacturing, retail, and service industries. He found that firms in retail and service 
industries showed a higher mortality rate than firms in manufacturing industry, since retail 
and service industries have lower entry barriers than manufacturing industry, he concluded. 
Bates (2005) and Ejermo and Xiao (2014) also reported that the exit rate was high in 
industries with low entry barriers. On the other hand, Segarra and Callejón (2002) reported 
the existence of opposite effects from their results of an analysis of Spanish companies: a 
high industrial entry rate contributed to higher survival rates.  




and routinized regimes. According to Winter (1984), the early stage of the industry life 
cycle, that is the process of forming the industry or entrepreneurial regime, shows high 
entry rates and exit rates. However, as the entrepreneurial regime changes into a routinized 
regime over time, the entry and exit rates decline. Agarwal et al. (2002) followed this 
classification and found that competition is severe in entrepreneurial regimes, while 
competition in the routine-regulated regimes is relatively weak (see also Agarwal & 
Audretsch (2001) and Agarwal et al. (2002)).  
There are also studies that analyze the relationship between industrial growth and firm 
survival among the dynamic characteristics of industry. These studies point to the fact that 
during the growth of an industry, a firm can experience a positive impact on survival, 
because of the expanding size of the market in which it can generate sales. A growing 
industry, even if the entry rate is high, can be expected to have a positive impact on survival, 
because firms can occupy a larger market. Mata and Portugal (1994) found that firms in a 
growing industry were more likely to survive than those in a declining industry. Bellone et 
al. (2008) analyzed the results for French companies and found that the larger the market 
growth rate, the lower the probability of exit. Kaniovski and Peneder (2008) analyzed 
Austrian firms and found that the larger the growth rate of the industry, the more favorable 
were the chances of survival of the firm (see also Segarra & Callejón (2002)). It is possible 
to derive a stylized fact about the relationship between the dynamic characteristics of firms 





Stylized fact 11:  Survival rate of firms is low when the industry entry rate is high.  
Stylized fact 12: Survival rate of firms is high when the industry is growing. 
 
1.2.4 Firm survival determinants: Macro level  
At the macroeconomic level, empirical analysis is conducted mainly by using macro 
variables such as the unemployment rate and inflation rate. Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) 
analyzed the relationship between unemployment and firm survival and found that as 
unemployment increases, firm survival decreases. Everett and Watson (1998) found that 
increasing interest rates and increasing unemployment both negatively impacted the 
survival of firms in Australia. Box (2008) measured the effects of the macroeconomic 
environment in which the economy grew, using GDP growth as a variable. The analysis of 
Swedish firms showed that as the GDP growth rate increased, the survival rate of firms also 
increased. Fotopoulos and Louri (2000) found that firms entering during the recession 
period had a lower survival rate than those that did not. From the above discussion, the 
following stylized fact about the relationship between macroeconomic level and firm 
survival can be derived.  
 
Stylized fact 13:  Survival rate of firms is low in the economic downturn. 
 
The factors that affect the survival of firms are categorized into individual level, firm 
level, industry level, and macro level. As many empirical studies along these lines have 




empirical studies are summarized in Table 1 below. In addition, the literature reviewed in 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Chapter 1, we examined the theoretical background of firm survival and exit and 
reviewed the empirical studies on determinants of firm survival. In terms of the survival of 
firms, the emphasis on market competition is common, from the perspectives of 
Schumpeterian capitalism, evolutionary economics, and organizational ecology. 
Schumpeterian research has shown that even if an entrepreneur secures monopoly profits 
through innovation, the equilibrium of the market is broken by competitors, and the efforts 
to secure monopoly profits lead to innovation efforts of the firm. Evolutionary economics 
views the firm as an organic system that explores, imitates, and evolves new routines in 
order to achieve the desired level of profit. Organizational ecology aims to secure the 
necessary resources for growth and survival through competition within organizational 
communities, and those firms that have failed to secure the necessary resources 
consequently exit from the market. In relation to the survival of companies, 
Schumpeterians have regarded the market as a Schumpeterian competition environment 
and found that firms’ survival and growth differed according to their innovation capabilities. 
In evolutionary economics, universal Darwinism suggests that a firm with the most suitable 
routines in the market environment will survive, and the routines of surviving firms will 
become the dominant routines of the industry. Finally, as in the case of evolutionary 
economics, organizational ecology recognizes that market selection is similar to natural 
selection in nature.  




are reviewed. The determinants of firm survival are classified into the individual, firm, 
industry, and macroeconomic levels, and stylized facts about the survival of firms are 
derived from a number of previous studies. At the individual level, it was found that 
intangible resources, such as level of education and experience, contributed positively to 
the survival of the company from the resource-based perspective. At the firm level, it was 
confirmed that size, age, innovation efforts, and export activities contributed to increase 
the firm survival rate. At the industry level, firm entry rate, economies of scale, and 
technology intensity were found to be factors affecting company survival. Identifying the 
determinants of survival of the firm is significant as a way to reveal what strategic decisions 
are needed to grow and survive in the competition. Also, from the policymakers’ point of 
view, research on the determinants of survival is worthwhile as a tool to identify the 
selection criteria in the market and to observe how these criteria change over time, in order 
to create a better environment for business.  
In Chapter 2, based on microeconomic data from Korea, we describe the selection 
criteria in Korean industry by examining some of the stylized facts derived in Chapter 1. 
Also, we examine how institutional change has affected firm behavior and market selection 
criteria by comparing the situations between before and after the Asian financial crisis in 







Chapter 2. Evolution of Firm Selection 
Criteria in the Korean Manufacturing Sector 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the 1970s, it is hard to see that Korea’s economic growth has been achieved 
through the dynamic process of creative destruction from the perspective of industrial 
dynamics, rather than through the economic growth of incumbent firms. In the 1980s, the 
government enacted the Industrial Development Act and tried to maintain the efficiency of 
the economy as a whole through the rationalization process of excess investment during 
the high growth period. At the firm level, intra-firm resource reallocation occurred from 
mature industries to emerging industries for sustainable growth. However, in the 1990s, 
after the high growth period, the problem of the disposal of low-performing firms and 
insolvency issues emerged. In particular, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 revealed the 
absence of a mechanism of exit for insolvent firms in Korean industry. As Stiglitz and 
Greenwald (2014) stressed, the absence of an appropriate exit mechanism caused a 
restructuring process to be carried out, regardless of the competitiveness of the company. 
During the crisis period, many competitive firms were bankrupted not because of their low 
competitiveness, but because of their vulnerable financial status. 
While the massive and unsystematic exit of firms during the economic crisis period can 




During the Lost Decade of Japan in the 1990s, productivity growth slowed down 
considerably. Hoshi (2006) and Caballero et al. (2008) pointed out that the cause of the 
stagnation of productivity was caused by the increase of “zombie” firms in Japan; in other 
words, firms that deserved to be exited were not exited and occupied resources. This was a 
problem because resources were not reallocated to other firms or new entrants and 
consequently productivity growth stagnated. In Korea, the problem of zombie firms is 
getting serious as well. According to the Bank of Korea (2016), 15% of Korean listed 
companies are zombie firms, and 11% of them are chronic zombie firms, which are 
identified as zombie firms for more than five years in a row. The issue with zombie firms 
is not just that zombie firms themselves have low productivity, but they also pose a serious 
problem in terms of impeding the appropriate reallocation of resources throughout the 
economy (Caballero et al., 2008). 
From this point of view, this study analyzed the survival determinants of Korean firms. 
In particular, large-scale restructuring of the financial and industry sector proceeded while 
overcoming the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, and there were economic and 
institutional changes that could affect the industrial environment, such as the revision of 
the Bankruptcy Law. The purpose of this study is to identify firm survival determinants and 
their changes before and after the Asian financial crisis. Analyzing firm survival 
determinants provides a description of the market selection criteria, and from these, we can 
see the dominant routines existing in Korean industry. It is also worthwhile to observe 




industry has had. In addition, by identifying the characteristics of surviving firms, it can be 
ascertained which factors are causing the creative destruction process in Korean industry. 
Chapter 2 follows the following configuration. In Section 2.2, we review the empirical 
studies on firm survival determinants that have focused on Korean industry. Section 2.3 
investigates the legal and institutional changes in the financial sector during the Asian 
financial crisis. Section 2.4 reviews the survival analysis methodology implemented in the 
study. Section 2.5 describes the data and variables used in the study. In Section 2.6, we 
analyze the survival determinants of Korean industry and compare the change in selection 
criteria before and after the Asian financial crisis.  
 
2.2 Literature review  
Since the 1990s, survival analysis methodology has been applied to firm level micro 
data and there have been attempts to examine the determinants of survival of Korean 
companies. Section 2.2 reviews the empirical studies on the survival determinants of 
Korean firms.  
The first attempt to analyze the survival determinant of Korean firms is the study of Lee 
(1998). In this paper, he analyzed 252 small and medium sized Korean firms in the 
electronics industry listed in the Korean Business Review of 1992. The Cox proportional 
hazards (PH) model was used as the analytical model. The model included variables such 
as productivity, profitability, capital structure, liquidity, and activity as the factors affecting 




decreased the risk of exit, while those with higher fixed long-term adequacy ratios had an 
increased risk of exit. Also, the study argued that labor productivity should be increased for 
the survival of enterprises. However, Lee (1998) indicated that the analysis was 
implemented with no exact theoretical basis for identifying the survival factors of the firm,  
Lee (2002) then analyzed the determinants affecting the growth and survival of 3,395 
Korean firms from 1991 to 2000. Those firms were externally audited registered firms and 
belonged to the manufacturing sector. The size, age, market share, export status, and R&D 
investment of the firms were set as the main explanatory variables and the Heckmen two-
stage estimation was performed, based on a probit model. He found that the size and the 
age of the firm have a positive effect on the survival of the company. Also, firms with high 
market share and R&D investment have a higher survival rate than those without. He varied 
the analysis period from 1991–1996 to 1991–2000 to identify the difference in firm survival 
rates before and after the Asian financial crisis. Before the crisis, the size and the age of 
firm contributed positively to survival; however, these effects were not observed in the 
analysis that covered the crisis period. The author interpreted these results as indicating a 
change in the growth and survival standards of Korean industry. However, this 
interpretation is problematic in that it does not consider the massive and unsystematic exit 
of firms during the Asian financial crisis period.  
The study of Hong (2002) focused on the survival determinants of startup firms. He 
surveyed de alio firms newly established by the 30 Chaebol firms from 1988 to 1999. 




The result showed that firms are highly likely to survive in industries that are highly 
concentrated and growing. The relationship between industry concentration and firm 
survival is interpreted as a result of reflecting the characteristics of the Korean industry, in 
that the chaebol occupies a considerable portion of the monopoly market, and once it enters, 
it is difficult for independent startups to arrange business easily. Also, he found a tendency 
for firms with a large entry size to be more likely to survive; in addition, the higher the 
funding capacity of the entrants, the higher the survival probability. On the other hand, 
variables such as the possibility of resource sharing with the parent firm and the managerial 
capacity of the parent firm did not have a significant effect on the survival of the de alio 
firms. This implies that the survival of the firm is determined by the capacity of the firm 
itself, rather than the relationship with the parent firm, even though it is a subsidiary firm 
belonging to the chaebol firms.  
Lee and Shin (2005) conducted a survival analysis of 1,780 firms established during the 
period from 1984 to 1994. They used the time varying Cox PH model to investigate survival 
determinants, using firm level financial data. Explanatory variables of firms were classified 
into firm level, industry level, and macroeconomic level. The firm entry size, current size, 
and entry type were used as firm level variables, and industry entry rate, market 
concentration, and economies of scale were used as industrial level variables. GDP growth 
rate was used as the macroeconomic level variable. They found that current size of firm 
contributes significantly to survival. On the other hand, the size of firm at entry contributes 




of entry firms, rather than the resources required at entry. Also, the industry level variables 
showed that the higher the market entry rate and the higher the market concentration, the 
lower the risk of exit. As the minimum efficient scale (MES) increases, the risk of exit of 
the entering company increases. 
Jang (2006) conducted a survey to identify the differences between companies that 
overcame the Asian financial crisis and those that did not. A logistic regression analysis 
was conducted for 115 venture companies based on two surveys, conducted in 1997 and 
2000. The factors affecting the survival of firms were classified into human capital and 
social capital. As a result of the analysis, it was confirmed that firms with higher human 
capital and with strong external networking showed higher probability of survival.  
Lim et al. (2008) analyzed the survival period and determinants of survival of 13,754 
venture firm with 5 years or more in terms of firm age by 2001. They used the Cox PH 
model to analyze the effects of founder characteristics, corporate competence, external 
environment, and venture capital investment, on corporate survival. The characteristics of 
founders in their 50s were found to increase the survival time of venture companies. This 
was interpreted as implying that the socially diverse experience and existing network of the 
founder contribute positively to the survival of the enterprise. In terms of corporate 
competence factors, the longer the survival period is, the larger the size of company, gross 
profit, and net profit. On the other hand, the degree of R&D intensity, proxied by the 
number of innovations per employee, did not have a significant effect on survival. 




contribution to the survival of venture firms. 
Kang and Lee (2009) conducted a survival analysis on 112 SMEs in the construction 
industry. The firms’ financial indicators were used as the main explanatory variables, in the 
categories of profitability, stability, activity, growth, cash flow, and size of firms; and the 
Cox PH model was used. The higher the profit margin and the total asset value, the higher 
the probability of survival. On the other hand, the higher the reliance on borrowing, the 
more the probability of survival decreases. However, it is hard to generalize this result, 
since the study only focused on the construction sector.  
Song and Noh (2011) analyzed the survival period and determinants of survival of 
venture firms, based on data of venture firms from 2006 to 2009. Their empirical strategy 
was to regress both the Cox PH model and a parametric model. This approach is also used 
in Cefis and Marsili (2005) to examine the robustness of the model. However, Song and 
Noh (2011) selected the Weibull distribution for their parametric model without statistical 
consideration of the data they used. The results of both the Cox PH model and the 
parametric model revealed that firms that are large and have patents showed better 
performance in terms of survival.  
The study of Park et al. (2012) focused on the fact that the survival determinants of 
firms may vary in each industry. They collected firm level data from 1987 to 1996 and 
categorized observations into five industries: construction industry, light industry, 
wholesale and retail industry, heavy industry, and service industry. They analyzed the 




potential, and capital adequacy. Although the variables that had a significant effect on each 
industry were different, it was confirmed for all five industries that the probability of 
survival was higher as indicators of firm stability, such as capital adequacy ratio and current 
ratio, increased.  
The study of Hwang (2012) conducted an empirical analysis focusing on the existence 
of innovation premiums in firm survival for Korean SMEs. The hypothesis of the research 
was that the innovation premium may be different according to the size and the age of firm; 
and also, that the innovation premium may occur differently, depending on the technology 
intensity of the industry. The analysis result using the Cox PH model revealed that 
innovation investment contributed negatively to survival for smaller firms. The author 
argued that while innovation investment may be a survival tool for small firms, at the same 
time, it is likely to be a risky investment. The study also confirmed that there is a strong 
innovation premium for survival in medium-high-tech industry, rather than in high-tech 
industry.  
A recent study conducted by Kim and Lee (2016) noted that firm survival can be 
influenced by differences in the technical regimes of various industries. Variables such as 
size of firm at entry, R&D intensities, R&D stock, and timing of entry were used as 
explanatory variables. The technological regime of the industry was classified along two 
axes: technical opportunities and R&D appropriability. The Cox PH model was used for 
the analysis. The results show that the size of firms contributed positively to firm survival 




of firm’s knowledge through R&D investment for firm survival was largest in the industries 
with high technological opportunities and low appropriability. 
As reviewed above, some empirical analyses have been conducted on the determinants 
that influence the survival of firms in Korean industry. However, it is difficult to generalize 
the results of these studies, because the analysis periods are short. Some studies that 
analyzed only entrant firms have an advantage in controlling for the cohort effect; on the 
other hand, they are limited in their description of the selection criteria of the whole 
industry at the same time. Finally, some studies have analyzed GDP growth rate variables 
to control for macroeconomic effects. However, controlling for macroeconomic effects 
cannot examine the changes in firm behavior patterns and firm selection criteria that may 
arise from institutional changes such as the Asian financial crisis. In the following sections 
in the chapter, we identify the selection criteria in Korean industry and compare their 
changes against the institutional improvements before and after the Asian financial crisis.  
 
2.3 Research hypothesis  
In the 1990s, the Asian financial crisis had a great impact on the Korean economy. As 
a consequence, a large number of firms went bankrupt, and the restructuring of surviving 
firms was a major event that changed the landscape of the Korean economy. In overcoming 
the financial crisis, the Korean government accepted the recommendations of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). As a result, there has been a great change in the Korean 




financial system based on close cooperation between government, financial institutions, 
and corporations. However, after the Asian financial crisis, the role of the government was 
reduced and the properties of the Anglo-American financial system were strengthened 
(Shin & Chang, 2003). 
Before the Asian financial crisis, Korea’s financial system had problems such as a 
decline in capital adequacy of banks, an increase in short-term corporate debt, and 
inadequate financial supervision functions (Hahm, 2007). In particular, Korean firms 
operated through a large amount of loans, and the high debt to equity ratios of these Korean 
firms was recognized as one of the causes of the massive bankruptcies that followed the 
outbreak of the crisis. Therefore, during the process of overcoming the financial crisis, the 
government implemented a series of measures to improve the high debt ratio of Korean 
firms. The government recognizes that the weakened competitiveness of Korean firms 
originates from their weak financial structure, and established the principle of improving 
the financial structure and reducing the debt ratio of firms. The government has 
implemented restructuring policies to enhance the transparency of corporate management, 
the establishment of core business units, and the strengthening of the responsibility of 
controlling shareholders and management. The high level of corporate debt has impaired 
both the financial sector and the industry sector since the outbreak of the crisis. Korean 
firms had to maintain high debts levels for growth, since Korea had a limited amount of 
capital accumulation in the course of its rapid growth over a short period of time. Table 2 




period from 1991 to 2005. The average debt ratio of firms peaked in 1997 and has since 
declined steadily. This can be interpreted as the result of the immediate intervention of the 
government after the crisis. Thus, the government’s policies seem to have been effective in 
the process of overcoming the Asian financial crisis. In particular, the policies adopted to 
improve the financial soundness of both the corporate and financial sectors have led to 
improvements in the debt ratio and capital adequacy ratio of firms in both the finance and 
the real sectors.  
 
Table 2. Average debt ratio of firms in Korea: 1991 - 2005 
Year Debt ratio Long-term Debt ratio Short-term Debt ratio 
1991 0.712 0.329 0.383 
1992 0.720 0.328 0.392 
1993 0.713 0.331 0.381 
1994 0.714 0.320 0.394 
1995 0.705 0.312 0.392 
1996 0.719 0.322 0.397 
1997 0.765 0.361 0.404 
1998 0.715 0.341 0.374 
1999 0.604 0.271 0.333 
2000 0.601 0.243 0.358 
2001 0.565 0.251 0.314 
2002 0.550 0.234 0.316 
2003 0.521 0.213 0.309 
2004 0.498 0.192 0.306 
2005 0.494 0.198 0.296 





This study focuses on whether institutional change through policy intervention has 
affected firm behavior and selection criteria in the market. In particular, changes in 
financial institutions can be expected to affect industrial dynamics such as entry, growth, 
and exit of firms, since the financial and industrial sectors are closely linked.  
In his book “The theory of economic development,” Schumpeter (1912) emphasized 
that finance sector and firm are closely related to each other. He stressed the importance of 
corporate innovation activities as a driving force for the creative destruction process. His 
idea that finance is essential for corporate social activities is well understood through the 
following sentence: “Credit is essentially the creation of purchasing power for the purpose 
of transferring it to the entrepreneur” (Schumpeter, 1912, p. 107). In other words, since 
finance forms the purchasing power of the market, companies can perform innovation 
activities based on this market. Finance also provides the venture capital needed for 
innovation by providing credit to companies performing innovation activities. Schumpeter 
explained the interaction between business and finance through the German banking 
system. Schumpeter argued that the German banking system played an important role in 
the industrialization of Germany in the nineteenth century and the Second Industrial 
Revolution, providing large-scale funding for technological innovation and investment. In 
addition, the expansion and contraction of the loans provided by the banks was also 
recognized as an important variable in generating the business cycle. 
Perez (2002) looked at the link between the financial sector and the industry sector from 




finance and the real economy at the business cycle level, arguing that the two interactions 
occur through four phases in total. The first phase is the irruption phase, which succeeds 
the phase of stagnation, during which the preparation for the next technological revolution 
is carried out. The second phase is the frenzy phase. The period of harmonious growth ends 
and financial capital completely dominates production capital. Polarization occurs and the 
real economy declines. The third phase is the synergy phase. The gap between finance and 
industry has narrowed, and the two sectors continue to grow in a harmonious way. The last 
phase is the maturity phase, during which idle financial capital is moving to new areas, 
sectors, and regions. Perez (2002) argued that all five major technological revolutions 
observed (industrial revolution, steam and rail, steel and electricity, petroleum and 
automotive, telecommunications) could be explained by these four phases of interaction 
between financial capital and production capital.  
The pecking order theory proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984) argues that the 
relationship between firm and finance is close. The main idea of the theory is that since 
there are friction factors, such as information asymmetry, firms generally prefer internal 
funds rather than external funds as a source of investment. In other words, when a company 
invests, it considers internal financing to be a priority, and next in order, incurring debt or 
raising equity. If the regulations are strengthened to allow firms to raise loans, it implies 
that firms may become more reliant on the stock market for introducing financial resources.  
As reviewed above, the Asian financial crisis has had a great impact on both the Korean 




to lower the high debt ratio and to ensure financial soundness, which has been pointed out 
as a problem in overcoming the crisis. This study focused on the fact that the institutional 
change caused by government policy may have affected the behavior of firms. In particular, 
it is possible to expect that adjusting the upper limit of the debt ratio of the firm and 
strengthening the financial soundness regulations may cause changes in firm behavior in 
terms of the introduction of resources. In this context, this study tried to compare the 
determinants of firm survival before and after the Asian financial crisis.  
 
2.4 Empirical strategy 
This study analyzed the determinants of survival of Korean manufacturing firms using 
survival analysis methodology. Survival analysis is a statistical method that identifies the 
factors that affect the time to the occurrence of a specific event, defined as its survival time. 
This approach has been widely used for empirical analysis using corporate data since the 
early 1990s. In particular, since the analysis of firm survival using the hazard model has 
been undertaken, an attempt has been made to analyze the survival period and the 
determinants of survival on an empirical analysis. Section 2.4 explains the parametric 
model of survival analysis methodology and the exponential and Weibull distributions, 
which are most frequently used in parametric survival analysis. 
 
2.4.1 Survival function and hazard function 
The survival function is the probability that an event will not occur until a certain point 




time and " denote observed time of firm survival, then the survival function # "  is as 
follows:  
 # " = %& ! > "    (1) 
Let (  denote the total number of firms and ) denote the number of firms that have 
survived by the time ", and # "  can have the value )/(. Theoretically, the survival 
function has the following properties: 1) " = 0, # " = # 0 = 1, there are no firms that 
exit when the time of observation starts and thus, the survival function has the value of 1; 
2) " = ∞, # " = # ∞ = 0, there is no firm that survives when sufficient time has passed, 
and thus the survival function has the value of 0. If the survival function is focused on the 
number of surviving companies up to a certain point in time, we can consider the number 
of firms that have exited by the time ". This is the definition of survival probability, / " , 
and its cumulative distribution function is as follows.  
 / " = 1 − # " = 	%& ! ≤ "   (2) 
The density function can be obtained by differentiating the cumulative distribution function 
of the survival probability as the general cumulative distribution function. The probability 
density function is defined as follows:  
 	3 " = lim
78→:
Pr( " ≤ ! < " + @")
@"
  (3) 
The probability density function of the survival probability has information about the slope 
of the tangent line at time "	of the cumulative distribution function, that is, how quickly 











1 − # " = −
B
B"
# "   (4) 
The hazard function ℎ " , which is similar to the density function 3 " , is defined as:  
 
	ℎ " = lim
78→:









In other words, the density function refers the risk of firm exit among all firms from the 
beginning by time ", while the hazard function refers the risk of firm exit among firms that 
have survived by time ". Therefore, the hazard function is called the conditional incidence 
rate and the density function is called the absolute incidence rate. From Equations (3) and 
(5), it can be seen that the following relation holds: 
 	ℎ " =
3(")
#(")
  (6) 
Since 3 "  is a derivative of / "  and / "  is a complementary set of # " , ℎ "  can 
be rewritten as:  
















# "  
 (7) 
Equation (7) can be replaced by the derivative form of the natural logarithm as:  
 
	ℎ " = −
B
B"
E)# "   (8) 
Equation (9) can be obtained by integrating Equation (8): 
 − ℎ F BF
8
:




From Equation (9), # "  can be rewritten as:  
 # " = exp	[− ℎ F BF
8
:
]  (10) 
The survival function can be obtained by integrating hazard function ℎ "  by time " and 
the cumulative hazard L "  is obtained as:  
 L " = ℎ F BF
8
:
  (11) 
The survival function # "  and density function 3 " 	can be rewritten as Equations (12) 
and (13) by using Equation (11).  
 # " = exp	[−L " ]  (12) 
 ℎ F BF
8
:
= ℎ(")exp	[− ℎ F BF
8
:
]  (13) 
Even if the hazard function ℎ " 	is not known, we can derive the survival function from 
Equation (12).  
 
2.4.2 Parametric survival analysis model  
Survival analyses can be categorized into parametric and non-parametric models 
according to whether the information on the distribution of the survival function is 
estimated. There is also another approach, the semi-parametric model, which has moderate 
properties of both parametric and nonparametric models. The parametric survival model 
used in this study has the advantage that model-based estimations can be performed at any 
time by estimating only the related parameters. That is, while nonparametric models cannot 




models can estimate the survival probability beyond the longest surviving firm. For 
example, if the longest surviving firm observed is 20 years old, then nonparametric models 
cannot predict the survival probability after 20 years, but parametric models can. The 
distribution of the survival function is generally selected from among the exponential 
distribution, Weibull distribution, gamma distribution, Gompertz distribution, and log-
normal distribution. Section 2.4.2.1 and Section 2.4.2.2 discuss the process of reviewing 
the most frequently used exponential distribution, and the fit of the Weibull distribution 
and its application in survival analysis studies.  
 
2.4.2.1 Exponential distribution 
The simplest hazard function is to assume that the hazard is a time independent constant. 
Let M denote the time independent constant; # "  can then be obtained as Equation (14) 
by substituting in Equation (10). Also, / "  can be defined as Equation (15) through 
Equation (2).  
 # " = exp	(−M")   (14) 
 / " = 1 − exp	(−M")  (15) 
3 "  is rewritten through Equations (6) and (14) as:  
 3 " = Mexp	(−M")  (16) 
Assuming that the survival function follows the exponential distribution, there is only 
one parameter, M, that determines the shape of the exponential distribution. Since the mean 




exponential distribution can be determined from the average survival time of the 
observations N.   
The exponential distribution has the advantage of being easy to estimate by setting the 
hazard function as a time independent constant. However, it is necessary to confirm 
whether the given survival data can be assumed to have an exponential distribution. The 
general method for this confirmation is to plot the log-log transformation of # "  onto a 
plane that has two axes: log " as the horizontal axis and log[− log[# " ]] as the vertical 
axis. If the curve shows a slope of 1, the hazard function can be assumed to have a constant 
value. If the hazard function has a constant value, −log # " = M" . The logarithmic 
transformation of Equation (14) is rewritten as:  
 log[− log[# " ]] = log M + log "  (17) 
Let Q = log[− log[# " ]] , R = 1, S = log M , F = log "; Equation (17) then has a linear 
form Q = RF + S. If Equation (17) is drawn in the form of a straight line on the plane, it is 
not a problem to assume that the hazard function has a constant value.  
 
2.4.2.2 Weibull distribution  
The exponential distribution considered as a hazard function has a constant value 
regardless of time. However, if we assume the Weibull distribution for the hazard function, 
the hazard can change over time. The hazard function of the Weibull distribution is defined 
as: 




M  and T  denote scale parameter and shape parameter respectively (T > 0 ). The 
Weibull distribution is known to be highly flexible in survival analysis. If T = 1, Equation 
(18) is a constant M that is identical with the hazard function of the exponential distribution. 
If the hazard function is given as Equation (18), then the survival function #(") can be 
rewritten as:  
 	# " = exp	[− M" U]  (19) 
Similar to the exponential distribution, we need to draw the log-log transformation of 
# "  on the plane, which has two axes: log " as the horizontal axis and log[− log[# " ]] 
as the vertical axis.  
The log-log transformation of Equation (18) is as follows: 
 log[− log[# " ]] = Tlog M + Tlog " (20) 
Equation (20) is a linear equation that has T  as a slope, log"  as an independent 
variable, and Tlog " as an intercept. If the curve has the shape of a line and the slope is not 
close to 1, the data can be considered to be a Weibull distribution with the parameter T as 
a slope. If the slope is close to 1, it is reasonable to look at the exponential distribution. 
This is because the exponential distribution is a special case of Weibull distribution, as 
described above.  
 
2.5 Data and Variables  
2.5.1 Data  




KISVALUE is the oldest and most reliable firm level micro database in Korea (Kim & Lee, 
2016) and provides financial data for all the manufacturing firms listed on the KSE (Korea 
Stock Exchange) and the KOSDAQ (Korea Securities Dealers Automated Quotation) and 
on many non-publicly traded, but externally audited registered firms. In this study, 
observations from 1981 to 2014 were used for the analysis. All of the variables, such as 
sales, investment, etc., were converted into constant values using the producer price index 
(PPI) as of 2010.  
To analyze the dynamics of an industry, the entry of new firms and the exit of firms 
must be accurately identified. In this research, if a firm was observed with a new 
identification code in the database, it was identified as a new entry of a firm, following the 
work of Mata et al. (1995). Exit of firm was identified if the firm was not observed from 
the database due to a bankruptcy or business closure or an impaired capital case (Kim & 
Lee, 2016). Table 3 shows the number of entrants and exits, entry rate, and exit rate 
identified by the above method. Also, the table summarizing the number of observations 













Table 3. Number of observations 
Year Total Entry Exit  Year Total Entry Exit 
1981 131 N/A N/A  1998 4,438 568 104 
1982 185 59 5  1999 5,009 753 182 
1983 286 122 21  2000 5,318 664 355 
1984 707 422 1  2001 5,478 529 369 
1985 858 153 2  2002 6,308 1059 229 
1986 1,007 152 3  2003 6,812 728 224 
1987 1,164 185 28  2004 6,855 519 476 
1988 1,309 167 22  2005 6,835 437 457 
1989 1,385 98 22  2006 7,009 561 387 
1990 1,510 161 36  2007 7,109 516 416 
1991 1,676 186 20  2008 6,986 480 603 
1992 1,731 67 12  2009 6,770 341 557 
1993 1,753 132 110  2010 6,529 278 519 
1994 1,989 265 29  2011 6,209 275 595 
1995 2,685 720 24  2012 6,185 319 343 
1996 3,174 533 44  2013 5,976 332 541 
1997 3,974 853 53  2014 5,917 315 374 
     Total 131,267 12,949 7,163 
 
2.5.2 Variables 
The following five variables were set to examine the determinants of survival at the 
firm level. First, the size of firm was measured by the natural logarithmic transformation 
of the number of employees. Second, the age of firm was calculated from the database that 
has the information of establishment date. Third, firm investment was obtained from two 
variables in the database, investment on R&D and investment on tangible assets. Fourth, 




are not zero. Firm financial character is considered with debt dependency, which is the ratio 
of total debt to total assets.  
The technology level of the industry was included to examine its effect on firm survival 
at the industry level. The database has 24 industry classifications, based on the Korea 
Standard Industry Classification (KSIC). We reclassified these 24 industries into four 
industries, according to their technology level based on the classification of the OECD as 
the following Table 4. The following Table 5 summarizes the variables and operational 
definitions used in the study. The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis 
are attached in Appendix 2. 
 




Aircraft and spacecraftPharmaceuticals 
Office, accounting and computing machinery 
Radio, TV and communications equipment 
Medical, precision and optical instruments  
Medium-high-
technology industries  
Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c. 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  
Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals 
Railroad equipment and transport equipment, n.e.c. 
Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.  
Medium-low-
technology industries  
Building and repairing of ships and boats 
Rubber and plastics products 
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel  
Other non-metallic mineral products 








Manufacturing, n.e.c.  
Recycling 
Wood, pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing  
Food products, beverages and tobacco 
Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear  
 
Table 5. Variables and definition 
Level Variables Definition 
Firm level Size  Logarithm of number of employees  
Age Firm age 
R&D Expenditure Natural logarithm of R&D expenditure 
R&D R&D activity, Dummy variable  
Investment  Investment of tangible asset, Dummy variable 
Exporting  Export activity, Dummy variable   
Debt dependency Ratio of total debt to total assets. 
Industry level Low Tech Dummy variable 
Med-Low Tech Dummy variable 
Med-High Tech Dummy variable 
High Tech Dummy variable 
 
2.6 Results 
2.6.1 Specification of parametric survival function  
In order to implement the parametric survival analysis, the process of specification of 
the survival distribution from the data should precede. As noted in sections 2.4.2.1 and 
2.4.2.2, the log-log transformation of the survival function # "  was plotted on a plane 





Figure 1. Log-Log transformation of survival function 
 
As we can see in Figure 1, the log-log transformation of the survival function has the 
shape of a line. However, the linear regression result shows that the slope of the curve is 
0.71 and the intercept is −2.15 (XY: 0.992).	Also, the null hypothesis was rejected that the 
slope has the value of 1 (^Y = 648.60). Thus, the Weibull distribution was assumed for 
the survival distribution of the data.  
 
2.6.2 Regression result of parametric survival model   
This study analyzed firm level data from 1981 to 2014 before and after the Asian 




financial crisis, the observations from 1981 to 1996 were used, and the observations from 
2000 to 2006 were used to examine the situation after the crisis. Observations after 2006 
were not included since the global financial crisis effect might influence the result. Table 6 
shows the analysis results.  
The result confirmed some stylized facts on firm survival. First of all, the size of a firm 
has a positive effect on firm survival. In other words, we can confirm that there is a liability 
of smallness in Korean industry. This result can be interpreted through Jovanovic’s (1982) 
passive learning model. Jovanovic argued that a firm is able to learn about its cost structure 
and competitiveness after entering the market and the decisions about the size of the firm 
follow. Under this framework, firm size can be a buffer during a firm’s learning process 
after entry. Therefore, the size of the firm can be expected to have a positive effect on the 
survival of the firm, and the empirical analysis supports this. In addition, Korean industry 
has a difference in the ability to secure resources such as the financial networking capability 
of large enterprises and SMEs. Thus, it can be understood that the larger the size of a 
company, the higher the probability of its survival. 
It is also found that firm age also contributes positively to firm survival. In similar 
fashion to previous studies, we found that liability of newness exists in Korean 
manufacturing industry. Firms with higher age are more experienced and have more 
accumulated knowledge than firms with lower age. In addition, as Cohen and Levinthal 
(1990) insisted, even in the process of acquiring new knowledge, firms with larger 




context, liability of newness can be quite clearly understood as a phenomenon. 
 
Table 6. Regression results for parametric survival model 
  Model I Model II 
 (1981-1996) (2000-2006) 
Size -0.5524 *** -0.2328 *** 
 (0.0201 ) (0.0120 ) 
Age -0.012 *** -0.0185 *** 
 (0.0023 ) (0.0013 ) 
R&D -0.0181 *** -0.0090 *** 
 (0.0054 ) (0.0030 ) 
Exporting -0.1787 -0.1327 
 (0.1111 ) (0.0881 ) 
Med-Low Tech. -0.1626 *** -0.0047 
 (0.0565 ) (0.0309 ) 
Med-High Tech. -0.4375 *** 0.0552 
 (0.0623 ) (0.0352 ) 
High Tech. -0.3186 *** 0.1090 *** 
 (0.0648 ) (0.0379 ) 
   
Year dummy Controlled Controlled 
Log likelihood -3487.0824 -7639.0402 
Number of Observations 21,550 44,615 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard 
errors are given in parentheses. 
 
Firm R&D investment was used to analyze the existence of an innovation premium in the 
survival of firms. The result confirms that there is a strong innovation premium in Korean 




with other investments. However, it is essential to improve productivity or invent new 
products to increase competitiveness of firms. In other words, R&D investment contributes 
not just to firm growth, but also to firm survival, as Cefis and Marsili (2005) found.  
Unlike the determinants of firm level survival, the determinants of industry level 
survival changed before and after the Asian financial crisis. Before the Asian financial 
crisis, the survival rate in the low technology sectors was lower than that of the other sectors. 
However, after the Asian financial crisis, the survival rate in the high technology sector 
was higher than that of other sectors, which is a stylized fact derived from previous studies. 
One of the reasons for this change can be interpreted as the increase in technological 
innovation and the shortening of the technology life cycle. Compared with the past, Korean 
firms have increased investment in technology innovation, which means intense 
competition in the high technology sector. The findings captured this change in Korean 
industry.  
Table 7 shows the estimation results of the model including the financial variables of 
the firms. The estimated models in Table 7 include debt dependency as an explanatory 











Table 7. Regression results for parametric survival model 
  Model I Model II 
 (1981-1996) (2000-2006) 
Size -0.8645 *** -0.2243 *** 
 (0.0441 ) (0.0117 ) 
Age -0.0230 *** -0.0195 *** 
 (0.0034 ) (0.0013 ) 
Debt Dependency -0.0045 *** 5.35E-05 
 (0.0009 ) (6.24E-05 ) 
Export -0.3168 ** -0.1381 
 (0.1539 ) (0.0881 ) 
R&D -0.3365 *** -0.1021 *** 
 (0.0482 ) (0.0223 ) 
Investment -0.3560 *** -0.1679 *** 
 (0.0376 ) (0.0211 ) 
   
Industry dummy Controlled Controlled 
Year dummy Controlled Controlled 
Log likelihood -3762.8294 -7601.8291 
Number of Observations 21,550 44,615 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard 
errors are given in parentheses. 
 
From the results in Table 7, the debt dependency contributed differently in Models I and II. 
The debt dependency in model I contributed positively to firm survival before the Asian 
financial crisis. This means that those firms that borrow more financial resources from the 
outside showed a higher probability for survival. On the other hand, the debt dependency 




This difference can be interpreted as a result of institutional changes in Korean industry 
after the Asian financial crisis. After this crisis occurred, Korean firms tried to change their 
corporate structures through intensive restructuring. In particular, restructuring was carried 
out to reduce excessive borrowing, which was pointed out as a direct cause of massive and 
unsystematic exit of firms during the crisis. In other words, as a result of the restructuring 
policy of enhancing the capital adequacy of the financial sector and reducing the debt ratio 
of firms, the selection criteria of the market changed.  
In addition, the incentive for firm export activity changed before and after the crisis. 
Exporting firms were about 1.37% more likely to survive than those that did not export 
before the crisis. However, this tendency was not observed after the crisis. Also, the 
comparison between the two results shows that the market had more favorable selection 
criteria for investment of firms in R&D and tangible assets before than after the crisis. 
Before and after the crisis, the marginal effects of investment in R&D and tangible assets 
decreased from 1.39% and 1.43% to 1.18% and 1.18%, respectively. 
 
2.7 Sub-conclusion  
In Chapter 2, some of the stylized facts about the survival of companies derived from 
Chapter 1 were examined through a survival analysis of Korean firm level data. We also 
investigated the change of selection criteria before and after the Asian financial crisis by 
comparing the selection criteria of two periods. First of all, firm size, age, R&D investment, 




industry level, firms in low technology sectors showed a higher survival rate before the 
crisis. However, firms in high technology sectors showed a higher survival rate after the 
crisis. Second, it was confirmed that changes in the corporate and financial system caused 
changes in the corporate selection criteria after the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis. 
Before the Asian financial crisis, it was found that the there was a tendency for firms to 
operate with high levels of debt. However, firms’ financial structures, which relied on 
external borrowing and were vulnerable to external shocks, led to a large number of 
bankruptcies during the Asian financial crisis. In the process of overcoming the Asian 
financial crisis, a series of measures was taken to improve the financial soundness of 
business and finance, and this institutional change also influenced the firm selection criteria 
of the market.  
Generally, the high debt to equity ratios of firms in the credit based financial system 
were accepted as natural. However, the evaluation of firm credit has been strengthened and 
financial institutions have been improved to enhance the financial soundness of banks as a 
result of the Asian financial crisis. This institutional change has affected the corporate 
funding path. The funding path has changed from being heavily reliant on the main bank 
of each firm to introduce capital from the stock market. However, it has been argued that 
the supply of capital by the stock market is very limited in providing the growth funds 
needed by firms. Allen and Gale (1992) reported that the proportion of funds raised through 
the stock market in the US and UK were −8.8% and −10.4%, respectively. Considering that 




figures make us think again about the capital-supply function of the stock market. In this 
respect, the Korean financial system has contributed to the growth of firms by providing 
credit before the Asian financial crisis. However, it is observed that the Anglo-American 
properties of the Korean financial system were strengthened after the crisis. Recently, the 
growth rate of the Korean economy has slowed considerably. Even though we call such 
low growth the New Normal, it is necessary to remember that providing credit to firms for 




Chapter 3. Productivity Dynamics and 
Cleansing Effect of Two Economic Crisis in 
Korean Manufacturing Sector 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Inevitably, pressure is placed on every firm to survive once it opens for business. A 
firm’s decision to exit a market is the last option and a fate that all stakeholders of the firm 
want to avoid. However, from the perspective of either the industry or the nation, a firm’s 
exit decision has a different meaning. In general, less productive firms are replaced with 
more productive firms through competition, and the resources in the market can then be 
used in more productive ways. The process of the entry into the market of more productive 
firms and the exit of those less productive can be captured through Schumpeter’s (1934) 
canonical model of creative destruction. Through the process of creative destruction, a new 
equilibrium is formed. When the old equilibrium is moving toward a new one, resource 
reallocation happens in a way that is more productive. Thus, to ensure a more productive 
use of resources, the exit of a less productive firm gains significance at the industry or 
national level. This may be one reason why researchers have focused on which firms are 
exiting the market. The well-known research, such as Jovanovic (1982), found that more 
productive firms have a survival and growth advantage and less productive firms are more 




of firm dynamics in terms of market entry and exit. Propositions in the research showed 
that the productivity level of a firm was related to its survival. He also noted the necessity 
of the resource reallocation process in firm dynamics. Other research has pointed out that 
the market selection mechanism works to filter out less productive firms from more 
productive ones (Baily et al., 1992; Ericson and Pakes, 1995; Disney et al., 2003).  
The process of selection and productivity-enhancing resource reallocation can be 
accelerated through the business cycle. Schumpeter (1942), a pioneer who researched the 
relationship between creative destruction and the business cycle, argued that the business 
cycle could influence the magnitude of creative destruction in recessions. In a period of 
economic downturn, less productive firms are more likely to exit markets and their 
resources then flow to more productive firms. Consequently, the productivity of the whole 
economy can increase with the more productive use of such resources. This is the reason 
that Foster et al. (2016) called silver lining of recession. However, empirical studies on the 
cleaning effect hypothesis do not show a definite result as theoretically established (Barlevy, 
2002). This may be a problem originated from the measurement of resource reallocation. 
Many studies attempted to measure the resource reallocation through employment change. 
However, this method cannot precisely measure which firms have been exited and the 
released resources from firm’s exit have been reallocated to which firms. Therefore, in 
order to find out which firms have gone out of business during the economic downturn and 
how the resources have been redistributed, an empirical analysis different from the 




In this study, the empirical analysis of the cleaning effect hypothesis was analyzed 
through the productivity growth decomposition analysis based on the micro data of Korea. 
Korea suffered from the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s and the Global financial crisis 
of the 2000s. Thus, it can be considered as a good example for comparing the existence and 
size of the cleaning effect in Korea, which suffered two economic crises in a relatively short 
period of time.  
The subsequent sections of the chapter are organized as follows. Section 2 briefly 
reviews the literature on economic downturn and creative destruction. Section 3 introduces 
the background of the two economic crises in Korea in the 1990s and 2000s. Sections 4 
and 5 describe the empirical methodology implemented and the data analyzed in this study, 
respectively. Section 6 demonstrates the results. The final section, section 7, summarizes 
and concludes the research.  
Chapter 3 follows the following configuration. In Section 3.2 briefly reviews the 
literature on economic downturn and creative destruction. In Section 3.3 investigates the 
legal and institutional changes in the financial sector during the Asian financial crisis and 
derive research hypotheses. In Section 3.4 reviews the survival analysis methodology 
implemented in the study. In Section 3.5 describes the data and variables used in the study. 
Section 3.6 demonstrates the results of productivity growth decomposition analysis and 







3.2 Literature review 
Generally, the profitability of a firm is the final determinant in its exit from the market 
in a period of economic downturn. Thus, the number of firms below the exit threshold 
increases in recessions as described in Figure 2. After a massive market exit of firms, the 
resources of these firms will be released and flow to survivor firms that are more profitable 
and productive than the ones leaving the market. Through the process of resource 
reallocation, the aggregated productivity will be increased and this is called productivity-
enhancing reallocation or the cleansing effect.  
 
 
Figure 2. Cleansing Effect in an Economic Crisis 
 
The existence of the cleansing effect has grabbed attention as a topic in previous 
literature. A number of studies have analyzed employment changes to investigate the 




exit and restructuring of firms increases and the increase of employment in the recovery 
phase follows after the downturn. Thus, it is reasonable to measure resource reallocation 
by gross employment change. Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) investigated gross job 
creation and destruction in the period 1972 to 1986. They analyzed plant level employment 
changes in the U.S. manufacturing sector to examine resource reallocation in terms of 
employment. Their research revealed that job reallocation rates showed countercyclical 
when the business cycle increases and the job reallocation rate decreases and vice versa. 
Caballero and Hammour (1994) examined industry response to demand fluctuation with 
job-flow data in the U.S. They found outdated production units are the most likely to have 
low profitability and to exit the market in a recession. In addition, they found that job 
destruction is more responsive than job creation and it leads to a recession’s cleansing effect. 
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) analyszed employment dynamics and found that an 
aggregate shock induces a negative correlation between job creation and job destruction, 
whereas a dispersion shock induces a positive correlation. Campbell (1998) studied the 
market entry and exit of U.S. manufacturing companies and provided evidence of the 
hypothesis that shocks to technological change can be a significant source of economic 
fluctuation. That is, these shocks replace old technologies with new ones. Davis et al. (2012) 
examined employment flows with several theoretical models. They analyzed business level 
data from 1990 to 2010 and found the existence of an increase of reallocation of labor in 
recession periods. On the other hand, some studies reported no clear evidence was founded 




(1991) researched industrial behavior during the Great Depression with business data from 
the U.S. motor vehicle industry in the period 1929 to 1935. They found no relationship 
between resource reallocation and recession; instead, they found businesses tend to contract 
proportionately in terms of size. Also, Baily et al. (2001) investigated cyclical dynamics of 
productivity and resource reallocation with manufacturing business data from 1972 to 1989. 
They found that the impact of the employment reallocation showed countercyclical 
behavior in a modest way (see also Schuh and Triest (2000)).   
However, examining the existence of cleaning effect through changes in employment 
has the problem that it cannot accurately measure the flow of resource reallocation process. 
That is, it is impossible to identify where the resource come from and where the resource 
reallocated. It is only possible to observed the magnitude of resource reallocation. The main 
mechanism of the cleaning effect is that the less productive firms exit in the economic 
downturn and the resource they had occupied is reallocated to more productive firms. 
Barlevy (2002) pointed out the possibility of a problem of this measurement. According to 
Barlevy, the layoff increases during the economic downturn, yet the new employment 
increases in economic recession is only found in temporal or low-paying jobs. The sullying 
effect, introduced by Barlevy, refers that the resource reallocation increases in economic 
downturn, however, it does not guarantee the reallocation is productivity enhancing.  
Productivity growth decomposition analysis could be more precise empirical alternative 
to examined the cleansing effect accurately. Griliches and Regev (1995) examined the 




productivity comes from productivity changes within firms rather than the entry or exit of 
firms in the market. Thus, the market exit of firms was not productivity enhancing. Foster 
et al. (2001) compiled business level data from 1987 to 1992. They measured and 
decomposed aggregated productivity year by year and found that there was a substantial 
reallocation generated by the market entry and exit of firms. Moreover, they also showed 
that there was no difference in the magnitude of reallocation between recession and non-
recession periods. Recently, Foster et al. (2016) analyzed the survival determinants during 
the global financial crisis and found that firms with low productivity were more likely to 
exit. Also, they found that firms with high productivity were not only more likely to survive, 
but also showed higher growth rate.  
As we can see from the previous studies, the cleansing effect rests on solid theoretical 
foundations, empirical research shows different results. That is, the cleansing effect was 
found differently from country to country: Griliches and Regev (1995) versus Davis et al. 
(2012), and differently by time even in same country: Baily et al. (2001) versus Davis et al. 
(2012).  
The contradictory results of these empirical studies have been sought to find in the 
surrounding environment of the economic downturn. Barlevy (2002) argued that the 
cleaning effect may not occur when the financial sector contracts in a downturn based on 
the credit market imperfection model of Bernake and Gertler (1989). When finance sector 
contracts, the liquidity of a firm strongly influences on firm survival during the economic 




Also, Barlevy (2003) developed a model on resource reallocation behavior during 
recessions with credit market friction. The results show that reallocation might not cleanse, 
that is, resources could be reallocated to less productive firms. In other words, if the 
selection mechanism heavily relies on financial capability rather than productivity there 
will be no cleansing effects.  
In summary, the reason for the presence of the cleansing effect relates to the market 
selection criteria in the recession. Without a financial contract, the market selection criteria 
would be heavily based on the productivity of firms, and thus productivity-enhancing 
reallocation would follow. Another possible explanation is that job creation and destruction 
may measure resource reallocation but not guarantee that a huge reallocation will be 
productivity enhancing. If a low productive firm shuts down and employees move to 
another low productive firm, then job flow increases but productivity does not. Thus, job 
reallocation may not be the best measure for the cleansing effect; rather, productivity 
growth decomposition may be a better way to observe where productivity growth comes 
from. In addition, previous studies have analyzed only one crisis and compared different 
countries or analyzed a crisis from long ago. Thus, differences of space and time might 
influence the analysis of the cleansing effect. In contrast to previous literature, this study 
analyzed two different economic downturns within a relatively short time period of 20 







3.3 Research hypothesis  
The two economic crises studied here occurred in 1997 and 2008 and left a significant 
impact on the Korean economy. As Figure 3 describes, the Asian Financial Crisis in the 
1990s and the Global Financial Crisis in the 2000s dropped the GDP and GDP per capita 




    Source: Bank of Korea (2016) 
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The two crises were quite different in terms of their underlying causes and their 
aftermaths in many respects. For this reason, previous literature has compared the distinct 
causes and characteristics of these two crises (e.g., Sheng, 2009). In particular, during the 
Asian financial crisis, the domestic financial sector was vulnerable in terms of capital 
adequacy, and thus financial sector was restructured through active government 
intervention to overcome the crisis. On the other hand, the global financial crisis period 
was in better condition than the Asian financial crisis in terms of capital adequacy both 
finance and industry sector. The difference in the financial sector have had different effects 
on the survival of firms, especially in the Asian financial crisis (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 
2014). We focused on the relationship between the finance sector stability and the 
occurrence of cleansing by comparing two crises.  
 
Table 8. Comparison two financial crises  
 Asian Financial Crisis Global Financial Crisis 
Cause of  
Outbreak 
Endogenous factor by  
opening capital market  
External factor spread from  
foreign countries  
Restructuring 
Entity  




Disqualification of insolvent  
financial institutions 
Strengthening supervision  
system  
Lowering the possibility of  








3.3.1 Cleansing effect in the Asian financial crisis  
The main cause of the economic crisis in the 1990s was the unstable foreign exchange 
and financial market in Southeast Asia. On July 1997, Thailand announced that it would 
adopt a floating exchange rate system, posing a serious threat in the Asian region. As a 
result, Korea’s sovereign credit rating dropped and this accelerated the outflow of foreign 
capital. The depletion of foreign-exchange reserves followed and thus, the Korean 
government requested emergency funding from the International Monetary Fund. In order 
to stabilize the surging exchange rate, the government increased the short-term interest rate 
from 12% in November to 31% in December. In addition to vulnerability in the financial 
markets, many firms’ profitability fell, especially in the manufacturing industry, as of the 
mid-1990s. Chopra et al. (2001) indicated that a high dependency on external funding was 
the main cause of the drop-in profitability. From the industry dynamics perspective, before 
the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, there was not a proper market exit system for insolvent 
firms and banks. Distressed assets were not properly managed and the restructuring 
mechanism did operate well. Consequently, the accumulation of insolvent firms during this 
period led to an increase in distressed-debt in the financial market. As a result, the Korean 
domestic market and the real economy went through a steep downturn after the Asian 
Financial Crisis. The drop in private consumption expenditure and investment were also a 
big obstacle to overcoming the crisis. With the financial support from the International 
Monetary Fund, a massive restructuring among firms and banks followed. Many firms were 




However, the efforts to restructure insolvent firms ultimately improved the financial 
fundamentals of the Korean economy.  
 




Corporate Loan Interest Rate (%) Corporate Bond  
Interest Rate (%) Large Enterprises SMEs 
1993 2.9 N/A N/A 12.63 
1994 2.5 N/A N/A 12.90 
1995 2.1 N/A N/A 13.79 
1996 2.0 11.42 10.88 11.87 
1997 2.6 12.19 11.63 13.39 
1998 7.0 16.13 14.89 15.10 
1999 6.3 9.49 8.75 8.86 
2000 4.1 8.75 7.95 9.35 
2001 3.8 7.69 7.38 7.05 
2002 3.1 6.17 6.56 6.56 
2003 3.4 5.98 6.21 5.43 
2004 3.5 5.72 5.97 4.73 
2005 3.5 5.20 5.76 4.68 
2006 3.3 5.56 6.20 5.17 
2007 3.0 6.09 6.72 5.70 
2008 3.0 6.79 7.31 7.02 
2009 3.4 5.61 5.65 5.81 
2010 3.4 5.25 5.68 4.66 
2011 3.0 5.50 6.00 4.41 
2012 2.8 5.18 5.66 3.77 
2013 2.8 4.46 4.92 3.19 
Source: Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System (2015)  
 




industrial and financial sectors were exposed to shock. Specifically, as we can see in Table 
9, the financial sector was under the very unstable condition during the Asian financial 
crisis. In order to stabilize finance sector, a strong restructuring of the government's 
financial sector was under way. Restructuring of the financial sector led to high interest 
rates for industry sector and restrictions on new loans, as a consequence, many firms exited 
due to the liquidity problem. Since the finance sector was unstable, the process of resource 
reallocation could not proceed desirably. Therefore, we can expect there was no cleansing 
effect in the Asian financial crisis period.  
 
3.3.2 Cleansing effect in the global Financial Crisis  
The financial crisis in the 2000s engulfed the whole world. Continuous low interest 
rates led to an increase in household loans; this created a global property bubble. Real estate 
related institutions and investment banks engaged in aggressive investment through 
leveraging risk. As Korea had undergone a rigorous restructuring after the Asian Financial 
Crisis, firms that survived this period were comparatively strong. The profitability as well 
as financial soundness of many firms improved after the Asian financial crisis. Additionally, 
the debt ratio of manufacturing companies significantly decreased after the Asian financial 
crisis as firms started to depend less on excessive loans, which generate high financial costs. 
The financial supervisory system also improved as of 1997. Before the Asian financial 
crisis, there was no integrated supervision system for banks, insurance, and the stock 




government integrated their supervision under one umbrella known as the Financial 
Supervisory Service and also established a revised deposit insurance system. Moreover, an 
institution was established to deal with distressed assets and to work as a mediator to 
facilitate resource movement in the market. From these efforts, the financial soundness and 
profitability of banks and other firms improved. It is generally accepted that the Korean 
economy was more severely impacted by the Asian financial crisis than by the global 
financial crisis. There are two explanations for this, First, Korea was not the main trigger 
of the global financial crisis, and second, Korean firms were financially more stable during 
the crisis in 2008. The interest rates in Table 9 show the differences in the stability of the 
economy in the recession periods. The financial markets during the Asian financial crisis 
were far unstable than during the global financial crisis. In other words, unlike the Asian 
financial crisis, the global financial crisis did not severely influence to financial sector.  
Thus, the financial sector could support the restructuring process in industry sector during 
the crisis period. Therefore, we can expect that these was a cleansing effect in the global 
financial crisis.  
 
3.4 Empirical strategy   
This study used two empirical methodologies. The first measured aggregated 
productivity at the plant total factor productivity (TFP) level and decomposed the growth 
of the aggregated productivity. The result captures the link between industrial dynamics 




growth. Moreover, more importantly, through decomposition, it is possible to observe the 
cleansing effect of the recessions. The second methodology implemented was to examine 
the determinants of the survival of plants. Generally, survival analysis is implemented to 
observe specific characteristics that strongly influence the occurrence of the interested 
event. In this research, we investigated plants to assess which variables influenced firm exit 
in the two crisis periods, and the analysis result would imply which determinant and manner 
worked during the market selection process. 
 
3.4.1 Measure of Total Factor Productivity 
The TFP of each plant can be measured using the chained multilateral index approach 
developed by Good et al. (1997). The methodology has been applied in works by Aw et al. 
(2001), Hahn (2004), and Oh et al. (2009). The greatest advantage of using the chained 
multilateral productivity index is that it enables a plant-to-plant comparison with cross-
sectional data or panel data. It generates a hypothetical plant as a reference point for each 
cross-sectional observations and links hypothetical plants in each year over time. By 
linking hypothetical plants, the transitivity is ensured and it enables us to compare 
productivity levels between plants in different time periods. The reference point for a given 
year is constructed with the arithmetic mean of input shares and input levels, and equals 







Figure 4. Transitivity in Chained multilateral index approach 
 
The inputs, output, and productivity level of each plant can be measured relative to the 
reference point, hypothetical plant, of the base year. Thus, the productivity level of each 
plant in each year is measured relative to the hypothetical plant at the base year. This 
approach allows us to make transitive comparisons of productivity levels in panel data.   
The productivity index for plant b at time " is measured as follows:  














#he + #heVW)(E)ihe − E)iheVW  
where d, i, #, and !/% denote output, input, input share, and total factor productivity 
level, respectively. In this research, we considered three input factors of capital, labor, and 
intermediary inputs. In addition, the output was measured with the volume of production. 
Variables with the upper bar denote the corresponding arithmetic mean for input share and 




3.4.2 Decompose TFP growth  
TFP growth decomposition analysis is an appropriate methodology to link industrial 
dynamics and productivity growth. Ahn (2001) reviewed three widely used decomposition 
methodologies and summarized their advantages and disadvantages. In this study, the 
methodology introduced by Griliches and Regev (1995) was implemented. The first step is 
to calculate the aggregated productivity in the base and end years. The aggregated 
productivity is calculated as follows:  
 %8 = kc8lc8
c
 (22) 
where % and l represent aggregated and individual plant TFP, respectively, and k 
denotes the market share of the individual plant. Griliches and Regev (1995) suggested 
decomposing changes in productivity into four terms as follows:  
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c∈q
− kc8Vr(lc8Vr − %)
c∈s
  
where b, ", and " − t denote the individual plant, the base year, and the end year, 
respectively, and, the set of plants, u, (, and i denote continuing, entry, and exit plants, 
respectively. The continuing plants were plants that were observed in both "	and " − t 
periods. Entry plants were not observed in period " − t but observed in period ", and vice 
versa for exit plants. The bar over a variable denotes the average of the variable over the 
base and end years. Looking from left to right, the equation denotes: 1) within productivity 




share; 3) productivity changes resulted from newcomers; and, 4) productivity changes 
resulted from plants exiting the market. 
 
3.4.3 Survival analysis: Cox proportional hazard model  
The proportional hazard model was proposed by Cox in 1972. The main idea of the 
model was to regress the failure or hazard rates onto explanatory variables. In this research, 
the model was implemented to observe the effects of covariates on the hazard rate of plants. 
Specifically, the model is a semi-parametric model for the hazard function that allows the 
addition of explanatory variables and it keeps the baseline hazard as an arbitrary, 
unspecified, nonnegative function of time. The hazard rate of plants at time "  can be 
calculated as follows, 
 ℎ "c = ℎ: "c ∙ wFl{yzFc + {z|c " }  (24) 
where the function ℎ:  is the baseline hazard and it has the value of innate hazard 
without any effects from other covariates. Fc is a vector of time-independent covariates 
and |c(") is a vector of time-dependent covariates. Some covariates are treated as having 
constant values such as the employees or sales at the time of entry. These covariates have 
the same value in all periods, which is why they are time-independent covariates. On the 
other hand, some covariates vary over time, for example, productivity level, sales, and 
production. The left hand side of Equation (24), ℎ "c  denotes the hazard function that is 
the failure rate for a small interval of time. It becomes the instantaneous failure rate as ∆" 
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  (25) 
The unique effect of a unit change in a covariate is multiplicative with respect to the 
hazard rate of plant. The effect of the covariates contributing to the instantaneous failure 
can be obtained by regression analysis. If the coefficient of the covariate is negative, it 
decreases the instantaneous failure, and if the coefficient is positive, it increases the 
instantaneous failure.  
 
3.5 Data and variables 
3.5.1 Data  
The data used in this study were plant level data from the Annual Mining and 
Manufacturing Survey conducted by the Korean government covering the period of 1993 
to 2013. The survey collects information on all plants with 10 or more employees. The 
number of observations varies each year but shows a gradual increasing trend except in the 
two recession periods. Table 3 shows the number of observations classified by size of plants. 
Small, medium, and large plants had 10 to 50, 51 to 300, and 301 or more employees, 
respectively. Since the survey covers all plants with 10 or more employees, small size plants 
represent a large portion of the data, which is why there are a total number of plant changes 








Table 10. Number of observations by size 
 Number of Plants  
Year Small Medium Large Total 
1993 36,934 7,610 871 45,415 
1994 37,993 7,734 850 46,577 
1995 38,297 7,587 843 46,727 
1996 37,816 7,246 828 45,890 
1997 34,237 6,673 711 41,621 
1998 30,796 5,846 584 37,226 
1999 31,720 6,315 601 38,636 
2000 35,210 6,710 636 42,556 
2001 36,203 6,527 587 43,317 
2002 37,316 6,598 572 44,486 
2003 37,546 6,619 554 44,719 
2004 38,618 6,502 555 45,675 
2005 40,105 6,542 517 47,164 
2006 43,258 6,436 519 50,213 
2007 46,216 6,449 515 53,180 
2008 45,061 6,339 499 51,899 
2009 43,862 6,310 470 50,642 
2010 43,052 6,949 502 50,503 
2011 44,757 7,028 520 52,305 
2012 46,711 7,269 538 54,518 
2013 37,557 6,995 500 45,052 
Total 823,265 142,284 12,772 978,321 
 
Since this study aims to measure and decompose TFP growth over time from micro data, 
the most disaggregated unit of production data is needed in the study. In addition, the 




discussed earlier. Therefore, the identification of the plant’s market entry and exit has to be 
captured clearly. In this study, the market entry and exit of plants are identified based on 
the observed plants appearing and disappearing over time. Table 4 and Figure 3 show the 
market entry, exit, and turnover rate among the observations. We adopted the definitions of 
continuing, entering, and exiting plants on the basis of three time periods following 
previous literature (Bartelsman et al., 2003 and OECD, 2004). We defined the continuing 
plants that were observed in periods of " − 1, ", and " + 1. The entry plants were plants 
that were not observed in period of " − 1, however, observed in the period of " and " +
1. The exit plants are plants that were observed in the period of " − 1 and ", but were not 
observed in the period of " + 1. Some plants entered and exited in the same year. In other 
words, they were not observed in " − 1 and " + 1, yet only observed in ". As OECD 
(2004) noted that these short-lived plants may have possible measurement errors and/or ill-
defined data. Thus, we did not include these observations in the analysis.  
Table 11 shows the entry and exit dynamics from 1994 to 2012. Entry and exit rate 
fluctuate with the economic upturns and downturns. The exit rate of plants increases and 
entry rate decreases in economic downturns. Moreover, the entry rate increase seems to 
have lagged after both recession periods. Additionally, we examined the entry, exit, and 








Table 11. Entry, exit, and turnover rate 
Year Entry Rate Exit Rate Turnover Rate 
1994 0.163 0.138 0.301 
1995 0.195 0.191 0.386 
1996 0.142 0.160 0.302 
1997 0.104 0.197 0.301 
1998 0.133 0.239 0.373 
1999 0.194 0.157 0.351 
2000 0.232 0.130 0.362 
2001 0.152 0.134 0.285 
2002 0.159 0.132 0.290 
2003 0.201 0.196 0.397 
2004 0.171 0.150 0.321 
2005 0.161 0.128 0.289 
2006 0.196 0.132 0.328 
2007 0.147 0.088 0.235 
2008 0.098 0.122 0.220 
2009 0.087 0.112 0.199 
2010 0.159 0.1621 0.321 
2011 0.142 0.106 0.248 
2012 0.121 0.079 0.201 
 
                                            
1 Capital of some plants was not collected in a 2010 survey. Since the survey collects the average 
book value of capital stocks at the beginning and end of the year, we could restore from the data of 





Figure 5. Entry, exit, and turnover rate 
 
3.5.2 Variables  
Some variables were used to measure TFP level of individual plants. As in Equation 
(21), input and output variables are required. For the output variable, we used gross 
production. Additionally, we measured input by three dimensions: capital, material, and 
labor inputs. The survey collects the average book value of capital stocks at the beginning 
and end of the year. We used both average values for the capital stocks. Oh et al. (2009) 
discussed how the capital in Korean manufacturing has been traditionally used intensively 
with very small losses in the rate of capacity utilization. From this perspective, the book 
value of capital stock can be used as an appropriate measure of capital input. For 
intermediate input, we used major and other production cost as the variable. The major 
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manufactured goods, and maintenance costs. The other production cost includes the cost of 
advertising, transportation, communication, and insurance. Finally, the labor input was 
measured by the number of workers. The survey includes the number of production and 
non-production workers. All values, except labor input, were deflated to 2010. Specifically, 
the output was deflated by the producer price index (PPI), capital was deflated by the capital 
goods deflator, and the intermediary input was deflated by the intermediate input price 
index. All the deflators were obtained from the Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System. 
The descriptive statistics are attached in Appendix 3. Measuring TFP with a chained 
multilateral index requires a production function assumption of constant returns to scale. 
This assumption enables us to easily calculate factor input elasticities. In this study, labor 
and intermediate input elasticities were calculated as their average cost share within the 
same sized plant and same class in the five-digit industry code. Since the sum of the factor 
input elasticities equals one, the average cost share of capital can be computed by the 
deduction of labor and intermediate input elasticity from one. 
 
3.6 Results 
3.6.1 Calculation result of total factor productivity (TFP) 
Table 12 shows aggregated productivity weighted by the market share of each plant. 
Since the base year of the research is 1993, the productivity of 1993 is normalized to zero; 
this enables a comparison of the growth achieved relative to the productivity in 1993. From 




Crisis this average growth was 3.75% annually, but after the crisis it seems to have 
stagnated.  
 
Table 12. Aggregated productivity by year 
Year Productivity Growth 
1993 0.0000          N/A 
1994 0.0246 0.0246 
1995 0.0415 0.0169 
1996 0.0823 0.0409 
1997 0.1598 0.0775 
1998 0.1093 -0.0505 
1999 0.0364 -0.0729 
2000 0.0613 0.0249 
2001 0.1987 0.1374 
2002 0.2524 0.0537 
2003 0.3343 0.0820 
2004 0.4041 0.0698 
2005 0.4439 0.0397 
2006 0.4873 0.0434 
2007 0.5302 0.0430 
2008 0.6051 0.0748 
2009 0.5102 -0.0949 
2010 0.5602 0.0500 
2011 0.5973 0.0371 
2012 0.6211 0.0237 
2013 0.5954 -0.0256 
 
As Figure 6 describes, there were two productivity drops in the recession periods of 




a strong relationship with the business cycle as Basu and Fernald (2001) reported. They 
researched four possible explanations as to why productivity is pro-cyclical; in the Korean 
case, the pro-cyclic behavior may originate from the utilization of inputs that vary over the 
cycle and resource reallocation across plants with different marginal products may 
contribute to pro-cyclicality as well. 
 
 
Figure 6. Aggregated productivity growth (Base year: 1993) 
 
3.6.2 Decomposition analysis result of productivity growth  
Table 13 shows the productivity decomposition results for: within effect (within 
productivity changes in continuing plants), between effect (productivity changes resulting 
from changes in market share), entry effect (productivity changes resulted from 
newcomers), and exit effect (productivity changes resulted from plants exiting the market), 
as in equation (3). The results show a significant negative value for the within effect, 













productivity as a result of research and development (R&D) investment, and innovation in 
the plants. As plants generally decrease their investments and spending during recessions, 
the negative within effect during an economic crisis is reasonable. Moreover, as our study 
uses production as a variable measuring output, the decrease in demand during an economic 
downturn would lead to a decrease in production for plants, thus creating a negative within 
effect. 
Table 13. Productivity Growth Decomposition 
Period Within Effect Between Effect Entry Effect Exit Effect 
1993-1994 0.0622 -0.0414 0.0060 0.0022 
1994-1995 0.0662 -0.0514 0.0077 0.0055 
1995-1996 0.0246 0.0211 0.0016 0.0064 
1996-1997 0.0580 0.0173 0.0045 0.0023 
1997-1998 -0.0305 -0.0084 -0.0020 0.0096 
1998-1999 -0.0024 -0.0456 -0.0109 0.0141 
1999-2000 0.0452 -0.0173 0.0083 0.0114 
2000-2001 0.0744 0.0565 0.0094 0.0029 
2001-2002 0.0679 -0.0157 -0.0003 -0.0018 
2002-2003 0.0593 0.0094 0.0519 0.0386 
2003-2004 0.0649 -0.0026 0.0053 -0.0022 
2004-2005 0.0121 0.0212 0.0016 -0.0048 
2005-2006 0.0368 0.0028 -0.0005 -0.0043 
2006-2007 0.0358 -0.0009 0.0010 -0.0071 
2007-2008 0.0548 0.0208 -0.0012 -0.0004 
2008-2009 -0.1031 -0.0012 0.0074 -0.0020 
2009-2010 0.0576 -0.0112 0.0028 -0.0009 
2010-2011 0.0472 -0.0060 0.0000 0.0041 
2011-2012 0.0143 0.0082 0.0101 0.0087 





Figure 7. Productivity growth decomposition 
 
The entry effect during the research period showed a mixed result, with both a positive 
and negative aspect. In the Asian financial crisis period, it shows negative for the 
aggregated productivity. On the other hand, the majority of the entry effect in the global 
financial crisis period contributed positively to the aggregated productivity. This can be 
understood from two perspectives. First, the cleansing effect happened in productivity 
enhancing ways in the second crisis. Since the cleansing effect is one form of resource 
reallocation, the resources possessed by less productive plants were moved to more 
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possible to say that the resource reallocation was productivity enhancing in the global 
financial crisis period, yet it was not in the Asian financial crisis period. Second, the interest 
rate was remarkably high in the Asian financial crisis period, in contrast to the global 
financial crisis period. This high interest rate should have distorted the entry barrier by not 
promoting more productive plants to entry but instead it promoted plants with a huge 
owner’s equity. Finally, as the exit effects shows during the whole period of the research, 
we found that the exit criteria in the 1990s were not productivity enhancing. If productive 
plants had exited the market, the exit effect would have had a positive sign. Therefore, we 
can conclude that during the research period, the market selection criteria were not effective 
in filtering less productive plants. A similar positive exit effect was observed during the 
Asian financial crisis in the 1990s. This implies that the cleansing effect of liquidating 
plants with low productivity did not occur during the Asian financial crisis. However, the 
cleansing effect did turn negative in the early 2000s. Thus, we can assume that a systematic 
exit mechanism began to filter out plants with low productivity in the market at that point. 
This was due to the effort of the government to improve legislation and implement new 
mechanisms to liquidate firms with low productivity following the Asian financial crisis, 
as shown in section 3.3. We can confirm that the cleansing effect occurred during the 
recession of the global financial crisis since the exit effect negatively contributed during 
this period of time. Plants with low productivity were liquidated during this period, which 
would be the major explanation of the negative sign of the exit effect. This result is 




firms face financial constraints. As reviewed in Section 3.3, Korean firms had problems 
with high debt ratios and over expansion prior to the Asian financial crisis in the 1990s. 
Therefore, firms that were burdened by high financial costs when interest rates spiked were 
forced to liquidate. Since plants were more financially stable during the 2000s compared 
to the 1990s, the major criteria forcing plants to exit the market were not financial costs but 
rather productivity. In addition, we analyzed industry level productivity decomposition to 
examine the difference of the cleansing effect by industries. We found small industry 
specific differences, however, the main force behind the cleansing in the two crises showed 
an opposite result from the whole manufacturing industry level analysis. The industry level 
decomposition result is attached in an Appendix 4.  
 
3.6.3 Survival analysis result: Cox proportional hazard model  
The result of productivity growth decomposition analysis showed that the exit effect in 
two crises was differently contributed on productivity growth. In other words, the negative 
exit effect during the Asian financial crisis means that exit of plants occurred regardless of 
the productivity of the plant. On the other hand, the positive exit effect during the global 
financial crisis means that exit of plants with low productivity were mostly exited. From 
this difference, we can suppose the selection criteria of two crises was different. Survival 
analysis was implemented to describe the selection criteria in two crises. The variables used 





Table 14. Variables and description 
Variables Definition 
TFP Level of total factor productivity of plant 
Sales Logarithm of annual gross sales of plant 
Assets Logarithm of annual tangible asset of plant 
Crisis Dummy variable indicating whether the year was in crisis period  
or not (Crisis = 1, Otherwise = 0) 
 
Two survival models were estimated as shown in following Equation (26) and (27).  
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Tables 15 and 16 show the Cox proportional hazard regression results. Table 15 shows 
the results of the Cox regression without stratification and Table 16 shows the results of the 
Cox regression with stratification by two-digit industry codes and plant size. The first and 
second columns of both Tables 15 and 16 have observations between 1993 and 2002. The 
third and fourth columns of both Tables 15 and 16 have observations between 2003 and 
2013. Model I and II show the market selection criteria in the Asian financial crisis and 
Models III and IV show the market selection criteria in the global financial crisis. For 







Table 15. Cox PH regression result 
  
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
(1993-2002) (1993-2002) (2003-2013) (2003-2013) 
TFP 0.2875 *** 0.2716 *** 0.0942 *** 0.1157 *** 
  (0.0083 ) (0.0097 ) (0.0095 ) (0.0100 ) 
Sales -0.2979 *** -0.2870 *** -0.1836 *** -0.1710 *** 
  (0.0057 ) (0.0067 ) (0.0046 ) (0.0050 ) 
Asset -0.0569 *** -0.0628 *** -0.0199 *** -0.0086 ** 
  (0.0042 ) (0.0050 ) (0.0035 ) (0.0038 ) 
Crisis     0.2174 ***     1.3762 *** 
      (0.0512 )     (0.0669 ) 
Crisis*TFP     0.0352 *     -0.1351 *** 
      (0.0185 )     (0.0305 ) 
Crisis*Sales     -0.0246 **     -0.172 *** 
      (0.0125 )     (0.0137 ) 
Crisis*Asset     0.0169 *     -0.0733 *** 
      (0.0094 )     (0.0105 ) 
Log likelihood -756408.48 -710305.12 -942752.01 -755395.11 
No. of Obs. 349,483 349,483 419,625 419,625 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard 
errors are given in parentheses. 
 
As we reviewed in Section 3.4, the dependent variable, ℎ "b  is a failure rate of firm 
b	in time ". The explanatory variables used in Equation (26) vary over time, and we treated 
all covariates, TFP, sales, and assets, as time-dependent covariates. Since, the dependent 
variable is a failure rate of plants, the signs of coefficients of explanatory variables capture 
the effect of TFP, sales, and assets on a firm’s survival. First, the plant’s sales and assets 




increase in sales and assets decrease the failure rate. In other words, they increase the 
survival rate of a plant and thus, they have a positive association with the survival of the 
plant. On the other hand, the variable TFP showed a negative association with survival. 
This means that in the 1990s, the Korean market selection criteria relied heavily on the size 
of a plant’s sales and assets rather than its productivity. In this environment, it is hard to 
expect that the continuing plants had higher productivity than plants that exited. As 
mentioned in section 3, in the 1990s, plants needed to be large to survive. Plants had to 
enlarge their assets and size to compete, and thereby, may have suffered more severely from 
the Asian financial crisis. The results are shown with the interaction term the dummy 
variable ‘Crisis’, which has a value of 1 in recession periods and 0 otherwise. Productivity 
and sales in a crisis showed the same effect in non-recession periods. This implies that even 
in the Asian financial crisis period, sales were more helpful than productivity to survive. 
However, the assets in the crisis period showed the opposite effect in the non-crisis period, 
Model I, on a survival of a plant. Excessive asset investment brought a boomerang effect 
for survival in the crisis period. Regression result of the stratified Cox PH model is 
summarized on Table 16. Since the model is stratified with industry and plant size, we can 
expect that the results in Table 16 is dependent from the industry and size effect. As we can 







Table 16. Cox PH regression result: Stratified by size and industry 
  
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
(1993-2002) (1993-2002) (2003-2013) (2003-2013) 
TFP 0.1233 *** 0.0977 *** 0.1097 *** 0.1330 *** 
  (0.0138 ) (0.0150 ) (0.0099 ) (0.0104 ) 
Sales -0.2599 *** -0.2456 *** -0.1911 *** -0.1764 *** 
  (0.0065 ) (0.0075 ) (0.0050 ) (0.0053 ) 
Asset -0.0941 *** -0.1015 *** -0.0115 *** 0.0001 
  (0.0052 ) (0.0058 ) (0.0037 ) (0.0040 ) 
Crisis     0.2853 ***     1.3778 *** 
      (0.0560 )     (0.6749 ) 
Crisis*TFP     0.0425 **     -0.1484 *** 
      (0.0203 )     (0.0304 ) 
Crisis*Sales     -0.0325 **     -0.1696 *** 
      (0.0132 )     (0.1376 ) 
Crisis*Asset     0.0152     -0.0760 *** 
      (0.0097 )     (0.0105 ) 
Log likelihood -536995.20 -653314.29 -504740.53 -522146.94 
No. of Obs. 349,483 349,483 419,625 419,625 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard 
errors are given in parentheses. 
 
After the Asian financial crisis, the Korean government strived to strengthen their 
financial and market institutions. However, as Model III shows, it is difficult to determine 
whether this has been effective. Although the institutions still work in the same way as in 
the 1990s, the crisis period revealed a very different market selection process. Productivity, 
sales, and assets of a plant all showed a positive effect on survival. This means that the less 




Thus, we can say that the global financial crisis brought the cleansing effect to the Korean 
economy. This study can be evidence that supports the argument that the cleansing effect 
may not occur when there are financial constraints. The Asian financial crisis was a period 
with financial constraints and, as a result, showed no cleansing effect. On the other hand, 
the global financial crisis originated from U.S. financial sector, so it had a very limited 
magnitude of influence in the Korean financial sector. This could be one explanation as to 
why the cleansing effect occurred then and not earlier in Korea in its two large recessions.  
 
3.7 Sub-conclusion  
This study examined the relationship between the business cycle and creative 
destruction. Specifically, we focused on the cleansing hypothesis that creative destruction 
occurs in economic downturns. We analyzed two large recessions in Korea, the Asian 
financial crisis in the 1990s, and the global financial crisis in the 2000s to find evidence to 
support the occurrence of the cleansing effect. We measured and decomposed the 
productivity dynamics in Korea rather than examine employment dynamics, as done in 
some previous literature to observe resource reallocation. We found no evidence in the 
period of Asian financial crisis, however, we did find evidence to support the cleansing 
hypothesis from the global financial crisis. Additionally, we described the market selection 
criteria in both crises with the Cox proportional hazard regression. After the Asian financial 
crisis, the selection criteria of the market evolved to encompass creative destruction. During 




survival, but in the crisis period the large amount of assets backfired. On the other hand, in 
the crisis of the 2000s, the selection criteria became productive enhancing, that is, less 
productive plants were more likely to leave the market rather than those with large amount 
of assets.  
This study presents several policy implications. First, the cleansing effect or the process 
of creative destruction may vary depending on economic context. During the Asian 
financial crisis, financial institutions were not properly managed and did not lead to a 
productivity-enhancing reallocation. In contrast, with the improvement in the financial 
institutions after the first crisis, the process of creative destruction during the following 
economic downturn had a better outcome as productivity enhancing. Second, this study 
presents a new perspective on economic crises. It is generally accepted that every economy 
faces cycles, and therefore, economic downturns are unavoidable. Sometimes, a minor 
problem in a sector may trigger an economic recession at a macro level. It would be best if 
there was a way to escape such crises or minimize their impact on the economic system. 
However, such crises can also be viewed as opportunities for reallocating resources to 
enhance productivity. In short, there could be a silver lining to economic recessions. To 
facilitate such silver linings during economic downturns, institutional improvements are 
indispensable as a means to establish the environment in which creative destruction occurs 






Chapter 4. Identifying the Real Zombie Firms:  
The Role of Finance  
 
4.1 Introduction  
Firms experience the process of birth, growth, decline, and exit in a similar fashion to 
human beings. If a firm has accumulated competitiveness internally and the market 
environment is favorable to the firm, the firm will grow. Even if a firm is competitive, its 
growth can stagnate or decline if the market condition is unfavorable. The opposite also 
holds. In a booming market, a firm may not grow if it lacks competitiveness. Therefore, it 
is possible that the firm continues to grow only when both internal and external conditions 
are met. On the other hand, if either the internal or the external situation is disadvantageous 
to the firm, the firm is likely to stop growing and to become insolvent. In particular, when 
the growth of the economy as a whole slows down, corporate insolvency accelerates, 
because it is impossible for the company to cope with the decline of the economy. When a 
corporation becomes insolvent, the choice has to be made of whether to revive 
restructurethe corporation or allow it to exit. The discussion on restructuring is still 
debatable. There is a perspective that delaying restructuring is undesirable for the efficient 
use of resources (Baird & Jackson, 2002). On the other hand, there is also a view that 
excessive restructuring can reduce efficiency and negatively affect long-term growth 




financial crisis, the firm performance may improve as the economy recovers. However, if 
a firm loses its competitiveness, it is common for the firm to become insolvent over a long 
period of time. These firms are called zombie firms; firms that are unable to generate profits 
and introduce external funds through borrowing or the issuance of corporate bonds for 
subsistence. From the perspective of industrial dynamics, a number of studies on the issue 
of zombie firms argue that zombie firms need to be exited, not just because they are not 
productive, but also as they are a barrier to the process of resource reallocation in the market. 
From this perspective, it is reasonable to see that a zombie firm deserves to be exited from 
the market. However, the very heart of the zombie phenomenon is that there be a capacity 
to identify the real zombie firms and those firms that are in business difficulty and look like 
zombie firms. The definition of zombie firms is that firms that have a serious problem in 
their business activities and have a low probability of recovering, yet do not exit and rely 
on external financial support. On the other hand, firms that look like zombie firms face 
issues of liquidity due to problems in their operations in the short term. It is not uncommon 
that a firm experiences problem because of a large-scale investment for long-term growth, 
or when the market environment deteriorates and profit is not generated. Therefore, it is 
essential to identify these firms when discussing their exit from the market. Also, 
preferential support is required for firms that are expected to recover in the short term.  
This study attempts to approach the problem of zombie firms from a different 
perspective than previous studies. Chapter 4 is composed as follows. Section 4.2 discusses 




companies and draws research hypotheses. Section 4.4 describes the methodology used in 
this study. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 describe the data, variables, and empirical analysis used in 
the study. Finally, Section 4.7 presents a summary of the study and policy implications. 
 
4.2 Literature review  
4.2.1 Zombie firms in previous literature  
The existing studies on zombie firms have mainly focused on the long-term recession 
period of Japan. Zombie firms are not merely insolvent firms, but firms that survive in a 
state of low productivity and depend on external financial support (Ahearne & Shinada, 
2005). They have been called zombie firms, because their performance has worsened and 
they should have been exited or bankrupted; but they are still surviving with the help of 
banks and creditors.  
Ahearne and Shinada (2005) analyzed the zombie problem, that is, the increasing 
number of zombie firms in Japan, by linking it with the causes of low economic growth in 
the 1990s, which is called the Lost Decade of Japan. They argued that if a bank provides 
an interest discount to a zombie firm to prevent bankruptcy, the bank has to provide the 
loan with a higher interest rate than it does to other normal firms. From the empirical 
analysis, the authors found that there was productivity growth stagnation, the main cause 
of which was a decreased degree of resource and market reallocation. In addition, 
productivity deteriorates in industries with a high proportion of zombie firms, since the 




identified zombie firms in Japanese industry and analyzed the characteristics of zombie 
firms. He found that zombie firms have lower profit margins, higher debt ratios, and are 
more dependent on main banks than normal firms. In addition, it was confirmed that as the 
proportion of zombie firms increases, new employment decreases and the destruction of 
existing jobs increases. Caballero et al. (2008) also identified zombie firms in Japan in the 
same way as Hoshi’s (2006) identification method. According to their identification, the 
proportion of zombie firms in the 1980s was 5–10%, but since the early 1990s, the 
proportion of zombie companies has increased and reached more than 30% by the mid-
1990s. Also, they found that the productivity gap between zombie firms and normal firms 
was increasing over time, and both employment and productivity growth was decreasing 
in industries where the proportion of zombie firms was increasing.  
The findings of Fukao and Kwon (2006) support the arguments of the above studies. 
They conducted a productivity growth decomposition analysis in the 1990s using Japanese 
firm level data. They found that productivity growth from firms’ entry and exit contributes 
negatively, or by very little if positive, from 1994 to 2001. The productivity growth from 
resource or market reallocation decreased as zombie firms increased. Studies on zombie 
firms also have been conducted in Korea. Hoshi and Kim (2012) identified zombie firms 
in Korea in the mid-2000s based on two variables: financial cost to sales ratio and loan 
extension ratio. Empirical results show that their results are similar to those of Japanese 
zombie firms. Recently, Muge (2017) conducted a study on the increase of zombie firms in 




and Slovenia. The results confirmed the increase of the proportion of zombie companies in 
some countries, and revealed that productivity growth slowed down as the proportion of 
zombie companies increased.  
From the above discussion, some facts about zombie firms can be summarized. First of 
all, zombie firms refer to firms that are underperforming and rely on external support not 
to exit or go bankrupt. Second, zombie firms are less productive than normal firms, and the 
productivity gap widens as the zombie duration continues. Third, zombie firms impair 
industrial or national level productivity by interrupting the process of resource reallocation. 
Finally, it can be seen that the problem of zombie companies is concentrated in some 
specific countries.  
 
4.2.2 Role of finance and finance system 
One factor that most countries with problems of zombie firms have in common is that 
they have a credit based financial system. Muge (2017) reported an increase in zombie 
firms except in the UK, France, and Slovenia, among the nine countries listed above. In 
this context, Dosi’s (1990) classification of financial systems from the perspective of 
evolutionary economics sheds a light on zombie firms different from previous studies. He 
argued that the dynamics of an industry, including the exit of a firm, could vary according 
to differences in the financial system. Evolutionary economics recognizes that the evolution 
of the economy proceeds through two processes: learning and selection. Learning is a 




Also, selection refers to the process of achieving efficiency of resource utilization through 
the process of reward and punishment by society in the evaluation of the performance of 
the firm. Dosi (1990) distinguished between credit based systems and market based systems. 
Learning and selection processes may differ in the two financial systems. The difference 
between the two systems is as follows. 
First of all, a market based financial system is more responsive to the firm’s revealed 
performance. The difference is also seen in the method of identification of zombie firms by 
the central banks of Korea and the UK. The Bank of England, the UK’s central bank, 
identifies firms that have suffered losses over the last one year as zombie firms (Bank of 
England, 2013). In contrast, the Bank of Korea, Korea’s central bank, identifies firms with 
a higher interest expenditure than operating income over the past three years in a row as 
zombie firms (Bank of Korea, 2016). We can observe the difference in patience with a firm 
as its profit decreases.  
Second, firms in the credit based financial system have more opportunities for 
cumulative learning. In order for firms to introduce new innovations, learning processes 
must be preceded by trial and error, and during the process of trial and error, there can be 
only cost, but no profit. Credit based financial systems are less sensitive to the firm’s 
revealed performance than market based financial systems. Even if the process of trial and 
error of firms is prolonged or learning outcomes are not accepted into the market, there is 
a strong tendency to be patient with firms to continue learning new strategies. On the other 




rapidly and its survival is under threat in market based financial systems.  
Third, a credit based financial system shows a higher discretionality of resource 
allocative processes by financial agents. The main bank systems of Korea and Japan, and 
Hausbank of Germany, act as good examples. The relationship between the firm and the 
bank is based on close and long-term cooperation and that makes banks actively provide 
long-term investment funds to firms. In general, if a firm is not growing or performing 
poorly, the bank does not offer an additional loan or else it seeks to increase the interest 
rate for the risk. Hoshi’s (2006) study revealed that zombie firms are more reliant on their 
main banks than are normal firms and this implies that banks have high discretionality in 
credit based financial systems.  
 
Table 17. A taxonomy of features and properties of ‘stylized’ financial systems 
Properties Market based systems Credit based systems 
Selective pressure on  













diversification of  
incumbent firms 
More specialization More diversification 




Therefore, the difference between the two financial systems can be seen as a source of 
differences in the learning and exit processes of firms in the two systems. From this 
perspective, Dosi (1990) argued that finance plays a role in selection in the capitalist system 
and generates the dynamics of industry through two paths. The first path is a direct way: 
this is to induce more investment and growth of firms by providing more credit to firms 
with good performance. The second path is an indirect way: that is, the financial sector 
generates the information that the performance of the firm shows that it deserves to get 
financial support and this signal can influence other financial agents.  
The selection role of the finance system can also be found in the general role of finance, 
as noted by Levine (2005). Levine summarized the operation of finance as comprising five 
functions. First of all, finance mobilizes and concentrates savings. It minimizes the 
transaction cost of mobilizing savings from multiple individuals and overcoming 
information asymmetry problems. Second, finance generates information and allocates 
resources based on the available information. Agents in the finance sector are more 
advantaged than are individuals in terms of information acquisition and its costs. Based on 
this information, agents invest and allocate resources. Third, finance exercises its control 
over the firm and its business. As a supplier of capital, it plays a role in managing and 
supervising how a firm uses the supplied resources. Fourth, finance spreads the associated 
risks through diversification. Financial institutions can significantly reduce their 
investment risk through diversification of risk. Fifth, finance enables easy exchange of 




To summarize the above discussion, it can be seen that finance plays a role in evaluating, 
selecting, and monitoring the object of investment by mobilizing the resources of society. 
Thus, it is possible to argue that the finance sector can exert influence over the survival and 
exit of firms by providing resources within the capitalist system. 
 
4.3 Research hypothesis   
Korea has a credit based financial system, and the pressure to exit the business is weaker 
than in the United States or the UK, which have central banking systems as reviewed above. 
Bank of Korea (2016) and Muge (2017) reported that Korea is one of the countries with a 
high proportion of zombie firms. As we reviewed in the literature, many studies on zombie 
firms recognized that such firms should be held liable, because they interrupt metabolism 
in the industry, this being the process of creative destruction claimed by Schumpeter. 
However, countries with serious zombie firm problems have a common financial system, 
that is, a credit based financial system. If the credit based financial system is more 
advantageous for cumulative learning and more patient with underperforming firms than 
the market based financial system, and thus the market pressure to exit is not strong, the 
increase of zombie firms might be a natural phenomenon that occurs in the credit based 
system.  
When we consider the nature of R&D investment, which is the source of corporate 
learning processes, we can expect firms that have invested in R&D may underperform in 




characteristics: non-specificity, costliness, time lag, and uncertainty. First, non-specificity 
is also called externality, as opposed to appropriability. Non-specificity indicates that the 
result of R&D investment is not limited to R&D performers, but that the results may diffuse 
to other firms. Second, costliness means R&D investment requires a long time and a variety 
of resources from basic research to applied and development research. Third, there is a time 
lag until the R&D investment appears as a result. That is, R&D investment takes a certain 
period to be reflected in the product or service of a firm. Lastly, uncertainty of R&D 
investment is consistent with technological uncertainty and market uncertainty. 
Technological uncertainty indicates that new scientific knowledge may or may not be 
discovered at the time of investment. Market uncertainty refers to the possibility that new 
products or services may not be accepted in the market. In particular, Mazzucato (2013) 
argued that R&D investment is betting on the future, and that most attempts result in failure. 
Also, the uncertainty of R&D investment is a form of “Knightian uncertainty” (Knight, 
1921), that is, unlike a lottery where the probability of winning can be calculated, R&D 
investment cannot be calculated as a probability.  
In summary, a new perspective can be proposed on zombie firms. First of all, 
underperforming firms might be left as zombie firms because of a financial system that has 
low exit pressure. Second, a learning process is essential for companies to create new 
scientific discoveries and innovations, and R&D investment is necessary for learning. 
However, R&D investment is often unsuccessful because of high uncertainty. These 




case. Therefore, a firm identified as a zombie firm may be not competitive and deserves to 
be eliminated or may be a firm that has invested in R&D, but failed to overcome uncertainty 
and worsened its performance. If these two types of firms are identified as zombie firms, 
we have to reconsider whether eliminating all of them is a desirable restructuring. Many 
zombie firms eventually exit, but some zombie firms overcome their zombie status and 
recover to become normal firms again. In this context, this study tries to identify the 
characteristics of firms that overcome their zombie status in terms of cumulative learning. 
Also, if the zombies are heavily reliant on external financial support, there is a need to 
investigate the kind of evaluation that financial institutions undertake in assessing the 
cumulative learning of firms with zombie status.  
 
4.4 Empirical strategy   
This study focused on answering two questions about zombie firms and financial 
support. The first question was to find out which of the zombie companies were exiting and 
which ones would overcome their zombie status in terms of cumulative learning. The 
second was to examine which zombie firms succeeded in getting additional financial 
support. In order to answer these questions, two empirical analyses based on the competing 
risk model and a probit model were implemented.  
 
4.4.1 Competing risk model  
The competing risk model is a multistate model used to explain the transition from one 




of overcoming firms and exiting firms among zombie firms. Since zombie firms face one 
of the three following consequences: eventually exiting, overcoming zombie status, or 
maintaining zombie status until the end of observation, therefore, the competing risk model 
is an appropriate approach to compare firm characteristics between the overcoming group 
and the exiting group. In this study, the cause-specific hazard model of Prentice et al. (1978) 
and the subdistribution proportional hazard model of Fine and Gray (1999) were reviewed 
for implementation.  
 
4.4.1.1 Cause-specific hazard model  
Competitive risk models require an understanding of risk sets and competing risks. The 
risk set at time " refers to a set of firms that have not experienced events, have not been 
censored, and are likely to be at risk in the future. If there are t  hazards, event Ñ is 
defined by the event occurring from hazard Ö. If event Ñ occurs, the cause-specific hazard 
model treats it as if it was censored from all other events except Ñ. The cause-specific 
hazard of hazard Ö is defined as:  
 		ℎg " = lim
78→:
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  (28) 
Since the hazard function can be expressed with a probability density function and survival 
function, ℎg "  can be rewritten as Equation (29):  
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The cumulative distribution function of specific event Ñ, /g
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According to the definition of the probability density function, the probability density 
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Since /g
∗ "  and 3g
∗ "  are improper distributions with 3g
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denoted with a superscript asterisk. The survival function is given by the definition as:   
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The proportional hazard model based on the cause-specific model can be written as:  
 			ℎg "; î = ℎg: " exp î8{g , ïℎw&w		Ö = 1,2, … , ó	  (33) 
Holt (1978) derived the partial likelihood function of {g from Equation (34) as follows in 













"g ò 	(ü = 1, … , Bg) denotes Bg  events from hazard Ö , X{"g ò } denotes the risk set at 
time "g ò , and |g ò  denotes the covariates of "g ò , respectively. Estimates for Equation 
(34) can be obtained using maximum likelihood estimation. 
The cause-specific model estimates the regression coefficient by treating events other 
than the event of interest as censored. That is, the events from ℎW "  and ℎY "  are 
considered as independent in the model. Thus, in some cases, this identification can be a 




the investment can put the firm at risk for over-expenditure of cash. However, the cause-
specific model cannot consider two paths of effect of a covariate at the same time. This 
means that the research has to determine between two cases: the firm’s investment is helpful 
for the firm or obstructive for the firm.  
 
4.4.1.2 Subdistribution model: Fine & Gray (1999) model 
Unlike cause-specific hazards, the subdistribution hazard is obtained from a defined 
risk set. The risk set for cause 1 at time "  includes all observations that have not 
experienced event 1 and are not censored. For example, if a firm is already exposed to cause 
2 and we cannot observe the status of the firm, the firm is still included in the risk set of 
cause 1. In particular, the subdistribution of event Ñ is defined as:  
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Let !∗ = £ Ü = Ö 	×	! + {1 − £ Ü = Ö )}	×	∞; then, the distribution function of !∗  is 
/g
∗ "; î  and its probability density function 3g
∗ "; î  can be written as equation (36).  
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  (36) 
When " = ∞, the following holds:  
 Pr !∗ = ∞; î = Pr ! < ∞, Ü ≠ Ö; î = 1 −		/g ∞; î   (37) 
Fine and Gray (1999) suggested a competing risk survival model based on Cox’s (1972) 




 MW "; î = MW: t exp	(îô{)  (38) 
MW denotes the hazard for event 1; MW: "  denotes the subdistribution of event 1 and is 
assumed to be a monotonically increasing function.  
The cause-specific model has the problem of recognizing the effects of covariates 
differently. On the other hand, the subdistribution model includes the possibility that the 
effect of covariates can vary depending on the firm. Using the previous example again, the 
subdistribution model considers that a firm’s investment can lead the firm to grow or can 
put the firm at risk at the same time. Therefore, when it is not possible to specify the effects 
of certain covariates precisely, it is more appropriate to use the subdistribution model than 
the cause-specific model.  
 
4.4.2 Probit model  
The probit model is a regression model that is widely used when the dependent variable 
is of binary form. In this study, we use the model to identify which firms in the zombie 
state are financially supported. The probit model is estimated by the maximum likelihood 
estimation method. Let %c denote the probability that dependent variable dc has the value 
of 1; then the probability that dependent variable dc has the value of 0 equals 1 − %c. The 
maximum likelihood function can be expressed as:  
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Since %c  can be specified by %c = 3(ic




following Equation (40).  
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Equation (41) is the logarithmic transformation of Equation (40).  
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4.5 Data and variables 
4.5.1 Data  
This study used two databases, namely KISVALUE and KIPRIS. KISVALUE is the 
oldest and most reliable firm level micro database in Korea (Kim & Lee, 2016) and 
provides financial data of the entire cohort of manufacturing firms listed on the KSE (Korea 
Stock Exchange) and the KOSDAQ (Korea Securities Dealers Automated Quotation) and 
on many non-publicly traded but externally audited registered firms. In this study, 
observations from 1981 to 2014 were used for analysis. All of the variables such as sales, 
investment, etc., were converted into constant values using the producer price index (PPI) 
as of 2010. The KIPRIS database provided by Korea Patent Information Service was used 
to observe the number of patent applications. The two databases were merged by using the 
unique corporation registration number.   
The acting definition of a zombie firm is a firm that has a low possibility of overcoming 




Since the low possibility of overcoming is a subjective evaluation, a specific identification 
method of zombie firms is required. Table 18 summarizes the identification methods for 
zombie firms used in previous studies. In this investigation, we will follow the 
identification method of Bank of Korea (2016), that is a firm whose interest coverage ratio 
(operating profit / interest expense) is less than 100% for the third consecutive year. This 
is because the identification method has not only been used widely in Korean zombie firm 
research (Nam & Jeong, 2015; Cho & Park, 2016), but also in international comparative 
studies (Muge, 2017).  
 
Table 18. Identification of zombie firms in pervious literature 
Literature Identification 
Caballero et al. 
(2008) 
Firms with lower interest expense than market interest rate  
Hefan and Zhuhe 
(2016)  
Firms subject to interest rates lower than interest rates applicable to 
the most favorable firms  
Bank of Korea 
(2016) 
Firms with an interest coverage ratio (the ratio of operating income 
to interest expenses) less than one for three consecutive years 
Bank of England 
(2013) 
Firms with negative profit 
 









Table 19. Number of zombie and non-zombie firms: 1981 - 2014 
 Number of firms Share of  
zombie firms Year Zombie Non-Zombie Total 
1981 12 119 131 0.09 
1982 14 171 185 0.08 
1983 25 262 287 0.09 
1984 72 662 734 0.10 
1985 87 803 890 0.10 
1986 97 944 1,041 0.09 
1987 123 1,083 1,206 0.10 
1988 130 1,230 1,360 0.10 
1989 201 1,243 1,444 0.14 
1990 266 1,315 1,581 0.17 
1991 341 1,444 1,785 0.19 
1992 401 1,454 1,855 0.22 
1993 409 1,455 1,864 0.22 
1994 453 1,727 2,180 0.21 
1995 534 2,423 2,957 0.18 
1996 574 2,888 3,462 0.17 
1997 690 3,637 4,327 0.16 
1998 730 4,081 4,811 0.15 
1999 744 4,730 5,474 0.14 
2000 700 5,196 5,896 0.12 
2001 727 5,661 6,388 0.11 
2002 833 6,728 7,561 0.11 
2003 943 7,406 8,349 0.11 
2004 1,050 7,401 8,451 0.12 
2005 1,209 7,426 8,635 0.14 
2006 1,358 7,794 9,152 0.15 
2007 1,498 8,176 9,674 0.15 




Table 19. Number of zombie and non-zombie firms: 1981 – 2014 (continued) 
 Number of firms Share of  
zombie firms Year Zombie Non-zombie Total 
2009 1,474 8,378 9,852 0.15 
2010 1,239 8,490 9,729 0.13 
2011 1,017 8,589 9,606 0.11 
2012 877 9,080 9,957 0.09 
2013 632 9,422 10,054 0.06 
2014 569 9,921 10,490 0.05 
Total 21,551 149,624 171,175 0.13 
 
The proportion of zombie firms in Korea is maintained at over 10%, as we can see from 
Table 19. From 2012 to 2014, the number of zombie firms seems to decline, yet this is not 
an actual decline. This is because the identification method requires at least three years of 
observation; however, the observations from 2012 could not meet this requirement. 
Therefore, the estimated number of zombie firms will be smaller than the actual number, 
because it will not include zombie companies entering this state from 2012. The purpose 
of this study is to find the differences between the overcoming firms and the exiting firms 
in the zombie state. Therefore, accurate definitions of overcoming and exiting are needed. 
Among the identified zombie companies, overcoming firms were identified as zombie 
firms with two or more consecutive years of interest coverage ratio of 1 or more after 
zombie status. The reason for setting the period of interest coverage ratio as 1 or more for 
two consecutive years is that zombie firms that secure liquidity by selling off their assets 




into being zombies in the short term. Also, the exit of a firm was identified when one was 
observed at time ", but was not observed at time " + 1.  
 
Table 20. Number of zombie firms by overcome, exit, remain groups: 1981 – 2014  
Year Overcome Exit Remain Total 
1981 0 0 12 12 
1982 0 0 14 14 
1983 0 0 25 25 
1984 2 0 70 72 
1985 3 0 84 87 
1986 2 3 92 97 
1987 17 1 105 123 
1988 25 1 104 130 
1989 5 1 195 201 
1990 7 1 258 266 
1991 6 1 334 341 
1992 29 17 355 401 
1993 35 5 369 409 
1994 43 4 406 453 
1995 28 6 500 534 
1996 37 7 530 574 
1997 40 21 629 690 
1998 67 16 647 730 
1999 116 38 590 744 
2000 89 14 597 700 
2001 75 3 649 727 
2002 71 5 757 833 
2003 77 18 848 943 
2004 88 20 942 1,050 




Table 19. Number of zombie firms by overcome, exit, remain groups: 1981 – 2014 
        (continued) 
Year Overcome Exit Remain Total 
2006 74 55 1,229 1,358 
2007 69 131 1,298 1,498 
2008 104 126 1,292 1,522 
2009 141 128 1,205 1,474 
2010 143 127 969 1,239 
2011 133 109 775 1,017 
2012 141 112 624 877 
2013 0 9 623 632 
Total 1,751 1,012 18,219 20,982 
 
As we can see in Table 20 above, around 10% of firms annually overcome their zombie 
status. Also, it was found that the number of firms that overcome is greater than the number 
of firms that exit. These figures show that firms that are identified as zombies are not 
necessarily the real zombie firms.  
 
4.5.2 Variables 
In this study, we used the following variables to confirm the relationship between firm 
cumulative learning and overcoming zombie status. Variable R&D stock was included to 
measure the cumulative R&D investment of firms. R&D stock for a given year was 
measured by summing up annual R&D expenditures for the previous years, each 
depreciation rate being 0.15, following Griliches (1995) and Kim and Lee (2016). Patent 




one patent, the dummy variable has the value of 1 and is 0 otherwise. As a result of R&D 
investment, firms apply for patents as a means to protect new scientific discoveries. Since 
patent applications have a small time lag compared with patent registration, it is possible 
to recognize that the learning has occurred internally if the firm applied for a patent. The 
total liabilities variable was included in the analysis considering the characteristics of the 
zombie firms. As we have seen in Section 5.2, zombie firms are heavily reliant on external 
support. Firms with large liabilities mean that the firm has received much support from the 
financial sector, and we need to examine how this financial support affected the overcoming 
or elimination of the zombie situation. Also, the number of employees was included in the 
analysis to control the effects of the size of the firm. The above variables and definitions 
are summarized in Table 21 below. 
 
Table 21. Variables and definition 
Variables Definition 
R&D Logarithm of annual R&D stock (depreciation rate: 0.15) 
Patenting Dummy variable for patent application  
Debt Logarithm of total debt 
Size Logarithm of employees 
 
4.6 Result  
4.6.1 Regression result of competing risk model  





											M "c = M: "c ∙ wFl {WX&© + {Y%R"w)" + {©wS" + {Å#b|w   (42) 
Model I is the regression result for firms that have overcome zombie status, and Model 
II is the regression result for firms that have exited. If the regression coefficient shows a 
positive value, it increases the probability of overcoming (or exiting) from the zombie state, 
and if it has a negative value, it is interpreted as decreasing the probability of occurrence.  
 
Table 22. Regression result: Competing risk model  
  Model I Model II 
 (Overcome) (Exit) 
R&D 0.013 * -0.026 ** 
 (0.008 ) (0.011 ) 
Patenting 0.275 *** 0.084 
  (0.079 ) (0.104 ) 
Debt -0.355 *** -0.014 
 (0.029 ) (0.041 ) 
Size 0.307 *** -0.473 *** 
  (0.035 ) (0.036 ) 
   
Industry dummy Controlled Controlled 
Year dummy Controlled Controlled 
Log likelihood -12500.049 -5810.8974 
Number of Observations 17,586 17,586 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard 
errors are given in parentheses. 
 
The results show that there is a significant difference between the firms that overcome 




recovering from zombie status to being normal status enterprises. In addition, the firms that 
applied for patents while in zombie status showed a higher probability for recovery than 
firms that did not apply for a patent. Despite the managerial difficulties such firms face, it 
has been found that actively engaging in cumulative learning through R&D investment and 
protecting their achievements can help them overcome their difficulties. Also, cumulative 
learning of firms has been shown to contribute to reducing the probability of exit. It can be 
seen that there is an innovation premium, which is one of the stylized facts on firm survival, 
even though it is applied to a company with the status of zombie. In terms of the size of the 
firm, it is found to be advantageous to overcome the zombie status when the company size 
is large. Also, the size of the firm contributes positively to firm survival, as we can see from 
Model II. This can be interpreted as the “liability of smallness” among the stylized facts on 
firm survival as reviewed in Chapter 1.  
 
4.6.2 Regression result of probit model  
The following Equation (43) was estimated based on the probit model to identify the 
factors that see zombie firms receive additional financial support. The dependent variable 
has the value 1 if total liability increased from last year, and has the value 0 otherwise.  
Qc8 = y + {WX&© + {Y%R"w)" + {©wS" + {Å#b|w + Üc8  (43) 






       Table 23. Regression result: Probit model 
  Model III 
 (Probit) 
R&D 0.003 
 (0.003 ) 
Patenting 0.053 * 
 (0.030 ) 
Debt 0.061 *** 
 (0.011 ) 
Size -0.076 *** 
 (0.013 ) 
  
Industry dummy Controlled 
Year dummy Controlled 
Log likelihood -11562.894 
Number of Observations 17,586 
    ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
       Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
 
As can be seen in Table 23 above, firm R&D stocks have no significant impact on 
receiving additional financial support. On the other hand, it has been confirmed that the 
patent applications of a firm contributed positively to receiving additional financial support. 
We can suspect that this result would originate from the nature of R&D, which is high 
uncertainty. It is difficult to expect that the finance sector would like to take on the burden 
of additional risk that comes from the high uncertainty of R&D investment, since zombie 
firms are already a big risk to the finance sector. On the other hand, the finance sector 




investment are protected as a form of intellectual property. This is because the uncertainty 
is lower than that of R&D investment, and the value of the patent itself is worthwhile. 
However, the behavior of these financial sectors can be criticized. As noted above, R&D 
investments are high risk investments due to high uncertainties. However, rather than 
sharing and reducing the risks of these investments, the financial sector positively evaluates 
only those firms whose risk has already been partially eliminated. This behavior can be 
criticized in that the finance sector is not performing one of its major functions well, 
managing risk. Also, the finance sector might be blamed for the behavior of free riders. 
 
4.7 Sub-conclusion  
This study analyzed the characteristics of zombie firms, which are observed to be 
problems in Korean industry from the perspective of cumulative learning. Also, we 
examined the role of finance as a resource allocator by selecting which firms to support. 
As a result of the analysis, we found that 10% of firms were identified as zombie firms in 
the Korean manufacturing sector, among listed and externally audited registered firms. 
Unlike previous studies on zombie firms, this study approached the issue from the 
perspective of firm learning and its role in overcoming zombie status. In terms of the 
selecting role of the finance sector, finance can help a firm to survive or to grow by 
providing supporting resources, or conversely, it can lead to an exit by stopping its support. 
For a zombie firm, external financial support is critical for survival. In this context, we 




certain evidence was found. First of all, the cumulative learning of firms contributes 
positively both to overcoming zombie status and to survival. Thus, it is possible to think 
that the cumulative learning of a firm can be an evaluation standard for selection by the 
finance sector in deciding whether to support it or not. However, it is found that the finance 
sector of Korea does not consider the cumulative learning of firms as an important indicator 
for firm evaluation. Rather, the finance sector should be criticized for encouraging free 
rider behavior in terms of risk averse attitudes.  
Since Schumpeter observed the dynamics of capitalism, the process of replacing firms 
in the market as a result of competition over innovation, and introduced the concept of 
creative destruction, this whole process has been recognized as a value to pursue. However, 
while Schumpeter recognized the creative destruction process as the core of technological 
improvement and economic growth, he did not recognize this process as a purpose to 
pursue in itself. However, in contemporary Korea, these relations are reversed. We need to 
remember that creative destruction is one of the tools for driving economic growth and 
technological progress. Even if an industry is dynamic, this does not guarantee that the 
economy is necessarily growing, and the technology may not progress. Rather, we need 
creative destruction processes that consider the financial system of the country. The US and 
the UK are countries that have market based financial systems. We believe that the 
performance and potential of the company is reflected in the value of its stock. Creative 
destruction happens based on this belief. Firms with low value are exited or merged with 




cumulative knowledge and resources embodied in the acquired firm will be reused or scaled 
up by the acquiring firm. On the other hand, Japan is a country where banks are developed. 
We believe that the performance and potential growth of a firm is reflected in the interest 
rate at which the firm borrows. Creative destruction in Japan is not as dynamic as in the 
US. Rather, Japanese zombie firms are pointed out as obstacles for economic growth. 
However, banks in Japan keep supporting underperforming firms to overcome and grow 
again, even if the banks cannot make profits in short periods of time. In this atmosphere, 
Japanese firms are able to learn from their failures and reuse resources or scale up for 
growth.  
Korea has a credit-based financial system similar to that of Japan, and also has the 
problem of an increasing number of zombie firms. However, once again, we have to rethink 
cleaning out all zombie companies at once under the name of industry restructuring. Rather, 
we need to understand the properties of national finance systems for promoting creative 
destruction. Korea’s credit based financial system is advantageous for the cumulative 
learning of firms, but at the same time has a weak market pressure to exit. Thus, agents in 
the finance sector have to be able to identify which firm is a real zombie firm and which 
firm is one with cumulative learning; and selectively support firms that are in the learning 
process. This intuition is not taken in a way that simply depends on financial indicators; 
instead, an in-depth understanding of industry and technology is required. Corporate 
evaluations should look to the future rather than at past and present figures and judge the 










Chapter 5. Conclusion 
 
5.1 Summary of the study 
This study focused on the exit and survival of firms and the industrial dynamics of entry, 
growth, decline, and exit of firms. We have examined the meaning of the exit of firms and 
market selection criteria from the perspectives of Schumpeterian competition, evolutionary 
economics, and organizational ecology on the exit of firms. From the theoretical flow 
reviewed, the exit of a firm is a decision that should be avoided for the firm, yet it is 
necessary in terms of efficiency improvement through resource redistribution. From this 
theoretical background, we can derive a set of stylized facts on firm survival by examining 
previous empirical studies. These stylized facts are classified into the individual level, the 
enterprise level, the industrial level, and the macro level. At the individual level, the 
educational level of the human resources such as the founder and organizational members, 
and their experience before the start of business, contribute positively to the survival of the 
company. At the firm level, firm size (liability of smallness), firm age (liability of newness), 
innovation premium, and export activity have positive influences on the survival of firms. 
The industry characteristics measured by entry rate, industry growth rate, and technology 
intensity were confirmed to affect the survival of firms. At the macroeconomic level, it was 
confirmed that the firm survival rate increased during economic upturns and decreased 




In Chapter 2, we analyzed with parametric survival model to confirm the selection 
criteria of Korean industry based on stylized facts derived from Chapter 1. The results 
showed that the size and age of firm, innovation, and exporting activities contributed 
positively to firm survival in Korean industry, in line with the previous literature. We also 
examined the relationship between finance and industry dynamics and how institutional 
changes in the financial sector caused changes in firm behavior and selection criteria before 
and after the Asian financial crisis. This crisis changed the tendency of Korean firms to 
operate through a large amount of loans and high debt. We can observe this change of 
selection criteria from the results as well. Before the crisis, firms with high levels of debt 
were advantaged with regard to survival; however, this tendency was no longer found after 
the crisis. This implies that the dominant routine of Korean industry has changed.  
In Chapter 3, we focused on the relationship between the exit of the firm and the 
economic crisis, and examined the existence of a cleansing effect that could occurs in the 
economic downturn. The existing studies tried mainly to investigate the existence of a 
cleaning-out effect through employment changes, while this study applied a productivity 
growth decomposition analysis using plant level micro data for a refined analysis. The 
results revealed that during the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s, plant exits occurred 
regardless of the productivity of the business. On the other hand, during the global financial 
crisis of the 2000s, we were able to confirm that plants with low productivity had been 
exited. The difference in the cleaning-out effects in the two crises was presumed to be due 




sector. During the Asian financial crisis, interest rates rose to a very high level compared 
with before the outbreak, and both the industry and financial sectors were unstable. In 
contrast, during the global financial crisis, the finance sector was stable relative to the Asian 
financial crisis and thus, plants were exited according to their productivity levels, not by 
their financial condition.  
In Chapter 4, we approached the zombie firm problem from a different perspective to 
previous studies. Previous studies argue that zombie firms are less productive and impede 
resource reallocation in the market and this is why they should be exited from the market. 
However, we identified the fact that the problem of zombie firms is mainly concentrated in 
countries with credit based finance systems. Countries with a credit based finance system, 
such as Korea and Japan, can suffer from zombie firms, since the exit pressure of their 
markets is relatively weaker than the market based system. Also, in the capitalism system, 
finance has been seen to induce growth and exit of firms through selective support and 
provision of resources. In this context, we investigate the zombie firms and the behavior of 
the finance sector that provides zombie firms with additional resources. The result revealed 
that the cumulative learning of firms contributes positively toward overcoming zombie 
status. However, it has been found that the finance sector does not evaluate fairly the 
cumulative learning of firms identified as zombies. Rather, we found that there is an attitude 





5.2 Implications and limitations of study 
This study provides some implications from the analysis results. The role of finance in 
support of the creative destruction process observed by Schumpeter begins with selective 
support for specific firms. These specific firms are those with competitiveness, innovation 
capability, and growth potential. Also, it is necessary to induce the exit of firms that are 
depleted of competitiveness by a lack of supporting resources. As Dosi (1990) stressed, 
finance may or may not support the process of creative destruction as a selection device in 
the capitalism system.  
In Chapter 2, we investigate the effects of institutional change in the finance sector as 
a result of the Asian financial crisis. In the process of overcoming this crisis, the finance 
sector was improved in terms of soundness through restructuring and regulations. However, 
there was a side effect in that the finance sector has changed less actively in terms of 
provision of credit for firms. In particular, as Mazuccato (2013) has argued, long-term 
capital is essential for a firm to grow. In this respect, finance is required to function as a 
long-term capital provider. However, the finance sector, including banks, has turned to a 
passive attitude after the Asian financial crisis. At the same time, firms’ investment has also 
decreased; instead, reserves held within firms have increased. This tendency raises 
concerns that it may hinder the long-term growth of companies and the economy. The 
passive and risk averse attitude of the finance sector was also found in Chapter 4 with 
regard to zombie firm issues. We found that the finance sector does not properly support 




should be based on expected growth and productivity in future, but due to a lack of deep 
understanding of industry and technology on the part of the finance sector, the zombie firm 
problem emerges in Korea. If the finance sector has a proper capability to evaluate and 
selectively support which firm is a real zombie firm and which firm is in the learning 
process, these zombie firms will not be a serious problem.  
The upturn and downturn of the economy is repeated periodically. Generally, firms 
grow up in upturns. Every firm hopes the upturn will continue, but after the boom, recession 
always comes. In Chapter 3, we compared two economic crises in Korea and examined the 
cleansing effect of the two crises in terms of stability of finance and the economic 
environment. In a stable financial and business environment, the selection criteria worked 
properly. However, in the opposite case, we observed the massive and unsystematic exit of 
firms. As noted above, economic downturns are unavoidable. Sometimes, a minor problem 
may trigger an economic crisis at a macro level. It would be best if there is a way to 
minimize the impact of this on the economy. In contrast, such crises can also be viewed as 
opportunities for reallocating resources to enhance productivity. In short, there could be a 
silver lining to economic crises. In order to facilitate such silver linings during economic 
downturns, financial and macroeconomic stability is essential. Furthermore, a stable 
environment is essential for the investments of firms. No firm can move boldly in a 
situation where tomorrow is unpredictable.  
Manufacturing industry now faces the paradigm shift of the fourth industrial revolution. 




revolution, steam and rail, steel and electricity, oil and automobile, and telecommunications, 
have taken place through the interaction of industrial and financial capital. In the early days 
of the new technological revolution, finance played a role in supporting technological 
development. At this time, the finance sector is responsive in supporting firms that are 
constantly learning through trial and error to make new scientific discoveries, and this 
should help Korean industry to grow faster in the fourth industrial revolution.  
This study has great significance in terms of the empirical description of creative 
destruction process in Korean industry from the viewpoint of industrial dynamics. However, 
this study also has some limitations. First of all, this study focused on the analysis of firms 
in the manufacturing sector. Firms in the service industry are excluded from many studies, 
because the heterogeneity between firms is greater than for firms in the manufacturing 
sector. For this reason, many studies that suppose homogeneity among firms exclude the 
service industry. However, considering the fact that the proportion of service industry of 
the national GDP is increasing, it is necessary to conduct research on the service industry 
that overcomes the high heterogeneity of this sector. Second, consideration of the economic 
environment was insufficient. When analyzing long-term series data, it is necessary to 
reflect the environmental changes in terms of macroeconomic and technological change in 
the model. In this study, the macroeconomic environment was controlled with a year 
dummy variable, yet we can expect that the behavior of firm will be different in slow 
growth periods and high growth periods. Also, it is expected that a more precise analysis 




databases have not been overcome. The analyses of Chapters 2 and 4 included the firm’s 
financial variables in the model, and the micro data that could be obtained at a reliable level 
were the data of the listed firms and externally audited firms. Therefore, it was not possible 
to analyze SMEs and startups. Also, since not all firms were able to be observed at the time 
of entry, some firms were analyzed as if left truncated. If a complete set of data on startups 







Abernathy, W. J., & Utterback, J. M. (1994). Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation. Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press. doi:10.1016/0305-0483(75)90068-7 
Ackerberg, D., Benkard, L., Berry, S., Pakes, A., 2005. Econometric tools for analyzing 
market outcomes. In: Heckman, J.J. (Ed.), Working Paper Harvard University, 
Prepared for the Handbook of Econometrics.  
doi:10.1016/s1573-4412(07)06063-1 
Agarwal, R., & Audretsch, D. B. (2001). Does Entry Size Matter? The Impact of the Life 
Cycle and Technology on Firm Survival. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 
49(1), 21–43. doi:10.1111/1467-6451.00136 
Agarwal, R., & Bayus, B. L. (2004). Creating and surviving in new industries. In Business 
Strategy over the Industry Lifecycle (Vol. 21, pp. 107–130). Bingley: Emerald 
Group Publishing Limited. doi:10.1016/S0742-3322(04)21004-X 
Agarwal, R, & Gort, M. (2002). Firm and Product Life Cycles and Firm Survival. The 
American Economic Review, 92(2), 184–190. doi: 10.1257/000282802320189221 
Agarwal, Ratshree, Sarkar, M. B., & Echambadi, R. (2002). The Conditioning Effect of 
Time on Firm Survival: An Industry Life Cycle Approach. Academy of 
Management Journal, 45(5), 971–994. doi:10.2307/3069325 
Aghion, P., & Howitt, P. (1992). A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction. 




Ahearne, A. G., & Shinada, N. (2005). Zombie Firms and Economic Stagnation in Japan. 
International Economics and Economic Policy, 2(4), 363–381.  
doi: 10.1007/s10368-005-0041-1 
Aldrich, H. E., Hodgson, G. M., Hull, D. L., Knudsen, T., Mokyr, J., & Vanberg, V. J. 
(2008). In Defence of Generalized Darwinism. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 
18(5), 577–596. doi:10.1007/s00191-008-0110-z 
Allen, F., & Gale, D. (1992). Stock Price Manipulation, Market Microstructure and 
Asymmetric Information. European Economic Review 36, 624–630.  
doi: 10.1016/0014-2921(92)90120-L.  
Altman, E. I., & Saunders, A. (1997). Credit Risk Measurement: Developments over the 
Last 20 Years. Journal of Banking and Finance, 21(11-12), 1721–1742.  
doi:10.1016/S0378-4266(97)00036-8 
Audretsch, D. B. (1995). Innovation, Growth and Survival. International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 13(4), 441–457. doi:10.1016/0167-7187(95)00499-8 
Audretsch, D. B., & Mahmood, T. (1991). The Hazard Rate of New Establishments: A First 
Report. Economics Letters, 36(4), 409–412. doi:10.1016/0165-1765(91)90207-2 
Audretsch, D. B., & Mahmood, T. (1994). Firm Selection and Industry Evolution: The Post-







Audretsch, D. B., & Mahmood, T. (1995). New Firm Survival: New Results using a Hazard 
Function. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 77(1), 97–103.  
doi:10.2307/2109995 
Baily, M. N., Hulten, C., Campbell, D., Bresnahan, T., & Caves, R. E. (1992). Productivity 
Dynamics in Manufacturing Plants. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 
Microeconomics, 1992, 187–267. doi:10.2307/2534764 
Baird, D. G., & Jackson, T. H. (2002). Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of 
Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured 
Creditors in Bankruptcy. In: Wittman. A. (Ed.), Economic Analysis of the Law: 
Selected Readings. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.  
doi:10.1002/9780470752135.ch21 
Banbury, C. M., & Mitchell, W. (1995). The Effect of Introducing Important Incremental 
Innovations on Market Share and Business Survival. Strategic Management 
Journal, 16(S1), 161–182. doi:10.1002/smj.4250160922 
Bank of England (2013), Inflation Report, Bank of England, London.  
Bank of Korea (2016), Financial Stability Report, Bank of Korea, Seoul. 
Barney, J. (1991). Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage. Journal of 
Management, 17(1), 99–120. doi:10.1177/014920639101700108 
Bates, T. (1995). A Comparison of Franchise and Independent Small Business Survival 





Bates, T. (2005). Analysis of Yong, Small Firms that Have Closed: Delineating Successful 
from Unsuccessful Closures. Journal of Business Venturing, 20(3), 343–358.  
doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2004.01.003 
Baumol, W. J. (2002). The Free-market Innovation Machine: Analyzing the Capitalist 
Growth Miracle. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Maksimovic, V. (2005). Financial and Legal Constraints 
to Growth: Does Firm Size Matter? The Journal of Finance, 60(1), 137–177.  
doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00727.x 
Bellone, F., Musso, P., Nesta, L., & Quere, M. (2008). Market Selection Along the Firm 
Life Cycle. Industrial and Corporate Change, 17(4), 753–777.  
doi: 10.4337/9781781000632.00014 
Bernard, A. B., & Jensen, J. B. (2007). Firm Structure, Multinationals, and Manufacturing 
Plant Deaths. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(2), 193–204.  
doi: 10.1162/rest.89.2.193 
Bernard, A. B., Eaton, J., & Jensen, J. B. (2003). Plants and Productivity in International 
Trade. The American Economic Review, 93(4), 1268–1290.  
doi:10.1257/000282803769206296 
Boden, R. J., & Nucci, A. R. (2000). On the Survival Prospects of Men’s and Women’s 






Børing, P. (2015). The Effects of Firms’ R&D and Innovation Activities on Their Survival: 
A Competing Risks Analysis. Empirical Economics, 49(3), 1045–1069.  
doi:10.1007/s00181-014-0901-z 
Bottazzi, G., Grazzi, M., Secchi, A., & Tamagni, F. (2011). Financial and Economic 
Determinants of Firm Default. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 21(3), 373–
406. doi:10.1007/s00191-011-0224-6 
Box, M. (2008). The Death of Firms: Exploring the Effects of Environment and Birth 
Cohort on Firm Survival in Sweden. Small Business Economic, 31(4), 379–393. 
doi:10.1007/s11187-007-9061-2 
Brüderl, J., Preisendörfer, P., & Ziegler, R. (1992). Survival Chances of Newly Founded 
Business Organizations. American Sociological Review, 57(2), 227–242.  
doi:10.2307/2096207 
Buddelmeyer, H., Jensen, P. H., & Webster, E. (2010). Innovation and the Determinants of 
Company Survival. Oxford Economic Papers, 62(2), 261–285.  
doi:10.1093/oep/gpp012 
Caballero, R. J., Hoshi, T., & Kashyap, A. K. (2008). Zombie Lending and Depressed 
Restructuring in Japan. American Economic Review, 98(5), 1943–1977.  
doi:10.1257/aer.98.5.1943 
Campbell, J. R. (1998). Entry, Exit, Embodied Technology, and Business Cycles. Review 





Cefis, E., & Marsili, O. (2005). A Matter of Life and Death: Innovation and Firm Survival. 
Industrial and Corporate Change. 14(6), 1167–1192. doi:10.1093/icc/dth081 
Cefis, E., & Marsili, O. (2012). Going, Going, Gone. Exit Forms and the Innovative 
Capabilities of Firms. Research Policy, 41(5), 795–807.  
doi:10.1016/j.respol.2012.01.006 
Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1990). Absorptive Capacity: A new Perspective on 
Learning and Innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1), 128–152.  
doi:10.2307/2393553 
Coleman, S., Cotei, C., & Farhat, J. (2013). A Resource-based View of New Firm Survival: 
New Perspectives on the Role of Industry and Exit Route. Journal of 
Developmental Entrepreneurship, 18(1), 1350002–25.  
doi:10.1142/S1084946713500027 
Comanor, W. S. (1967). Advertising Market Structure and Performance. The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 49(4), 423–440. doi:10.2307/1928327 
Cooper, A. C., Gimeno-Gascon, F. J., & Woo, C. Y. (1994). Initial Human and Financial 
Capital as Predictors of New Venture Performance. Journal of Business Venturing, 
9(5), 371–395. doi:10.1016/0883-9026(94)90013-2 
Cox, D. R. (1972). Models and Life-tables Regression. Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society. Series B, 34(2), 187–202. doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-4380-9_37 





Crotty, J., & Lee, K. K. (2001). Economic performance in post-crisis Korea: a critical 
perspective on neo-liberal restructuring (Working paper series). Amherst: 
Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts. from 
http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=peri_
workingpapers  
Crouhy, M., Galai, D., & Mark, R. (2000). A Comparative Analysis of Current Credit Risk 
Models. Journal of Banking and Finance, 24(1-2), 59–117. doi:10.1016/S0378-
4266(99)00053-9 
Disney, R., Haskel, J., & Heden, Y. (2003). Restructuring and Productivity Growth in UK 
Manufacturing. The Economic Journal, 113(489), 666–694. doi: 10.1111/1468-
0297.t01-1-00145 
Dosi, G. (1990). Finance, Innovation and Industrial Change. Journal of Economic Behavior 
& Organization, 13(3), 299–319. doi:10.1016/0167-2681(90)90003-v 
Dunne, T. (1994). Plant Age and Technology Use in US Manufacturing Industries. The 
RAND Journal of Economics, 25(3), 488–499. doi:10.2307/2555774 
Ejermo, O., & Xiao, J. (2014). Entrepreneurship and Survival over the Business Cycle: 
How Do New Technology-based Firms Differ? Small Business Economics, 43(2), 
411–426. doi:10.1007/s11187-014-9543-y 
Ericson, R., & Pakes, A. (1995). Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for 





Esteve-Pérez, S., & Mañez-Castillejo, J. A. (2008). The Resource-based Theory of the Firm 
and Firm Survival. Small Business Economic, 30(3), 231–249.  
doi:10.1007/s11187-006-9011-4 
Esteve-Pérez, S., Llopis, A. S., & Llopis, J. A. S. (2004). The Determinants of Survival of 
Spanish Manufacturing Firms. Review of Industrial Organization, 25(3), 251–273. 
doi: 10.1007/s11151-004-1972-3 
Esteve-Pérez, S., Mañez-Castillejo, J. A., & Sanchis-Llopis, J. A. (2008). Does a “Survival-
by-exporting” Effect for SMEs Exist? Empirica, 35(1), 81–104.  
doi:10.1007/s10663-007-9052-1 
Everett, J., & Watson, J. (1998). Small Business Failure and External Risk Factors. Small 
Business Economics, 11(4), 371–390. doi:10.1023/A:1008065527282 
Fine, J. P., & Gray, R. J. (1999). A Proportional Hazards Model for the Subdistribution of 
a Competing Risk. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 94(446), 496–
509. doi:10.1080/01621459.1999.10474144 
Fontana, R., & Nesta, L. (2009). Product Innovation and Survival in a High-Tech Industry. 
Review of Industrial Organization, 34(4), 287–306. doi:10.1007/s11151-009-
9210-7 
Foster, J. (1997). The Analytical Foundations of Evolutionary Economics: From Biological 
Analogy to Economic Self-organization. Structural Change and Economic 





Fotopoulos, G., & Louri, H. (2000). Location and Survival of New Entry. Small Business 
Economics, 14(4), 311–321. doi:10.1023/A:1008180522759 
Freeman, J., Carroll, G. R., & Hannan, M. T. (1983). The Liability of Newness: Age 
Dependence in Organizational Death Rates. American Sociological Review, 48(5), 
692–710. doi:10.2307/2094928 
Fukao, K., & Kwon, U. H. (2006). Why did Japan’s TFP Growth Slow Down in the Lost 
Decade? An Empirical Analysis Based on Firm-level Data of Manufacturing Firms.  
Japanese Economic Review, 57(2), 195–228.  
doi:10.1111/j.1468-5876.2006.00359.x 
Geroski, P. A. (1995). What Do We Know About Entry? International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 13(4), 421–440. doi:10.1016/0167-7187(95)00498-X 
Gimeno, J., Folta, T. B., Cooper, A. C., & Woo, C. Y. (1997). Survival of the Fittest? 
Entrepreneurial Human Capital and the Persistence of Underperforming Firms. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(4), 750–783. doi:10.2307/2393656 
Görg, H., & Strobl, E. (2003). Multinational Companies, Technology Spillovers and Plant 
Survival. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 105(4), 581–595.  
doi: 10.1111/j.0347-0520.2003.t01-1-00003.x 
Griliches, Z. (1995). R&D and Productivity: Econometric Results and Measurement Issues. 
In: Stoneman, P. (Ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation and 
Technological Change. (pp. 52 – 89). MA: Blackwell Publisher 




Korean Journal of Economic Studies, 55(4), pp.401-445.  
Hannan, M. T. (2005). Ecologies of Organizations: Diversity and Identity. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 19(1), 51–70. doi:10.1257/0895330053147985 
Hannan, M. T., & Freeman, J. (1977). The Population Ecology of Organizations. American 
Journal of Sociology, 82(5), 929–964. doi:10.1086/226424 
Hannan, M. T., & Freeman, J. (1984). Structural Inertia and Organizational Change. 
American Sociological Review, 49(2), 149–164. doi:10.2307/2095567 
Harhoff, D., Stahl, K., & Woywode, M. (1998). Legal Form, Growth and Exit of West 
German Firms--Empirical Results for Manufacturing, Construction, Trade and 
Service Industries. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 46(4), 453–488. 
doi:10.1111/1467-6451.00083 
Headd, B. (2003). Redefining Business Success: Distinguishing Between Closure and 
Failure. Small Business Economics, 21(1), 51–61. doi:10.1023/A:1024433630958 
Helfat, C. E., & Lieberman, M. B. (2002). The Birth of Capabilities: Market Entry and the 
Importance of Pre-history. Industrial and Corporate Change, 11(4), 725–760. 
Doi:10.1093/icc/11.4.725 
Helmers, C., & Rogers, M. (2010). Innovation and the Survival of New Firms in the UK. 
Review of Industrial Organization, 36(3), 227–248. doi:10.1007/s11151-010-
9247-7 
Henderson, B. D. (1984). The Application and Misapplication of the Experience Curve. 




Hodgson, G. M. (2002). Darwinism in Economics: From Analogy to Ontology. Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics, 12(3), 259–281. doi:10.1007/s00191-002-0118-8 
Hodgson, G. M. (2004). Darwinism, Causality and the Social Science. Journal of Economic 
Methodology, 11(2), 175–194. doi:10.1080/13501780410001694118 
Holt, J. D. (1978). Competing Risk Analyses with Special Reference to Matched Pair 
Experiments. Biometrika, 65(1), 159–165. doi: 10.2307/2335291 
Hong, J. B. (2002), The Study on the Post-entry Performance of Diversifying Entries by 
Chaebol, Korea Business Review, 31(6), 1609–1629. 
Honjo, Y. (2000). Business Failure of New Firms: An Empirical Analysis Using a 
Multiplicative Hazards Model. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 
18(4), 557–574. doi:10.1016/S0167-7187(98)00035-6 
Hopenhayn, H. A. (1992). Entry, Exit, and firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium. 
Econometrica, 60(5), 1127–1150. doi:10.2307/2951541 
Hoshi, T. (2006). Economics of the Living Dead. Japanese Economic Review, 57(1), 30–
49. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5876.2006.00354.x 
Hoshi, T., & Kim, Y. (2013). Macroprudential Policy and Zombie Lending in Korea. 
Working Paper. 
Hwang, J. (2012), The Impacts of Different Types of Innovation on the Survival of Small 
and Medium Firms, The Journal of Small Business Innovation, 15(1), 69–92.  
Hymer, S. (1976). The International Operations of National Firms. MA: MIT Press. 




Korean Venture Survival, STEPI Policy Studies 2008-11, Seoul: STEPI.  
Jang, S. D. (2006), Survival of Venture Firms: The Role of Human and Social Capitals, 
Korea Business Review, 35(4), 1131–1155  
Jovanovic, B. (1982). Selection and the Evolution of Industry. Econometrica, 50(3), 649–
670. doi:10.2307/1912606 
Kang, M. & Lee, J. W. (2009), Survival Analysis of Small and Medium Size Construction 
Enterprises Using Cox Proportional Hazards Model, Journal of the Korea Real 
Estate Analysts Association, 15(2), 41–57 
Kaniovski, S., & Peneder, M. (2008). Determinants of Firm Survival: A Duration Analysis 
Using the Generalized Gamma Distribution. Empirica, 35(1), 41–58.  
doi:10.1007/s10663-007-9050-3 
Kaplan, E. L., & Meier, P. (1958). Nonparametric Estimation from Incomplete 
Observations. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 53(282), 457–481.  
doi:10.2307/2281868 
Kato, M., & Honjo, Y. (2015). Entrepreneurial Human Capital and the Survival of New 
Firms in High- and Low-tech Sectors. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 25(5), 
925–957. doi:10.1007/s00191-015-0427-3 
Kay, N. (1988). The R and D function: corporate strategy and structure. In Dosi, G., 
Freeman, C., Nelson, R., Silverberg, G., & Soete, Luc. (Ed.), Technical change and 
economic theory. London and New York: Pinter Publishers. 




45(1), 232–243. doi:10.1016/j.respol.2015.09.006 
Kimura, F., & Fujii, T. (2003). Globalizing Activities and the Rate of Survival. Journal of 
the Japanese and International Economies, 17(4), 538–560.  
doi:10.1016/j.jjie.2003.08.003 
Knight, F. (1921), Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. MA: Hart, Schaffner & Marx  
Lee, B. K., & Shin, K. C. (2005), The Determinants of New Firms Survival: An Empirical 
Analysis Using Hazard Model, Kukje Kyungje Yongu, 11(1), 131–154  
Lee, B. K. (2008), Analysis of the Effect of Corporate Restructuring on the Economic 
Performance Before and After the Financial Crisis, Seoul: Korea Economic 
Research Institute. 
Lee, B. K. (2015), Analysis on Industry Dynamics of Korea. KERI Brief 15-02, Seoul: 
Korea Economic Research Institute. 
Lee, I. K. (2002), An Empirical Study on Korean Enterprises’ Growth Dynamics, Kukje 
Kyungje Yongu, 8(1), 85–110. 
Lee, S. H. (1998), Analysis on Survival Determinant of Small and Medium Sized Firms in 
Electronic Industry, Kukje Kyungje Yongu, 4(2), 93–112. 
Levine, R. (2005). Chapter 12 Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence In Aghion, P., & 
Darlauf, S. N., (Ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth. Amsterdam: Elsevier (North 
Holland Publishing Co.). doi:10.1016/S1574-0684(05)01012-9 
Levinthal, D. A. (1991). Random Walks and Organizational Mortality. Administrative 




Liao, J. J., Welsch, H., & Moutray, C. (2008). Start-Up Resources and Entrepreneurial 
Discontinuance: The Case of Nascent Entrepreneurs. Journal of Small Business 
Strategy, 19(2), 1–15.  
Liu, X., & Li, H. (2015). Financial Constraints and the Productivity-survival Link: 
Evidence from China's Firm-level Data. Industrial and Corporate Change dtv020. 
doi:10.1093/icc/dtv020 
Mata, J., P., Portugal, P., & Guimaraes, P. (1995). The Survival of New Plants: Start-up 
Conditions and Post-entry Evolution. International Journal of Industrial 
Organizations, 13(4), 459–481. doi:10.1016/0167-7187(95)00500-5 
Mata, J., & Portugal, P. (2002). The Survival of New Domestic and Foreign-owned Firms. 
Strategic Management Journal, 23(4), 323–343. doi:10.1002/smj.217 
Mata, J., & Portugal, P. (1994). Life Duration of New Firms. The Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 42(3), 227–245. doi:10.2307/2950567  
Mazzucato, M. (2013). Financing Innovation: Creative Destruction vs. Destructive 
Creation. Industrial and Corporate Change, 22(4), 851–867.  
doi:10.1093/icc/dtt025 
Melitz, M. J. (2003). The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate 
Industry Productivity. Econometrica, 71(6), 1695–1725. doi:10.2307/1555536  
Merton, R. C. (1974). On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates. 
The Journal of Finance, 29(2), 449–470. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb03058.x 




Theory of Unemployment. The Review of Economic Studies, 61(3), 397–415. 
doi:10.2307/2297896 
Muge, A. M. (2017). The Walking Dead? Zombie Firms and Productivity Performance in 
OECD Countries, (Economics department working papers No. 1372). OECD. 
Retrieved February 2, 2017, from https://www.oecd.org/eco/The-Walking-Dead-
Zombie-Firms-and-Productivity-Performance-in-OECD-Countries.pdf  
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984). Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when 
Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 13(2), 187–221. doi:10.1016/0304-405X(84)90023-0 
Park, J. K., Oh, K. H., & Kim, M. S. (2012), Survival Analysis on the Business Types of 
Small Business Using Cox’s Proportional Model, Journal of the Korean Data & 
Information Science Society, 23(2), 257–269. 
Parker, S. C., & Belghitar, Y. (2006). What Happens to Nascent Entrepreneurs? An 
Econometric Analysis of the PSED. Small Business Economics, 27(1), 81–101. 
doi:10.1007/s11187-006-9003-4 
Peña, I. (2002). Intellectual Capital and Business Start-up Success. Journal of Intellectual 
Capital, 3(2), 180–198. doi:10.1108/14691930210424761 
Penrose, E. T. (1952). Biological Analogies in the Theory of the Firm. The American 
Economic Review. 45(5), 804–819. doi:10.2307/1812528 
Prentice, R. L., Kalbfleisch, J. D., & Peterson, A. V., Jr. (1978). The Analysis of Failure 





Nelson, R. R. (1981). Research on Productivity Growth and Productivity Differences: Dead 
Ends and New Departures. Journal of Economic Literature, 19(3), 1029–1064. 
Nelson, R.R., & Winter, S. G., (1982). An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. 
Harvard Business School Press. 
Robinson, W. T., & Min, S. (2002). Is the First to Market the First to Fail? Empirical 
Evidence for Industrial Goods Businesses. Journal of Marketing Research, 39(1), 
120–128. doi:10.1509/jmkr.39.1.120.18938 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1912), The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, 
Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, trans. by R. Opie from the 1926 
(revised) edition of Theorie der Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, London: Oxford 
University Press, 1961. 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1934). The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, 
Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1942). Capitalism, socialism and democracy. New York: Harper. 
Segarra, A., & Callejón, M. (2002). New Firms' Survival and Market Turbulence: New 
Evidence from Spain. Review of Industrial Organization, 20(1).  
doi: 10.1023/A:1013309928700 
Sinha, R. K., & Noble, C. H. (2008). The Adoption of Radical Manufacturing Technologies 





Song, C. S. & Noh, Y. H. (2011), Characteristics of Korean Venture Firms and Their 
Survival Analysis: A Micro-Level Approach, Journal of Small Business Innovation, 
14(3), 1–24.  
Stiglitz, J. E., & Greenwald, B. C. (2014). Creating a Learning Society: A New Approach 
to Growth, Development, and Social Progress. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Strotmann, H. (2007). Entrepreneurial Survival. Small Business Economics, 28(1), 87–104. 
doi:10.1007/s11187-005-8859-z 
Thompson, P. (2005). Selection and Firm Survival: Evidence from the Shipbuilding 
Industry, 1825-1914. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(1), 26–36. 
doi:0.1162/0034653053327531 
Tveterås, R., & Eide, G. E. (2000). Survival of New Plants in Different Industry 
Environments in Norwegian Manufacturing: AS Semi-Proportional Cox Model 
Approach. Small Business Economics, 14(1), 65–82.  
doi:10.1023/A:1008189411442 
van Praag, C. M. (2003). Business Survival and Success of Young Small Business Owners. 
Small Business Economics, 21(1), 1–17. doi:10.1023/A:1024453200297 
Winter, S. G. (1984). Schumpeterian competition in alternative technological regimes. 





Wright, T. P. (1936). Factors Affecting the Cost of Airplanes. Journal of the Aeronautical 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. 
1981  1,717.9   2,161.2   N/A   N/A  1998  202.1  1,161.7   84.5   112.0  
1982  1,519.7   1,800.9   2,918.4   3,626.7  1999  197.0  1,262.0   69.3   160.7  
1983  1,571.5   6,744.4   433.1   449.0  2000  201.2  1,258.3   102.1   290.2  
1984  806.8   1,843.8   292.0   -  2001  194.4  1,214.5   55.8   117.9  
1985  711.4   1,731.8   335.5   318.9  2002  180.0  1,188.9   47.1   89.6  
1986  693.4   1,702.6   742.0   871.8  2003  181.0  1,242.8   34.1   34.2  
1987  665.9   1,770.7   122.4   85.4  2004  185.7  1,320.1   33.2   37.6  
1988  650.9   1,958.4   86.3   52.0  2005  190.6  1,473.9   33.0   27.9  
1989  636.1   2,078.2   120.5   128.7  2006  188.8  1,501.4   49.7   119.8  
1990  583.7   2,008.0   154.7   270.1  2007  192.1  1,506.6   84.3   775.3  
1991  531.8   1,964.0   89.1   81.0  2008  192.0  1,510.1   59.3   85.1  
1992  529.9   1,984.6   538.6   1,440.9  2009  195.1  1,535.0   77.2   176.1  
1993  498.2   1,989.0   95.0   85.0  2010  212.2  1,689.4   61.4   77.4  
1994  465.3   2,033.3   72.9   41.6  2011  223.5  1,786.0   62.0   165.2  
1995  367.9   1,856.6   199.9   560.6  2012  220.7  1,709.1   53.7   94.2  
1996  314.9   1,743.3   93.6   102.3  2013  227.5  1,795.7   263.9  1,653.3  












Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. 
1981 23.6 11.5 N/A N/A 1998 12.5 11.0 9.6 9.0 
1982 23.4 11.0 15.4 5.8 1999 12.3 11.1 8.7 7.6 
1983 20.0 10.9 9.9 5.2 2000 12.3 11.2 9.4 8.4 
1984 15.5 10.5 24.0 - 2001 12.6 11.2 7.4 6.6 
1985 15.3 10.5 13.5 4.9 2002 12.2 11.0 7.4 7.0 
1986 15.2 10.4 15.3 4.0 2003 12.7 11.1 6.4 5.7 
1987 15.0 10.4 10.5 7.3 2004 13.3 11.2 7.0 6.6 
1988 14.9 10.5 10.1 7.7 2005 14.0 11.4 6.5 5.8 
1989 15.4 10.7 9.0 7.3 2006 14.4 11.5 8.1 6.6 
1990 15.4 10.7 9.9 5.8 2007 14.9 11.7 9.0 7.5 
1991 15.4 10.7 8.7 6.1 2008 15.3 11.9 11.5 9.4 
1992 16.4 10.9 13.0 13.0 2009 15.9 12.0 12.2 9.5 
1993 16.6 11.1 11.2 7.6 2010 16.8 12.3 12.8 10.1 
1994 16.2 11.2 12.0 8.6 2011 17.4 12.5 11.5 8.7 
1995 14.3 11.2 7.5 9.0 2012 17.8 12.6 12.4 9.0 
1996 13.5 11.3 9.5 8.8 2013 18.3 12.7 16.4 13.5 












Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. 
1981  5,521.2   19,977.5   N/A   N/A  1998  12,472.0   230,907.7   1,870.5   6,564.8  
1982  3,263.9   20,935.4   12,288.1   26,323.5  1999  8,329.1   312,251.4   959.4   2,699.3  
1983  3,222.2   19,124.7   2,850.7   12,866.6  2000 11,227.7   433,551.8   1,120.2   8,835.8  
1984  2,327.6   15,668.7   -   -  2001 12,094.6   445,639.8   476.9   1,599.5  
1985  2,959.3   23,341.6   30.6   43.2  2002 14,077.0   516,633.1   379.1   1,282.3  
1986  3,782.3   33,077.3   3.5   6.0  2003 15,660.3   585,824.7   262.4   996.9  
1987  4,347.5   39,227.0   103.5   384.1  2004 12,914.6   415,771.7   321.2   1,578.0  
1988  4,619.8   39,178.4   140.0   329.7  2005 14,024.5   466,817.6   425.1   1,211.4  
1989  6,597.0   76,755.8   1,598.7   6,366.3  2006 14,613.7   485,429.9   1,071.1   4,763.6  
1990  9,006.0   119,950.7   154.0   451.9  2007 16,274.7   502,287.8   1,723.3   7,177.1  
1991  10,490.0   166,524.9   418.6   674.2  2008 17,237.4   509,419.4   1,943.1   9,064.6  
1992  13,473.0   193,393.1   242.5   591.6  2009 18,004.7   538,035.6   2,010.8   7,701.1  
1993  16,458.1   247,386.8   368.4   862.8  2010 28,533.1  1,128,145.0   1,764.5   5,777.4  
1994  11,615.6   133,608.3   846.5   2,428.1  2011 28,032.9  1,131,103.0   2,978.0   24,661.6  
1995  11,462.3   170,121.9   1,586.1   4,845.9  2012 32,294.7  1,268,508.0   3,090.3   22,852.2  
1996  11,896.3   177,757.0   377.3   770.9  2013 40,046.9  1,634,742.0  16,186.4  171,389.4  












Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. 
1981 0  0  N/A N/A 1998 0.844 0.363 0.827 0.380 
1982 0  0  0  0  1999 0.850 0.357 0.835 0.372 
1983 0  0  0  0  2000 0.856 0.351 0.794 0.405 
1984 0  0  0  0  2001 0.856 0.352 0.770 0.422 
1985 0.905 0.293 0  0  2002 0.837 0.370 0.760 0.428 
1986 0.897 0.304 1.000 0.000 2003 0.837 0.369 0.670 0.471 
1987 0.888 0.316 0.857 0.356 2004 0.839 0.368 0.676 0.468 
1988 0.883 0.321 0.864 0.351 2005 0.837 0.370 0.678 0.468 
1989 0.884 0.321 0.864 0.351 2006 0.824 0.381 0.677 0.468 
1990 0.880 0.325 0.806 0.401 2007 0.818 0.386 0.731 0.444 
1991 0.874 0.331 0.850 0.366 2008 0.811 0.391 0.706 0.456 
1992 0.880 0.325 0.917 0.289 2009 0.809 0.393 0.707 0.455 
1993 0.878 0.327 0.827 0.380 2010 0.815 0.388 0.671 0.470 
1994 0.870 0.336 0.759 0.435 2011 0.811 0.392 0.657 0.475 
1995 0.867 0.340 0.833 0.381 2012 0.794 0.404 0.688 0.464 
1996 0.863 0.344 0.795 0.408 2013 0.790 0.407 0.773 0.420 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 4: Result of aggregated productivity growth 
decomposition analysis by industry 
 
 
[1] Result of aggregated productivity growth decomposition analysis by industry 
Industry 
Classification Asian Financial Crisis Global Financial Crisis 















10 Food Products 
1997-
1998 -0.0063 0.0034 0.0014 0.0012 
2007-
2008 0.0015 0.0000 0.0003 0.0002 
1998-
1999 -0.0002 -0.0021 0.0012 0.0016 
2008-
2009 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0005 
1999-
2000 0.0030 -0.0041 0.0016 0.0007 
2009-
2010 -0.0041 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 
11 Beverages 
1997-
1998 -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
2007-
2008 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 
1998-
1999 0.0017 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 
2008-
2009 0.0012 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 
1999-
2000 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 
2009-
2010 -0.0011 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
12 Tobacco Products 
1997-
1998 -0.0008 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 
2007-
2008 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
1998-
1999 -0.0022 -0.0030 0.0001 0.0016 
2008-
2009 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1999-
2000 0.0010 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
2009-
2010 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
13 Textiles 
1997-
1998 -0.0005 0.0026 0.0013 0.0030 
2007-
2008 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 
1998-
1999 0.0006 -0.0011 0.0014 0.0012 
2008-
2009 0.0005 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 
1999-
2000 -0.0006 -0.0016 0.0015 0.0012 
2009-
2010 -0.0011 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
14 Clothing 
1997-
1998 0.0004 0.0006 0.0021 0.0018 
2007-
2008 0.0008 0.0002 0.0005 0.0005 
1998-
1999 -0.0016 0.0002 0.0010 0.0027 
2008-
2009 0.0016 -0.0006 0.0008 0.0003 
1999-
2000 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0027 0.0015 
2009-







1998 0.0001 0.0009 0.0005 0.0010 
2007-
2008 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
1998-
1999 -0.0011 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0005 
2008-
2009 0.0004 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
1999-
2000 0.0007 -0.0001 0.0009 0.0017 
2009-
2010 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 
16 Wood and Cork 
1997-
1998 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 
2007-
2008 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1998-
1999 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 
2008-
2009 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1999-
2000 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
2009-
2010 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 
17 Pulp, Paper Products 
1997-
1998 -0.0033 0.0007 0.0002 0.0010 
2007-
2008 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 
1998-
1999 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 
2008-
2009 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 
1999-
2000 -0.0018 -0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 
2009-






1998 -0.0028 0.0003 0.0001 0.0013 
2007-
2008 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1998-
1999 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0052 
2008-
2009 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 
1999-
2000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0005 0.0002 
2009-





[1] Result of aggregated productivity growth decomposition analysis by industry (continued) 
Industry 
Classification Asian Financial Crisis Global Financial Crisis 





















1998 -0.0015 0.0069 0.0008 0.0004 
2007-
2008 -0.0130 0.0034 0.0001 0.0001 
1998-
1999 -0.0063 -0.0067 0.0002 0.0003 
2008-
2009 0.0163 0.0125 0.0000 0.0000 
1999-
2000 -0.0025 0.0035 0.0002 0.0068 
2009-
2010 -0.0736 -0.0066 -0.0002 0.0002 
20 Chemical Products 
1997-
1998 -0.0051 0.0020 0.0055 0.0105 
2007-
2008 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0001 
1998-
1999 -0.0007 -0.0017 0.0020 0.0043 
2008-
2009 0.0023 -0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0003 
1999-
2000 0.0028 -0.0006 0.0056 0.0010 
2009-







1998 0.0000 0.0000 0.0141 0.0012 
2007-
2008 0.0005 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 
1998-
1999 -0.0051 -0.0048 0.0005 0.0010 
2008-
2009 0.0010 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0005 
1999-
2000 0.0015 0.0003 0.0004 0.0000 
2009-






1998 -0.0023 0.0014 0.0022 0.0025 
2007-
2008 -0.0034 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0004 
1998-
1999 -0.0014 0.0002 0.0052 0.0025 
2008-
2009 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 
1999-
2000 0.0021 -0.0005 0.0039 0.0046 
2009-







1998 -0.0012 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
2007-
2008 0.0013 0.0003 0.0005 -0.0001 
1998-
1999 0.0001 -0.0008 0.0001 0.0002 
2008-
2009 0.0005 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0002 
1999-
2000 0.0031 -0.0003 0.0005 0.0004 
2009-
2010 -0.0016 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 
24 Basic Metal Products 
1997-
1998 -0.0012 0.0069 0.0043 0.0043 
2007-
2008 -0.0079 -0.0009 0.0015 0.0000 
1998-
1999 -0.0035 -0.0052 0.0025 0.0052 
2008-
2009 -0.0062 -0.0020 -0.0002 0.0009 
1999-
2000 0.0029 -0.0024 0.0045 0.0022 
2009-






1998 -0.0020 -0.0020 0.0030 0.0052 
2007-
2008 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0009 0.0004 
1998-
1999 -0.0033 -0.0005 0.0050 0.0039 
2008-
2009 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 
1999-
2000 0.0004 -0.0011 0.0051 0.0040 
2009-








1998 0.0150 -0.0387 -0.0244 -0.0182 
2007-
2008 0.0434 -0.0057 -0.0014 -0.0083 
1998-
1999 0.0221 -0.0192 -0.0281 -0.0120 
2008-
2009 0.0100 0.0090 -0.0042 -0.0040 
1999-
2000 0.0148 -0.0125 -0.0208 -0.0088 
2009-







1998 0.0000 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003 
2007-
2008 0.0012 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0006 
1998-
1999 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0002 
2008-
2009 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0008 
1999-
2000 0.0007 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0008 
2009-
2010 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 
28 Electrical  Equipment 
1997-
1998 -0.0001 0.0010 -0.0118 -0.0062 
2007-
2008 0.0039 0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0012 
1998-
1999 0.0007 -0.0015 -0.0062 -0.0077 
2008-
2009 0.0042 0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0010 
1999-
2000 0.0052 0.0000 -0.0038 -0.0044 
2009-





[1] Result of aggregated productivity growth decomposition analysis by industry (continued) 
Industry 
Classification Asian Financial Crisis Global Financial Crisis 





















1998 -0.0021 -0.0040 0.0075 0.0147 
2007-
2008 -0.0022 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0003 
1998-
1999 -0.0007 0.0019 0.0064 0.0072 
2008-
2009 0.0012 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0007 
1999-
2000 0.0033 0.0021 0.0085 0.0042 
2009-






1998 -0.0056 0.0031 -0.0001 -0.0016 
2007-
2008 0.0035 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0006 
1998-
1999 0.0036 0.0003 -0.0007 0.0002 
2008-
2009 0.0093 0.0030 -0.0001 -0.0011 
1999-
2000 0.0069 0.0008 0.0003 0.0002 
2009-






1998 0.0004 0.0008 0.0004 0.0005 
2007-
2008 0.0026 0.0006 -0.0014 0.0001 
1998-
1999 -0.0030 -0.0007 0.0004 0.0005 
2008-
2009 0.0072 -0.0006 0.0003 0.0002 
1999-
2000 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0004 0.0004 
2009-
2010 -0.0083 -0.0007 0.0000 0.0005 
32 Furniture 
1997-
1998 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 
2007-
2008 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
1998-
1999 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0006 0.0000 
2008-
2009 0.0007 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 
1999-
2000 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 
2009-






1998 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 
2007-
2008 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1998-
1999 -0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 
2008-
2009 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 
1999-
2000 0.0006 0.0000 0.0003 0.0002 
2009-







Appendix 5: Descriptive statistics of empirical data in 
Chapter 4 
 
[1] R&D Investment by overcome, exit firms and all firms (Unit: 1,000 KRW deflated according to the 2010 price index) 
Year 
Overcome Firms Exit Firms All Firms 
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. 
1981 2505.6 3429.0 N/A N/A 2505.6 3429.0 
1982 1378.5 2339.6 457.5 - 1307.7 2254.5 
1983 7531.0 26384.9 171.3 242.2 6830.1 25128.7 
1984 7108.1 30182.0 509.2 850.1 6426.4 28621.7 
1985 14457.9 69501.6 352.7 615.2 13262.9 66574.3 
1986 19535.8 102159.0 3395.5 7052.8 17984.1 97480.3 
1987 21729.7 110300.6 3370.8 6410.9 20061.4 105473.6 
1988 20267.5 90338.6 2933.9 5606.2 18119.6 84946.5 
1989 7788.5 45165.2 1086.3 2734.0 6592.6 40879.5 
1990 7642.7 42008.6 959.3 1867.4 6509.1 38192.9 
1991 8575.8 56544.4 1210.7 2590.6 7431.8 51985.2 
1992 11192.7 88554.9 2124.4 4368.2 9668.5 80903.6 
1993 14893.5 131735.4 3061.8 7048.1 13108.9 121633.0 
1994 16461.5 153757.7 4042.2 9749.0 14434.8 141065.6 
1995 17635.4 176562.1 4294.7 10941.5 15202.6 160265.8 
1996 20746.5 208642.0 5164.0 15979.1 17873.6 189410.7 
1997 26289.3 280352.3 4092.5 11829.3 21946.6 252050.0 
1998 21710.9 192150.9 5148.2 17452.3 18656.3 172246.5 
1999 9238.2 75101.5 1083.9 3114.7 7771.6 66799.1 
2000 15257.4 149064.6 3088.9 13692.0 12493.6 130239.2 
2001 10003.6 72785.1 3047.3 8949.9 8172.4 61518.0 
2002 12658.2 95035.6 4524.3 15501.0 9715.5 75974.5 
2003 12697.3 127294.2 3534.3 12698.0 8783.5 96913.3 
2004 9302.1 92684.0 2874.0 9869.1 6221.9 67152.6 
2005 11216.2 101196.3 3475.2 17176.4 7350.2 70989.1 
2006 9964.6 102922.3 3245.2 9836.5 6767.2 70159.1 
2007 8030.2 90170.3 2829.7 7943.9 5818.6 60293.1 
2008 4128.4 19618.6 2271.8 5898.6 3783.0 17317.6 
2009 4142.0 18917.0 1578.7 4604.7 3435.6 15656.5 
2010 4724.4 20861.7 25359.3 380403.9 10055.8 193216.8 
2011 4766.5 25205.0 29512.4 342106.2 9392.7 150717.8 
2012 5455.8 25814.8 50308.7 429424.8 12106.7 148219.0 





[2] Patent activity by overcome, exit firms and all firms (Patent application: 1, Non: 0) 
Year 
Overcome Firms Exit Firms All Firms 
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. 
1981 0.000 0.000 N/A N/A 0.000 0.000 
1982 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 
1983 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1984 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1985 0.923 0.269 1.000 0.000 0.930 0.258 
1986 0.900 0.302 0.800 0.447 0.896 0.307 
1987 0.894 0.310 0.714 0.488 0.883 0.322 
1988 0.875 0.332 0.800 0.422 0.872 0.336 
1989 0.860 0.348 0.680 0.476 0.835 0.372 
1990 0.857 0.351 0.727 0.452 0.838 0.369 
1991 0.858 0.349 0.744 0.442 0.843 0.364 
1992 0.853 0.355 0.729 0.449 0.836 0.370 
1993 0.858 0.350 0.711 0.458 0.839 0.368 
1994 0.879 0.327 0.717 0.455 0.857 0.350 
1995 0.867 0.340 0.750 0.436 0.851 0.357 
1996 0.870 0.337 0.714 0.455 0.849 0.358 
1997 0.850 0.357 0.708 0.457 0.831 0.375 
1998 0.854 0.354 0.725 0.449 0.835 0.372 
1999 0.845 0.362 0.713 0.455 0.824 0.382 
2000 0.845 0.362 0.728 0.447 0.822 0.382 
2001 0.853 0.355 0.777 0.418 0.838 0.369 
2002 0.864 0.343 0.817 0.388 0.849 0.359 
2003 0.880 0.326 0.830 0.376 0.863 0.344 
2004 0.865 0.342 0.831 0.375 0.851 0.357 
2005 0.851 0.357 0.814 0.390 0.837 0.370 
2006 0.864 0.344 0.815 0.389 0.840 0.367 
2007 0.863 0.344 0.820 0.384 0.838 0.369 
2008 0.854 0.353 0.819 0.385 0.827 0.378 
2009 0.864 0.344 0.807 0.395 0.827 0.379 
2010 0.847 0.361 0.805 0.397 0.821 0.383 
2011 0.853 0.355 0.825 0.381 0.825 0.380 
2012 0.848 0.361 0.843 0.366 0.823 0.382 







[3] Total amount of debt by overcome, exit firms and all firms (Unit: 1,000 KRW deflated according to the 2010 price index) 
Year 
Overcome Firms Exit Firms Total Firms 
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. 
1981  605,982   440,872  N/A N/A  605,982   440,872  
1982  650,098   511,839   592,672  -  645,681   490,307  
1983  1,156,792   2,189,023   373,661   324,848   1,082,208   2,091,269  
1984  855,008   1,997,116   245,956   252,289   790,973   1,899,681  
1985  902,122   2,176,743   256,823   256,857   846,953   2,090,276  
1986  930,227   2,171,475   369,433   310,284   876,096   2,077,774  
1987  1,096,846   2,938,097   356,743   307,494   1,030,110   2,815,009  
1988  1,149,344   3,454,279   295,714   323,095   1,045,928   3,253,451  
1989  992,549   3,164,144   323,889   392,719   867,504   2,873,485  
1990  1,025,271   3,482,453   435,199   603,345   919,448   3,176,018  
1991  1,379,510   6,398,492   432,506   622,700   1,229,923   5,888,713  
1992  1,360,207   6,241,299   514,166   785,986   1,225,304   5,714,142  
1993  1,410,118   6,565,012   604,258   816,576   1,286,750   6,071,109  
1994  1,474,810   6,886,209   656,733   890,756   1,339,287   6,328,974  
1995  1,188,850   5,197,970   582,441   889,912   1,076,998   4,733,473  
1996  1,367,511   6,062,295   685,577   1,189,730   1,238,235   5,524,409  
1997  1,427,436   6,984,966   667,803   1,402,422   1,272,636   6,308,552  
1998  1,547,092   6,364,948   943,917   2,426,741   1,400,504   5,782,385  
1999  1,433,894   5,284,956   878,030   2,703,092   1,288,104   4,816,214  
2000  1,502,907   5,683,852   797,520   2,475,388   1,304,050   5,075,896  
2001  1,199,529   4,224,242   802,904   2,955,935   1,044,595   3,811,566  
2002  922,038   3,369,950   611,537   2,393,681   780,705   2,963,012  
2003  712,736   2,671,505   540,754   2,771,032   610,322   2,554,443  
2004  508,318   2,524,121   412,349   2,696,250   439,704   2,423,621  
2005  395,020   1,700,468   370,405   2,556,262   367,345   1,976,381  
2006  422,916   1,927,466   357,305   2,623,979   376,902   2,093,342  
2007  362,922   1,675,147   280,329   862,246   314,161   1,222,405  
2008  283,649   683,965   268,418   649,492   289,807   684,844  
2009  310,610   844,611   274,870   591,965   299,441   676,231  
2010  361,950   1,006,752   816,800   8,091,263   464,502   4,149,889  
2011  332,263   889,809   1,145,829   9,987,896   627,534   6,120,651  
2012  370,135   908,853   1,874,866   13,900,000   746,696   6,698,353  











자본주의 체제에서 경제 성장과 기술 진보 과정을 창조적 파괴 과정으로 설명
한 슘페터의 연구는 기업의 진입, 성장, 쇠퇴와 퇴출로 발생하는 산업 동학
(industry dynamics)에 관한 많은 연구에 영향을 주었다. 슘페터주의 뿐만 아니
라 진화경제학, 생태조직론 등의 관점에서도 산업 동학을 발생시키는 원인을 
파악하고자 하는 시도가 이어졌다. 각각의 관점은 약간의 차이는 있으나 모두 
시장에서의 경쟁이 산업 동학을 발생시키는 주요한 원인으로 인식하였다. 특
히 슘페터적 관점에서는 기업 경쟁력의 원천을 기술 혁신으로 인식하는 슘페
터적 경쟁(Schumpeterian competition)을 강조하였다. 본 연구는 이러한 시각에서 
한국 산업의 창조적 파괴 메커니즘에 대한 실증 분석을 시도하였다. 특히 퇴
출 기업에 대한 실증 분석을 통해 한국 산업계에 존재하는 선별 기준(selection 
criteria)을 확인하고자 하였다.  
첫째로 기업의 생존에 대한 이론적 배경과 실증 분석을 고찰함으로써 기업 생
존에 관한 정형화된 사실을 도출하였다. 선행연구의 생존 결정 요인을 개인 
수준, 기업 수준, 산업 수준, 거시경제 수준으로 구분하여 고찰하였다. 개인 수
준에서는 조직 구성원의 교육 수준, 경험 정도 등이 높을 수록 기업의 생존에 
유리하다는 정형화된 사실을 도출할 수 있었다. 기업 수준에서는 기업의 규모, 





주는 연구가 주를 이루었다. 산업 수준에서는 산업의 경쟁 정도를 결정하는 
기업 진입률, 산업 성장률와 산업의 기술 집약도 등이 기업 생존에 영향을 주
는 것으로 확인되었고, 거시 경제 수준에서는 경기가 하강할 때 기업의 생존
률이 낮다는 정형화된 사실을 도출할 수 있었다.  
둘째로 한국 산업계의 선별기준을 묘사하기 위해 생존 분석 방법론을 활용하
여 외감기업과 상장기업에 대한 생존 분석을 실시하였다. 분석 결과 한국의 
산업계에서도 기업의 규모, 업력, 연구개발 투자와 같은 기업 생존에 관한 정
형화된 사실들을 확인할 수 있었다. 특히 아시아 금융위기를 극복하는 과정에
서 금융부문과 기업부문의 구조조정의 결과로 기업 선별기준에 발생한 변화를 
확인하였다. 분석 결과 아시아 금융위기 전후로 기업의 자금 운용 행태에 변
화가 발생하였으며, 전반적으로 기업의 투자 활동에 대해 시장의 생존에 관한 
유인(incentive)이 감소한 것을 확인하였다.  
셋째로 경기 하강기에 발생하는 청소효과 가설에 대해 분석하였다. 아시아 금
융위기, 글로벌 금융위기 기간의 생산성 변화 분해 분석을 통해 기업 퇴출에 
의한 생산성 증대를 비교하였다. 사업체 수준의 미시 자료를 바탕으로 분석을 
실시하였으며, 생존 분석을 실시하여 두 위기기간의 퇴출 결정 요인에에 대해 
분석하였다. 분석 결과 아시아 금융위기는 청소효과가 발생하지 않았고, 글로
벌 금융위기는 청소효과가 발생한 것을 확인할 수 있었다. 또한 아시아 금융
위기 기간에는 사업체의 생산성 수준과 무관한 퇴출이 발생하였으나, 글로벌 





인하였다. 이러한 차이를 두 위기 기간의 금융 부문 안정성 차이에서 기인한 
것으로 해석하였다.  
넷째로 좀비 기업에 관한 문제를 기존의 연구와 다른 시각에서 접근하였다. 
기존 연구는 좀비 기업을 창조적 파괴 과정을 저해하는 요인으로 인식하였고, 
신속한 구조조정을 통해 퇴출되어야 할 대상으로 인식하였다. 그러나 본 연구
는 국가의 금융 시스템에 따라 좀비 기업 문제가 다르게 나타날 수 있다는 점
에 착안하여 한국과 같은 신용 기반 금융 시스템에서 좀비 상태의 기업들 중 
극복하는 기업과 퇴출하는 기업의 특성을 분석하였다. 외감기업과 상장기업을 
바탕으로 분석한 결과 축적된 지식의 양이 많은 기업들이 정상기업으로 회복
할 확률이 높은 것을 확인하였다. 또한 좀비 상태의 기업에 대한 금융 부문이 
정상상태로 극복하는 기업과 퇴출하는 기업을 명확하게 선별하여 지원하지 못
하고 있는 것을 확인하였다.  
 
주요어 : 창조적 파괴, 기업 생존, 청소 효과, 좀비 기업  
학  번 : 2013-30311  
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